Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Post-Vote, Declined Mandates Reshaped Kyrgyzstan’s Legislature

Reposted from Eurasianet.org
by Ryan Weber

Did Kyrgyzstan’s voters get the leaders they chose?

On December 17, the Respublika party announced the successful formation of a new governing coalition to lead Kyrgyzstan’s parliament. This second attempt at forming a majority succeeded where the first failed because Respublika, which led the effort, is unattached to the North/South regional divide or pro-/anti-government legacy of the other four winning parties.

But Respublika is unlike Kyrgyzstan’s other political parties in another way as well -- by the time the party came to power, most of its minorities and women had declined their seats in parliament, leaving a 100 percent ethnic Kyrgyz and mostly male party.

According to the Kyrgyz electoral code, voters cast ballots for a party’s list of candidates. Based on votes, each party is awarded a certain number of seats that go to the top candidates on their respective party lists. If a candidate declines his “mandate,” then the seat passes to the next highest candidate on his party’s list.

One candidate from Ata-Meken, Joomart Oturbayev, declined his mandate despite being #3 on the party’s list. There are rumors that Ata-Jurt co-chairman Kamchybek Tashiev wanted Dinara Isaeva, wife of former Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov (who is in hiding) and #12 on the Ata-Jurt party list, to decline hers, but she refused. Ata-Jurt, Ar-Namys, and the Social Democrats (SDPK) have not had a single candidate refuse a mandate.

Respublika, on the other hand, has had an incredible 18 mandates -- of its 23 total -- refused by candidates in the party’s top positions.

The combined effect of these voluntary exclusions has been to make Respublika’s parliamentary delegation much less diverse than its original party list -- the list voters elected. Alevtina Zavgorodnyaya (#8) and Yuri Nizovskii (#27), both ethnic Russians, were the only non-Kyrgyz candidates within Respublika’s top 50 positions. After they both declined their mandates, Respublika became the only party in parliament not to have a single non-Kyrgyz delegate. Four women candidates declined to enter parliament for Respublika, though five remained.

The resulting Respublika faction in parliament is exclusively Kyrgyz and 78 percent male -- i.e. not very representative of Kyrgyzstan as a whole.

Tuesday, December 28, 2010

No Thank You: Many Respublika Candidates Refused Mandates

by Ryan Weber

Though not yet much reported, something odd took place in the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections. It occurred after all the votes were tabulated, but before the new MPs were sworn in.

It wasn't fraud per se, nor was it at all illegal. Instead, it was the unusual expansion of a common, but usually isolated, practice of elected party candidates declining to accept a seat in parliament (their "mandate") on behalf of their party.

But this time, candidates from the Respublika party exercised their right to decline the mandates at an incredible rate.

Further analysis will be posted soon, but for now, here is the data which was compiled from Resublika's published election-day party listand the final list of sworn MPs issued by the Central Election Committee (CEC).

Party List #, Name, Ethnicity, Mandate Decision
  1. Babanov, Omurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#1
  2. Alimbekov, Nurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#2
  3. Pirmatov, Ishaq - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#3
  4. Sultanbekova, Cholpon - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#4
  5. Isaev, Kanatbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#5
  6. Torobaev, Bakyt - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#6
  7. Sulaimanov, Altynbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#7
  8. Zavgorodnyaya, Alevtina - Russian - DECLINED
  9. Moldobaev, Askhat - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  10. Baatyrbekov, Almazbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#8
  11. Esenamanov, Zamirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  12. Aknazarova, Rosa - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#9
  13. Boko, Kenjebek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#10
  14. Aripov, Nazarali - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#11
  15. Turuskulov, Jyrgalbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  16. Djumaliev, Elmira - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#12
  17. Obdunov, Elmurat - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#13
  18. Kadyrkulov, Iskender - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  19. Osmonov, Malik - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#14
  20. Amanbaeva, Urulkan - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#15
  21. Arym, Kubat - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  22. Aitmatov, Kushtarbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#16
  23. Shaynazarov, Tynchtyk - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#17
  24. Omurbekova, Altynai - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#18
  25. Andash, Turatbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  26. Ismailov, Ulanbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  27. Nizovskii, Yuri - Russian - DECLINED
  28. Shayymkulova, Ainura - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  29. Jolbolduev, Pamirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  30. Bakirov, Mirlan - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#19
  31. Oskonbaev, Beyshenbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  32. Alimzhanova, Damir - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  33. Asylbek, uulu Damirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  34. Duyshenbiev, Nursultan - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  35. Murashev, Nurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#20
  36. Dzhumabekova, Akylsayra - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  37. Bekmatov, Abdyjapar - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#21
  38. Zakirov, Asylbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  39. Sabirov, Maksat - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#22
  40. Sagynbaeva, Gulifa - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  41. Rezhavaliev, Abdulatipov - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#23

What Mystery? US Probe reveals Bribery, Corruption, Incompetence... and No Ethics Violations?

by Ryan Weber

A new report from the US Congress highlights Pentagon malpractice in its fuel supply contracting in Kyrgyzstan. As the details of the report filter out, clear repurcussions are ahead for the companies involved, the US Afghan war effort, and the future of US-Kyrgyz relations. What remains obscure is how US government contracting could be conducted to such poor standards for so long, and how the new report justifies its assertion that corruption - in the form of bribes and other kick-backs to former Kyrgyz regimes - was not part of the problem.

Background

On December 21, the US House of Representatives Oversight Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs issued its final report on an 8-month investigation into US fuel supply contacts for the Manas Transit Center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Situated on the grounds of the country's main international airport, within line-of-sight of commercial travelers, Manas ferries troops and supplies to Afghanistan as part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) .

When it was originally leased in December 2001, the US offered an aid package to the Kyrgyz government of Aksar Akayev totaling just over $2 million, a large portion of which went directly to Akayev's son, Aydar. Since then, two governments have fallen - Akayev's, and his 'revolutionary' successor Kurmanbek Bakiev - but Manas remains, first with an increase to $17 million annual rent in 2005, and now with a $63 million annual rent established in summer 2009. (See expert Alex Cooley's "Manas Matters" article for the above figures)

Thursday, December 23, 2010

Skin & Bones: The Structure of the new Kyrgyz Parliament


by Ryan Weber

"It's fun to write about an ACTUAL Kyrgyz government instead of a hypothetical one."
-Jax Jacobsen, reporter for Central Asia Newswire, in a tweet on December 20th, 2010

With the December 17 announcement of a successful majority coalition agreement, the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh parliament can finally get to the business of governing the Republic after more than 2 months of political stalemate. Following the results of the October 10 elections, 5 parties entered the 120-seat parliament, all far short of the 60 seats necessary to appoint a Prime Minister and other top positions. Ata-Jurt, the largest party, controlled just 28 seats, while Ata-Meken was the smallest with 18.

The successful coalition - even more impressive following the instantaneous collapse of the first such effort led by the Social Democrats (SDPK) - was undertaken by the Respublika party, and included 'pro-grovernment' SDPK as well as the nationalist-tinged Ata-Jurt.

Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys went into the opposition, but are unlikely to caucasus given their radically different positions on domestic and foreign policy. The same could be said of the relationship between SDPK and Ata-Jurt, though the coalition agreement suggests they may have found ways to compromise.

In rapid succession, the new coalition was able to fulfill its mandate by electing the new government's top leadership. Almazbek Atambaev of SDPK becomes Prime Minister (92 votes), Omurbek Babanov of Respublika becomes Deputy Prime Minister (88 votes), and Akhmat Khelidbekov of Ata-Jurt becomes Speaker of Parliament (101 votes).

All three positions are newly-empowered by the 2010 Kyrgyz Constitution, which elevates Parliamentary executives over the Kyrgyz President for the first time in the country's 20 years of independence.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Putting on a Show: Friends, Enemies & 'Frenemies' in Kyrgyz Politics

December 20, 2010, Bishkek – 24.kg News Agency
written by Asel Otorbayeva
style edit by Ryan Weber


Once again, Kyrgyz politicians place the importance of assigning government positions over actual governing.


Old Political Enemies

In its second attempt, the Kyrgyz parliament finally succeeded in electing a speaker. Their choice was the leader of the party [Ata-Jurt] which previously called for the return of ousted President Bakiev [actually, a rumor], and is comprised of many former allies to the fallen President.

Opponents [of Ata-Jurt] were highly critical of its intentions in the run-up to Parliamentary elections in October, charging it with a variety of "sins." Some even suggested members of Ata-Jurt helped instigate the June riots in Osh the ignited ethnic tension [and in several ways increased Ata-Jurts Nationalist rhetoric going into the election]. But the accusations against Ata-Jurt were never proven, and the other parties dropped attempts to link Ata-Jurt with the violence. Being veteran politicians, rather than defend themselves, Ata-Jurt enlisted [Kyrgyz] victims of the June events to protect their reputation.

Relatives of those killed during the April coup that removed Bakiev responded passionately to the former Bakiev administrators, [throwing eggs and] attempting to block their admittance to the new parliament. They demanded that such politicians never participate in government again, but the other ["pro-government"] parties did nothing to block their participation [such as passing a controversial Lustration law]. After a while, the general public acquiesced. [Respublika] party - as if it had forgotten the public distaste for Ata-Jurt - instructed the Social Democrat party (SDPK) to "make friends" with Ata-Jurt. They explained that economic concerns must trump personal animosity.

Now Almazbek Atambayev, SDPK leader and [recently-elected] Prime Minister must find a way to work with Akhmatbek Kelidbekov - the new Speaker of Parliament from Ata-Jurt. Whether they want to or not, their cooperation is vital for any progress [in Kyrgyzstan].

Friday, December 17, 2010

Take Two: Kyrgyzstan Finally Has New Government

Newly-elected Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev (at center) joined by Omurbek Babanov (sans tie) and other members of the successful majority coalition that finally gave Kyrgyzstan a functional government on December 17. (photo credit S. Dosalieva, AKI Press)

Three of Kyrgyzstan’s quarreling parties have finally succeeded – after two months and one failed attempt – to form a government. The partnership may seem an unlikely one, but it unifies the country’s fractious north and southand all hopes are on this group to shepherd the country safely into a new year without political instability and violence.
Parliament convened on December 17 to approve the coalition proposed by Respublika leader Omurbek Babanov. Provisional President Roza Otunbayeva chose Babanov to lead the process on December 4, after the first attempt by her Social Democratic Party’s (SDPK) Almazbek Atambayev, fell through.

This coalition looks much like the first, botched one, with a stark exception. In place of the pro-Otunbayeva Ata-Meken party, it includes the nationalist Ata-Jurt party, whose Myktybek Abdyldayev will take the speaker position; Atambayev has assumed the premiership. Together with Respublika, the coalition holds 77 of the legislature’s 120 seats, a comfortable majority.

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Shadow of the Shah: How US policy in Central Asia raises the specter of 1979, and why US diplomats may be making the same mistakes

by Ryan Weber

Two recent articles by non-regional experts have shed an interesting light on US policy in Central Asia. In reading history, as well as a few Wikileaks, they examine what precedents US diplomats may be following as they brazenly cooperate with corrupt regimes. Rather than revealing any new information, what they show is how closely the US continues to follow old patterns - even those with disastrous outcomes. When short-term objectives conflict with long-term ideals like 'freedom' and 'democracy', it is the latter that lose ground. This is not only a problem for ideological purity - a luxury no 'superpower' can afford - but puts more practical long-term needs like regional stability and influence in jeopardy.

For this reason, US willingness to prioritize transit access and basing agreements over progress in human rights and political freedom among Central Asian states serves as a dangerous choice for US policymakers - and they should know better.

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Who Will Become Author of Kyrgyz Political Default?

Reposted from News Agency 24.kg
Bishkek - December 14, 2010
(0913 hrs)
written by Asel Otorbayeva
style edit by Ryan Weber


In the throes of giving birth to a parliamentary majority coalition, Kyrgyzstan may suffer a second miscarriage. The reason is obvious - excessive greed [by party leaders] for key positions in the future parliament.


Which Prime Minister is Best?

The main battle area among the five parties appears to be for the top spot [in the restructured Kyrgyz] government. Leaders of Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) and Ar-Namys party both want to become Prime Minister. For better or worse, neither are strangers to the political arena - each possessing ample experience as well as political baggage. And neither leader, Almazbek Atambayev of SDPK or Felix Kulov of Ar-Namys, show any sign of willingly stepping aside.

The Respublika party was chosen for the second mandate to form a majority coalition, and its leader, Omurbek Babanov, now faces one of the most difficult challenges of his career. Much younger than the other party leaders, and with less time in politics, he is finding it difficult to compete. His most persuasive arguments are unable to overcome the [entrenched] SDPK or the "iron shield" of Ar-Namys. It is no secret that ambitions for the Prime Minister position are entwined with hopes for the 2011 Presidential election. SDPK and Ar-Namys both aspire to the presidency, and controlling the Prime Minister may be a necessary 'trump card' for that effort.


Speaker’s Throne as Alternative

[Realizing that the new Kyrgyz Constitution dramatically increases the power of parliament, the position of Speaker of Parliament has become much more valuable. Now, not only the leader of the Ata-Meken party, [Omurbek Tekebaev] aspires to the post [he once held], but also members of Respublika, Ar-Namys, and Ata-Zhurt's co-chairman, Akhmatbek Kelidbekov.

According to the Constitution, which Tekebaev authored, tremendous authority resides in the hands of the Speaker. Deputies of the fifth convocation - the current parliament - seem unaware of the trap inherent in Tekebaev's government structure. He "planted a bomb with a clock mechanism continuously ticking like a reminder: the Prime Minister and the Speaker shall, as Siamese twins, breathe, sleep and most importantly - work in unison. Otherwise - [say] goodbye to the coalition, and hello [to the] dissolution of parliament!"

Assuming Felix Kulov steps aside, and his sworn [enemy] Atambaev becomes Prime Minister. How well can Atambaev work with [Speaker] Kelidbekov? Will this arrangement have a [viable] future? Of course not. And what about another combination - Speaker Kulov and Prime Minister Atambaev?

Whatever the experts say about the necessity or political wisdom of regional balance [i.e. the inclusion of Ata-Jurt as a "Southern" party along with the other, predominantly "Northern" factions] to the long-term stability of state, most of the existing coalitions are [destined to be] short-lived.

Monday, December 13, 2010

Waiting for Parliament and a Kyrgyz Santa Claus

by Ryan Weber

For those of us anxiously waiting to see what sort of governing coalition will emerge from the Kyrgyz parliamentary negotiations, it's beginning to feel more and more like we may be waiting for a 'Godot' - the fictional character in Samuel Beckett's drama who, (in)famously, never arrives. Or perhaps, with the December 24 deadline for the formation of the next parliamentary coalition, it's up to the equally-fictional Santa Claus to finally bring resolution to the Kyrgyz political situation.

After requiring the full 15 working day period allowed by the constitution, the SDPK-Respublika-AtaMeken coalition failed to elect Omurbek Tekebaev as Speaker of Parliament on December 2. Since the coalition agreement was based on the awarding of the Speaker position to Tekebaev, as well as the Prime Ministership to SDPK leader Almazbek Atambaev, and Deputy PM to Respublika's Omurbek Babanov, the coalition couldn't enforce its contract, and thus dissolved. With 67 nominal coalition members in the 120-seat legislature, the surprising defeat with just 58 votes for Tekebaev demonstrated the practical, as well as theoretical, shortcomings of the agreement. Just days after signing a pact of solidarity, coalition members voted against their own coalition.

On December 3, an embarrassed Atambaev asked Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to select another party to form the coalition. Originally, Otunbayeva said Ata-Meken, as the other "pro-government" party, would be tasked with the duty if SDPK failed. Instead, whether because Tekebaev declined the opportunity, or Otunbayeva reacted to his apparent unpopularity, Omurbek Babanov and Respublika were given the charge along with a new deadline - December 24.

With the race to form a coalition once again wide open - with rumors that perhaps 4, or even all 5 political parties will join together - the possible make up of the ruling Kyrgyz government remains an item of intense, if largely uninformed, speculation.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

The "Free" Press: Trends in US Government Funding of Media Development Abroad

by Ryan Weber

A new study released December 7 by The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) examines trends in US government funding of foreign media development projects from 2007 to 2010. Africa received continued increases over the period, but the highest expenditures were 'South and Central Asia,' mostly concentrated in Afghanistan. Europe, the Caucasus, East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America all experienced gradual reductions in funding after a world-wide spike in media development in 2008.

The report, "U.S. Government Funding for Media Development: A Special Report to the Center for International Media Assistance" (full text) was written by Laura Motta, and commissioned by the National Endowment for Democracy. It considers projects tagged as either "Media Development" or "Freedom of Information" programs, with some examples including local journalist training, improved internet access, and news/communications programs for disabled, or hard to reach populations.

Specifically, the CIMA report looks at funding by two US government agencies - the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). From State, these projects are usually carried out by the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor program (DRL), the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) or the Bureau or Europe and Euarsian Affairs. The USAID departments include Democracy & Governance (DG) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which work in post- and on-going conflict areas.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Panel Suggests Media, Representation, Corruption all Obstacles to Peace & Democracy in Kyrgyzstan

by Ryan Weber

On the evening of December 6, the Elliott School at George Washington University in Washington, DC hosted a panel discussion titled, "Post-election Developments in Kyrgyzstan: The Tension Between Democracy Promotion and Conflict Mitigation."

The event was moderated by Dr. Sean Roberts, director of the International Development Studies Program at George Washington University, and author of the Roberts Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Panelists included Alisha Khamidov, lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University; Jeff Goldstein, senior policy analyst of Eurasia at the Open Society Institute; and Sam Patten, senior program manager of Eurasia at Freedom House.

The event drew a respectable crowd of students and DC-based Eurasia analysts, and focused on the relationship between democracy promotion and (ethnic) conflict resolution in post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan. Especially at issue was the tension between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in the country's Southern regions and how certain political factions used nationalist rhetoric to exploit and encourage this tension for their own gain leading up to the October 10 parliamentary election.

Each offered their perspective on the nature of the widespread June violence that shook Osh and lead to the death of hundreds and the flight of tens of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks to the nearby border with Uzbekistan. Each speaker had been to Kyrgyzstan within the past 6 months, during the Osh violence, October elections, or both.

Monday, December 6, 2010

If at First you Don't Succeed: Kyrgyz Parliament Takes Another Shot at Forming Majority Coalition

by Ryan Weber

The march of Kyrgyzstan's fledgling parliamentary democracy took another hit on December 4 as the recently-announced "Coalition for the Sake of Stability" turned out to be a "Stillborn Coalition" as it failed to achieve its first test of forming a parliamentary government.

Despite its 3 parties controlling 67 delegates - a majority of the 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh parliament - it was only able to muster 58 votes in support of its candidate for Speaker of Parliament. That candidate, the leader of the Ata-Meken party and a former Speaker of Parliament, Omurbek Tekebaev (pictured below right), failed to receive the necessary 61 votes because 9 coalition MPs (identities unknown) didn't vote for him.

Tekebaev has been out of government positions since 2006, but remains a major player in Kyrgyz politics as a former opposition activist, interim deputy chaiman, and architect of the new Kyrgyz Constitution adopted in July. With the possible exception of President Roza Otunbayeva, he is the individual most responsible for adoption of the strong parliamentary system under which Kyrgyzstan is struggling to operate.

Friday, December 3, 2010

Kyrgyzstan’s Stillborn Coalition

Originally published on Eurasianet.org
December 3, 2010 - 1:18am, by David Trilling

Inhale deeply, again. Three days after we breathed a collective sigh of relief that Kyrgyzstan’s squabbling politicians had somehow, after six weeks of backroom dealing, agreed to form a governing coalition, that “coalition” did not gather enough votes – from its own members – to assume power.

During a late, secret vote on December 2, the designated speaker, Omurbek Tekebayev, only received 58 votes, AKIpress reports. Sixty-one of the parliament’s 120 are required. The coalition-that-shall-not-be – comprising Tekebayev’s own Ata-Meken, the Social Democratic Party, and Respublika – holds 67 seats, highlighting dissension in the ranks.

The parliament has gone into crisis mode and Social Democrat leader Almazbek Atambayev, the would-be prime minister, says he intends to ask provisional President Roza Otunbayeva to pass the mandate for forming a coalition onto another party.

Ironically, the president has already said the next faction to try would be Tekebayev’s. Unless she changes her mind (or Tekebayev agrees to a post lower than speaker – unlikely), the next round of coalition building will be hard going.

As we reported last month, Tekebayev, who has held the post of speaker previously, is a dangerous partner:
Many say Tekebayev – who is deeply distrusted in Moscow and described disparagingly as “pro-Western” – is too much of a liability for either coalition since good relations with Russia are vital to Kyrgyzstan’s economic health. Tekebayev, author of the new constitution approved in June, has been described as a tragic political figure: He has kept a low profile since the October 10 elections, when, after the Russian media attacked him during the campaign, his party – a frontrunner in the polls – barely squeaked into parliament.
If Tekebayev fails, as many expect, according to the constitution the president will appoint a coalition herself. If that fails: more elections and more political uncertainty for Kyrgyzstan.

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

Cutting the Deck: Expert Opinions Divided on Prospects for New Coalition in Kyrgyz Parliament

by Ryan Weber

On November 29, three parties in the Kyrgyz parliament announced that they had successfully carried out President Roza Otunbayeva's directive to form a coalition of more than 60 seats. the Social Democrats (SDPK), Respublika, and Ata-Meken (Fatherland) will lead the legislature and nominate officers for the country's first ruling multi-party parliament, the 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh.

Since the announcement, various experts and analysts (including this one) have weighed in on the prospects for the coalition amidst an abysmal economy and the onset of Kyrgystan's harsh winter and regular power shortages. With Hilary Clinton's first visit to Bishkek scheduled for tomorrow (Dec 2), it's worth considering two well-respected, and entirely contrary, opinions from Bishkek-based experts.

Mars Sariev, a veteran political analyst based in Bishkek, told New Agency 24.kg that the SDPK-Respublika-AtaMeken coalition was the "best option for further development of Kyrgyzstan."
"The country is on the verge of economic and political collapse, and the ruling coalition will need team spirit. They won’t be able to cooperate without it. If we consider that each of the leaders will get their previous positions – Omurbek Tekebayev will become a Speaker, Almazbek Atambayev - Prime Minister and Omurbek Babanov - Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, recent incidents – arrest of an extremist group in the city of Osh and the explosion in the capital - had a sobering effect on the party leaders. All the incidents that broke out in the country after the April events and last outbreaks – the awareness that the state could collapse overnight and they will lose everything - joined the former oppositionists. The coalition, which could not be formed for a long time, had been established overnight. This means the coalition has a potential and contradictions between them have been minimized."

On the other hand, Elmira Nogoybaeva, head of the Bishkek-based think tank Polis Asia, told 24.kg that the resulting coalition is worrisome because it "doesn't represent interests of the people of Kyrgyzstan to the full extent."
“It turns out that interests of the south won’t be taken into account in the parliament [because the three parties in the coalition are all seen as Northerners]. I think it were more challenging to create the coalition with participation of two northern and one southern party – Ata-Zhurt. Yes, many understand these parties are ideologic and political rivals but the level of the compromise would be higher… Such coalition would be more stable. Unfortunately, the artificial regionalism intensified after [the] April events. This is dangerous. I think politicians must follow regional balance when they will distribute the portfolios."

The caveat virtually every Kyrgyz expert has used is that whatever the new coalition does, or does not, accomplish, it is operating in a situation in which "the deck is stacked against it," and "the stakes are high" for its potential democratic future.

Gambling metaphors aside, the prospects for the "experiment in parliamentary democracy" are uncertain, as is the degree to which the success or failure of the new coalition will determine the greater course of the country's governance. While it is interesting, and occasionally informative, for experts to speculate on such trajectories, the best analysis always comes in hindsight.

Fortune telling is best left to the demonstrably clairvoyant.

And tarot cards.

Kyrgyz Parliament Sets Majority Coalition

The Kyrgyz Parliament in their first (and so far, only) session on November 10. With the formation of a majority coalition on November 30, parliament is expected to begin regular meetings soon. (photo credit AFP)

by Ryan Weber

As reported earlier (Nov. 24 and Nov. 29), the Kyrgyz Parliament has been deadlocked since its opening session on November 10 because no single party, or even group of two parties, controls enough seats to form a majority of the 120-member Jogorku Kenesh Parliament and name a Prime Minister, as required by the Constitution.

On November 30, just 2 days before the deadline set by President Roza Otunbayeva, that deadlock has finally been broken. After weeks of intense negotiations, including meetings with the rival Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys parties, the SDPK party revealed an agreement with longtime fellow "pro-government" socialist party Ata-Meken and the new business-oriented party, Respublika.

This was the exact coalition that analysts expected to emerge following the October 10 elections, but breakdowns in the negotiations, accusations of international bias, and stubborn party leaders caused the "obvious" coalition to stall time and time again. Just November 29, Farid Niyazov, spokesman for the SDPK party, said that the two most likely coalition outcomes would include the Ata-Jurt party, which controls 28 seats in parliament, the most of any party.

But on November 30, an agreement was signed - without Ata-Jurt.


Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Minority Representation Paltry in Kyrgyzstan’s New Parliament

Originally published by EurasiaNet.org
November 29, 2010 - 11:54pm, by Ryan Weber

Kyrgyzstan's October parliamentary elections have been widely acknowledged as fair and credible by local and international observers. But one issue, minority inclusion, suffered a setback which may prove especially difficult to address in the wake of June’s ethnically fueled violence. Just a handful of deputies in the Jogorku Kenesh parliament come from non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups, in large contrast to Kyrgyzstan’s 30 percent minority population.

Uzbeks are the largest minority group in Kyrgyzstan, making up 14.5 percent of the population according to 2009 estimates. But the new parliament will include only three Uzbeks among its 120 members – a mere 2.5 percent of the governing body. Local sources reacting immediately after the election predicted as many as eight Russians would take up seats, though at least two (Yuri Nizovski and Alevtina Zavgorodnyaya of Respublika) have since declined their mandates. This still leaves Russians, who account for 8.3 percent of the population, in control of twice as many seats as Uzbeks.

These developments occurred despite institutional rules designed to promote minority involvement in parliament. Article 72 of the Kyrgyz Electoral Code requires 15 percent of each party’s candidates be non-Kyrgyz. However, the code provides no guidance on dividing those spots among different ethnic groups, nor regulating where they are placed numerically on the party lists. In its preliminary report, the OSCE’s ODIHR mission cautioned that only 3.6 percent of all candidates were Uzbek, and that they and other minority candidates were often relegated to the bottom of party lists. In this capacity, they fulfilled the official quota, but were unlikely to become parliamentary delegates as no party could legally win more than 65 seats.

As parliamentary mandates were awarded, it became clear that this is exactly what happened. The most egregious example is the Respublika party, in which 11 of its 24 minority candidates were listed in spots 100 - 120.

However, 2010 did provide at least one breakthrough in minority representation. Ravshanbek Sabirov, of the Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party, became the first ethnic Tajik to serve in the Kyrgyz parliament. The successful Uzbek delegates are Anvar Artykov of Ar-Namys (Dignity), and Sabir Atadjanov and Bakhtiar Kadyrov of the Social Democrats (SDPK). There is also one deputy from the minority Korean ethnic group, Roman Shin, who has been a Member of Parliament since 2005, and now sits as a member of Ata-Jurt (Fatherland).

Monday, November 29, 2010

Kyrgyz Horse-Trading: Negotiations Continue in Parliament Coalition Building

Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva and SDPK leader and presumptive Prime Minister, Almazbek Atambayev. Otunbayeva appointed Atambayev to form a majority coalition in parliament, but SDPK has struggled to deliver as the deadline nears. (photo credit RFE/RL)

by Ryan Weber

Negotiations to form a majority coalition in the Kyrgyz Parliament continue despite the passing of the November 27 deadline issued by President Roza Otunbayeva on November 11. At that time, she gave the Social Democrat party (SDPK) 15 days to assemble a functional coalition among the 5 parties represented in parliament. She also issued the stipulation that if they could not reach such an agreement, coalition-building power would transfer to the minority Ata-Meken party.

Depending on how one counts, that put the deadline at either November 27 (if 15 calendar days), or December 2 (if 15 working days). As the horse-trading heated up last week, SDPK party spokesman Farid Niyazov announced repeatedly that SDPK would be unveiling its coalition by November 30... then December 1... then December 3.

The Respublika party is a known coalition partner of SDPK, but together the two parties only control 49 seats in parliament, 11 short of the majority. The talks, which initially focused on the Ata-Meken party, have since expanded to include meetings with Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, leaving the possibility of a previously inconceivable cohort.

Rumors abounded late last week about the possibility of Ar-Namys leader Felix Kulov as the Attorney General, or Ata-Jurt's Kamchybek Tashiev as a deputy Prime Minister. Ar-Namys, the least likely candidate for partnership, reportedly snubbed these overtures, demanding the Prime Ministership as a condition for its participation in the majority.

Apparently, SDPK leader Almazbek Atambayev continued his furious pace of multi-party negotiations over the weekend, and has emerged on Monday (Nov 29) with what appeared initially as the most likely conglomeration - SDPK, Respublika, Ata-Meken.

The news comes less than a day after Niyazov told News Agency 24.kg that "the most possible variants of the parliament coalition in Kyrgyzstan are SDPK-Respublika-Ata-Jurt or SDPK - Ata-Meken, Ata-Jurt."

Instead, later that same day a draft agreement surfaced in which SDPK would award the PM to its own leader, Atambaev, while Ata-Meken leader Omurbek Tekebaev would become Deputy PM, and Respublika's Omurbek Babanov would be the Speaker of Parliament.

Until parliament meets again, the exact nature of the coalition is likely to remain uncertain. Ata-Jurt's willingness to consider working alongside its perceived nemeses SDPK and Ata-Meken is encouraging, as has been Respublika's role as a moderating, economic-focused influence between the progressive "pro-government" and "old guard" factions.

The War on Misidentified Terror: Islamic Militants, Nationalist-Separatists, and other glib Scapegoats

by Ryan Weber

On November 29, violence erupted once again in downtown Osh, the second city of Kyrgyzstan and home of the country's largest Uzbek minority population. Despite quick-spreading fears of a repeat of the ethnically-targeted attacks of the June riots that killed several hundred ethnic Uzbeks and caused tens of thousands to flee for the border with Uzbekistan, today's events are of an entirely different cause and nature.

UPDATE: the day after this was posted, November 30, at 8:55am local time a bomb was detonated in downtown Bishkek near the Palace of Sports, where the ceremonial trial of ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiev was scheduled to continue. The explosion, which killed 2 police officers and a nurse, effected minimal damage to the surrounding area according to an eyewitness account. The source of the explosion was described by state officials as an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a sewer manhole and detonated by mobile phone. While the events have changed since this post was written, most of the government and media reactions were the same as described herein.


Keneshbek Dushevaev, chief of the State National Security Service (GSNB), clarified in a statement to 24.kg News Agency, "There are not any mass riots and ethnic clashes in Osh city." Instead, the explosion and gun battle that sparked such fears were the unfortunate end of a raid by State Security special forces attempting to capture members of a "nationalist-separatist" organization planning to attack public markets in Bishkek and Osh with guns and explosive devices. The explosion in Osh was instigated by one of the suspects apparently in an attempt to avoid capture, and resulted in his death.

The Osh raid came 6 days after GSNB forces captured 9 other "nationalist-separatists" in separate operations in Bishkek and Osh. The names of the suspects have not been released, but the identity of their organization has been the subject of much debate. Or more accurately, the subject of much speculation.

New Kyrgyzstan Violence Ahead of Clinton Visit

Days ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first visit to Kyrgyzstan, authorities say they have thwarted a terrorist-nationalist-separatist plot.

At a November 29 press conference, Interior Minister Zarylbek Rysaliyev said nine people had been arrested late last week for attempting to destabilize the government with over 10 kilos of TNT. The group of ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and one Russian were reportedly arrested in Bishkek and Osh.

Authorities may not have nabbed them all, however. Within hours of Rysaliyev’s press conference, special forces got into a shootout with members of a criminal gang and/or terrorist group in Osh, with authorities killing at least four and detaining three. One apparently blew himself up. Some reports linked the group to the arrested nine. Reuters cited a police spokesman connecting the violence to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a banned Islamist group.

Controversial Osh Mayor Melisbek Myrzakmatov has stressed the conflict was not based on ethnic rivalries. (After this summer’s deadly clashes in his city, Myrzakmatov was accused of systemic favoritism toward ethnic Kyrgyz at the expense of Uzbeks -- allegations he’s denied.)

Even beyond Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s law-enforcement forces haven’t won many kudos for goodinvestigative work in the past half-year, when hundreds of civilians died in mass unrest in the capital and in the south. Do the recent arrests and firefights signal an improvement? Or a smokescreen crackdown to come?

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

The Great (Guessing) Game: Imagining the Unlikely Kyrgyz Parliamentary Coalition

Almazbek Atambaev and Omurbek Tekebaev, shown here during the 2009 Presidential election when both were protesting incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiev's victory.  The two now face a new challenge trying to form a coalition government between their SDPK and Ata-Meken parties. (photo from AKIpress)PHOTO: Almazbek Atambaev and Omurbek Tekebaev, shown here during the 2009 Presidential election when both were protesting incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiev's victory. The two now face a new challenge trying to form a coalition government between their SDPK and Ata-Meken parties. (courtesy AKIpress)

by Ryan Weber

Since the Kyrgyz CEC announced its official vote tally, and the resulting number of seats awarded to each of the 5 parties, on November 10, politicians and analysts have been predicting what the eventual ruling coalition would look like. Initial speculation that the pro-government Social Democrats (SDPK) would caucasus with Ata-Meken to form a majority were premature; even together the two parties don't control the 60 seats required to hold majority, and divisions and delays have continued to plague negotiations.

Instead, almost out-of-the-gate, SDPK announced a coalition with the new Respublika party, and began working to secure Ata-Meken as the third and final component. But this too has failed to materialize, and with the November 27 deadline issued by President Roza Otunbayeva just days away, Kyrgyz political calculus is headed rapidly into the realm of advanced theoretical mathematics. Ata-Meken, as the smallest party in Parliament with just 18 seats, would clearly benefit from joining the coalition, if not for the fact that if SDPK's efforts fail, Otunbayeva will next turn to Ata-Meken to lead the formation of government.

Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, both of whom swept into Parliament on much higher-than-expected results, were initially quite upset at winning a plurality of votes, only to wind up in the parliamentary opposition. But the failure of a "pro-government" bloc to materialize gives both an opening to gain influence by working with their former opponents.

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

A Hard Look in the Mirror: Central Asia Scores Poorly on Perception of Corruption


by Ryan Weber

Transparency International Released its 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and as the regional map shows (above), Central Asia is left looking rather red in the face. On a scale of 0 to 10, in which lower numbers were judged more corrupt by respondents, the regional regimes scored between 2.9 (Kazakhstan) and 1.6 (Uzbekistan & Turkmenistan). Georgia, China and Russia provide some context, with the first two - by no means poster children for anti-corruption - scoring higher than any Central Asian states at 3.8 and 3.5 respectively, while Russia, the dominant political force in the region, held steady with the pack at an embarrassingly low score of 2.1.

The Index, which is compiled from a series of surveys filled out by citizens of each country then averaged and adjusted according to the survey biases, is just one measure, and an admittedly imperfect one, to evaluate the level of corruption active in the everyday, as well as institutional levels of government. Corruption is a difficult concept to define, ranging from police traffic bribes to no-bid government contracting, and even more complicated to track accurately. The index provides a "rough barometer" of public perceptions, captured at the moment they take a survey, and not held against a baseline experience. As such, as the Transparency International website warns,
"The CPI is not a tool that is suitable for trend analysis or for monitoring changes in the perceived levels of corruption over time... Year-to-year changes in a country’s score can result from a change in the perceptions of a country’s performance, or changes in the methodology resulting from TI’s efforts to improve the index." (link)
Well and good, but trend analysis may in fact provide some interesting results when considered in light of the events affecting the various countries, or as a measure of the similar or dissimilar year-by-year corruption perception of citizens from different countries within a shared region. It must still be stressed, what such analysis will show is not the level of corruption in any country, but the perception of corruption among its citizens.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Re-Presenting Representative Democracy: Inclusion in Context for the Kyrgyz Parliament

SDPK Chairman, Almazbek Atambaev, casts his vote in the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections.PHOTO: SDPK chairman Almazbek Atambaev casts his vote in the October 10 Kyrgyz Parliamentary election. SDPK is now in negotiations with Respublika and Ata-Meken to form a government amid criticism that the parliament only 'represents' a small part of the country's population.

by Ryan Weber

Translating even the most "free and open" elections into equitable government representation is a difficult task, and amidst its most laudable effort to date, the Kyrgyz Republic has faced some harsh criticism for the low voter turnout, high effective thresholds, and the resulting small percentage of the national electorate and population represented in the resulting Jogorku Kenesh parliament.

As this blog and others have pointed out, the overall stunning success of the elections as a process should be the forefront in any analysis of the 2010 Kygyz contest, but that is not to say criticism is off limits. However, to be treated seriously, such criticism must first be based on rational, realistic understandings of the workings of a national plural party list parliamentary system - rather than ideal type models.

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Either/ Ore: Gold, Uranium and the Prospects for the Kyrgyz Economy

Is Kyrgyzstan the new El Dorado? photo from CA Newswire.
by Ryan Weber

In an October 21 article for CA Newswire, analyst Martin Sieff looks into the possibility that new deposits of gold and uranium could bolster the Kyrgyz economy and perhaps even remove the "resource-poor" moniker from the isolated, mountainous Central Asian country.
"Kyrgyzstan is usually described as resource-poor. But if the country can achieve political stability after its confusing and splintered parliamentary elections on October 10, it may have a far brighter future in the mining of precious minerals."
Sieff intelligently points out the while the global recession is hitting many sectors of the Russian and Kyrgyz economy hard, it also presents an opportunity in rare minerals:
"the weakness of the dollar and the euro on world markets has led to dramatic rises in the value of gold [and uranium], and consequently international mining corporations are showing a new eagerness in prospecting for gold in the remote Central Asian state."
Currently, Kyrgyzstan is ranked 22nd in gold-producing nations, putting out 18 tons of gold each year, but Seiff - working from reports by News Agency 24.kg - predicts that could rise as high as #15, up to 44 tons, with adequate international investment. Uranian, which is found in much smaller quantities in Kyrgyzstan, especially in comparison to the large fields in neighboring Kazakhstan, is also attracting some new attention.

According to Seiff, "In terms of known resources and the possibilities of un-surveyed or under-surveyed areas, Kyrgyzstan in fact shows great promise for finding significant new deposits of gold and uranium."

Thursday, November 11, 2010

A Look Inside the New Kyrgyz Parliament

PHOTO: A view inside the Kyrgyz Parliament during its first session on November 10, 2010.

by Ryan Weber

The 5th Supreme Council - Jogorku Kenesh - of the Kyrgyz Republic held its first meeting on November 10, but it faces many challenges, not the least of which will be defining the character of the country's first ruling Parliament given its unusual balance of power and presence of former opposition and pro-Bakiev politicians. Now that the elections have ended, the real work in Bishkek begins, and the international community gets its first look at the 120 MPs who will guide the Parliamentary Democracy under the newly-christened Constitution. Understanding the complexity of the coalition process, and the composition of individuals within parliament, is the first step in predicting the future trajectory of the Kyrgyz Republic.

From Votes to Government: Coalition is the Key Step

The exact results play out like a college political science classroom exercise. The winning party, Ata-Jurt, is a new political face for a collection of mostly old-hand politicians. It includes several officials from the administration of fallen President Bakiev and his Ak Jol party. Along with the recently-created pro-Russian Ar-Namys party, they call for the return of the Presidential system - effectively erasing the parliamentary "revolution" that removed Bakiev from power in April.

On the other side of the aisle are ironically-titled "pro-government" parties Social Democrats and Ata-Meken. Both have long pedigrees as "anti-government/ opposition" parties under the repressive Bakiev regime, and were instrumental in the formation of the post-Bakiev interim government and the drafting of the new Constitution, which made the President subordinate to the Parliament.

Somewhere in the middle - or perhaps, on a different scale altogether - is Respublika, a conglomeration of business leaders presumably willing to work with any political faction in pursuit of economic goals.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Kyrgyz Parliament Meets, But Many Difficulties Remain

repost from RFE/RL

The chairman of the Central Election Commission, Akylbek Sariev (right), distributed documentation to deputies, including Ar-Namys leader Feliks Kulov.

The chairman of the Central Election Commission, Akylbek Sariev (right), distributed documentation to deputies, including Ar-Namys leader Feliks Kulov.

November 10, 2010
By Bruce Pannier

No one said moving from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government would be easy, as the first session of Kyrgyzstan's newly elected parliament has revealed.

One month after Kyrgyzstan voted in a new parliament, deputies elected in the October 10 polls have assembled. The first day fell short of expectations, however, with a handful of the 120 elected deputies failing to show up at all, and numerous deputies drifting in late to receive their mandates.

The most conspicuous absence was that of Kamchybek Tashiev, leader of the Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party. Ata-Jurt received the most votes in the October 10 election but failed to win enough to gain a majority and now, despite having 28 seats, appears positioned to be left out of the governing coalition to play an opposition role in parliament.

No official reason for Tashiev's absence was issued by Ata-Jurt, but the party leader's no-show was magnified by the failure by 20 other party members to arrive on time for the session.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Azerbaijan Elections: Pseudo-Democracy as an All-Too-Familiar Mask

Ali Kerimli, leader of the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front, leaves a voting booth in Baku.
by Ryan Weber

On November 7, the people of Azerbaijan went to the polls to elect a new class of legislators for the 125-seat Milli Majlis parliament. The voting was conducted in a peaceful environment, and representatives from all major opposition parties were included on the ballots. The number of women representatives in Parliament rose from 12 to 16. This is the "good news," presented by such rose-tinged media outlets as PressTV, taken without context from the OSCE/ODHIR Preliminary Report issued on November 8.

But, of course, it leaves out a few key details, like credible reports of voter fraud, administrative bias, and manipulated vote tabulations, all occurring within a campaign reduced to just 1/3 its previous length, devoid of public debate, and with minimal signs of public engagement or political contestation.

The unedited OSCE executive summary reads as follows:
"While the November 7, 2010 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan were characterized by a peaceful atmosphere and all opposition parties participated in the political process, the conduct of these elections overall was not sufficient to constitute meaningful progress in the democratic development of the country.

Overall, the Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the technical aspects of the electoral process well. However, limitations of media freedom and the freedom of assembly and a deficient candidate registration process further weakened the opposition and made a vibrant political discourse almost impossible." (read the full OSCE 2010 report)
Put more bluntly, there may have been an election, but it was not an exercise in democracy. And despite the efforts of the OSCE and other election observer missions to address the subject delicately, we must admit that while there can be greater and lesser degrees of progress toward democratic processes, the greater question of whether a system of governance is or is not democratic is one of type, not degrees.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Kyrgyz Voter Lists: Do Unusual Figures Suggest Fraud, or First Honest Results?

by Ryan Weber

In Spring 2005, the government of President Askar Akayev conducted scheduled elections for the bi-cameral Kyrgyz Parliament. The results, and the process that attained them, were widely criticized, and by April 4 Akayev resigned after fleeing Bishkek to the Kyrgyz consulate in Moscow.

Akayev's fall was based on long-simmering accusations of corruption as well as his restrictions on political freedoms - especially in the electoral process. Four months after Akayev fled Bishkek, the Kyrgyz people went back to the ballot box, this time to elect his successor. Almost 2 million citizens cast votes - a 74.67% turnout - in what was regarded by international observers as "tangible progress" toward "international standards for democratic elections." (OSCE/ODHIR, 2005)

Five years later, after the hero of the "Tulip Revolution" was himself overthrown for nepotism and authoritarian tendencies, the Kyrgyz again went to the polls, this time to indirectly elect a new chief executive - the Prime Minister. Initial reports were even more positive, despite pointing out the "urgent need for profound electoral legal reform" (OSCE/ODHIR, 2010) The 2010 Parliamentary election also set new records - the largest number of registered voters (over 3 million), and the lowest turnout in the country's history (55%).

The ramifications of this turn of events have been felt across the small country, as new electoral laws have caused for the first time the discrepancy between registered voters and ballots cast to influence the formation of government, as discussed earlier. Many, especially the Butun Kyrgyzstan party that was denied seats in Parliament as a result, have questioned the sudden addition of over 200,000 registered voters within the last month of the campaign. Such occurrences are not without precedent in Kyrgyzstan; both 2005 and 2009 saw approximately the same % increase in registered voters, but this was often attributed by international observers to administrative fraud, such as when the Bakiev regime approved exactly 114,000 new registrations from citizens living abroad - mostly in Russia - shortly before the 2009 vote.

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Enthusiam Gap: How registered voter lists can marginalize small parties in the Kyrgyz Electoral System

by Ryan Weber

Following up on our earlier post about Kyrgyz Election Threshold Policy, numerous sources are citing the use of eligible voter lists, rather than actual ballots cast, as a highly unusual method of determining threshold results. One reason is the highly suspect nature of national registered voter lists, with common types of fraud including the registration of the deceased, minors, non-citizens, and even multiple registration.

In highly-efficient election systems, there are a number of bureacratic means to verify and double-check these registrations, combing through lists for repeats and cross-checking with tax records, etc. When all else fails, the system is protected to at least a slight degree by the difficulty of carrying this type of voter fraud into action. Multiple voting only works with the collusion of elections officials, and getting significant numbers of minors - much less the dead - to vote without arousing suspicion is also problematic.

According to the current Kyrgyz Electoral Code, election results are based on "votes of voters, included into voter lists, in the whole republic." (Article 77, subsection 2)

Interestingly, at least in its English translation, this sentence could grammatically infer two entirely different interpretations.
  1. "Based on votes of [actual] voters, [each of whom must be] included in voter lists"
  2. "Based on votes of [all potential] voters, [being any] included into voter lists"
In the case of the first example, the threshold should be calculated by its actual % of votes cast, as in most parliamentary systems. In the second, the unorthodox practice of applying threshold % based on non-voters becomes operative.

The previous post demonstrated the ramifications of this discrepancy.

But what about the voter lists themselves?

Thursday, October 21, 2010

By the Numbers: The Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election and its Quantitative Shortcomings

by Ryan Weber

As widely reported (including on this blog), the October 2010 Parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic were a tremendous accomplishment and a great step forward for the Central Asian state twice-"liberated" from semi-authoritarianism. The mere logistics of organizing an election in an often difficult-to-access country, with a weak central government, a history of rigged voting, and few experienced administrators were daunting. Doing so in the aftermath of an irregular regime change, under the guidance of a President still looking for legitimacy, and with simmering ethnic tensions following outbreaks of tremendous violence, is nothing to scoff at.

Or, as the opening paragraph of the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary report puts it, "The 10 October parliamentary elections were conducted in a peaceful manner. The authorities displayed the political will to bring the Kyrgyz Republic closer to holding democratic elections in line with OSCE commitments. Political pluralism, a vibrant campaign and confidence in the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CEC) characterized these elections. Fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, were generally respected. Overall, these elections constituted a further consolidation of the democratic process. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need for profound electoral legal reform."

However, handing the Kyrgyz effort a blank check of congratulations ignores some of the less laudable aspects of the process, and obscures the areas in which the government, even the newly-adopted Constitution itself, is working against its own stated objectives. Take, for instance, the question of electoral thresholds.

Nothing puts non-experts into a catatonic stupor like discussing electoral technicalities, but in the case of the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections, the numbers clearly demonstrate how one aspect of electoral policy can influence not only the makeup of the resulting government, but the ultimate distribution of power and future trajectory of the entire country. Additionally, electoral thresholds tell us a lot about the intended inclusiveness of the resulting government - that is, how many different voices are allowed to play a role in national decisions. Thresholds are employed in many parliamentary systems as a way to make governing more effective - removing marginal parties and encouraging compromise and coalition building - but have the notorious potential of going too far. When a threshold is set too high, or other factors are used to intentionally disenfranchise specific groups, this is recognized as an abuse of thresholds and contradictory to the productive democracy they ostensibly support.

I contend that the Kyrgyz elections, which employed a 5% threshold of eligible voters and a 0.5% "regional threshold," represent a poor implementation of the principle. Below I present figures demonstrating how different threshold policies would have resulted in different governing results and levels of inclusion for the 120-member Kyrgyz Parliament as it moves forward.

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Cautiously Optimistic: Kyrgyz Election Marks Progress, But Challenges & Concerns Remain

by Ryan Weber

On October 10, 2010, the people of the small Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic overcame considerable social, administrative, and historical hurdles to emerge as the region's most politically competitive country, and its first to entrust executive power to parliament. Both accomplishments are laudable, rebuking the dominant trends of this semi-authoritarian presidential region, though many uncomfortable conditions continue to surround the weak government of President Rosa Otunbayeva. The extra-legal method by which former President Kurmanbek Bakiev was ousted in April - alternately described as a coup, revolt, revolution, riot, or collapse - followed in June by ethnic violence against Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek identity, aided and abetted by members of the Kyrgyz military, hardly inspire confidence in the fledgling regime.

In addition to these high profile disturbances, the post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan has struggled to live up to the pro-democracy ideals professed by its interim government. Questions of press freedom, over-zealous state prosecutions of Bakiev-era politicians and business leaders, and continuing rifts along regional North-South and various ethnic divisions haunt the prospect of a free and equal society. The fervent opposition has become the ruling elite, only to face new demands and challenges from both dispossessed Bakiev supporters and former colleagues in Human Rights advocacy NGOs.

It is not an easy situation, with lingering international pressure between Russia and the United States in the balance, and a strong Chinese influence still waiting to throw its weight behind any particular group.

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Meet the Stans

Since the fall of the Soviet Union - and indeed, among certain specialist a full 50 years earlier - a large section of the largest continent on Earth has been divided into political units terminating with the suffix, "-stan," a (cognate) term in Persian that roughly means "place of." To the casual observer, for whom the region has little international relevance, the countries that have adopted this naming convention to describe their national identity are often lumped together under the umbrella term "The Stans." This informal geographic categorization assumes a certain political, cultural and linguistic similarity which is not entirely accurate. However, more formal delineations of the region - as Central Asia, the Greater Middle East, Eurasia, West Asia, etc. - also demonstrate obvious failures to identify the salient borders of a mid-continental, non-oceanic region.

Let us consider, then, a new conceptualization of this broad, geographically diverse landscape; let us start over from the naive innocence of name recognition, and apply ourselves to evaluating those countries, sub-national provinces, and macro-national regions that lay claim to a shared heritage. While existing formal definitions like Central Asia, et al fail to capture the interconnectedness of the region as a whole, an alternative conceptualization may present itself if we're willing to... Meet the Stans.


Thursday, April 8, 2010

Turmoil and Turnover

For those not spending the last few days following the various news and twitter feeds, here's a quick recap of what is going on with the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan and what it might actually mean.

First, let me say that there are a suprisingly large number of news organizations, professional freelance journalists, and amateur reporters covering this directly from Bishkek. I have listed some of the most thorough and reliable sources at the bottom, and if you really want the best view of what's going on, I would encourage you to consult these often for updates. Many of them are in Russian, but if you are using the Google Chrome browser, it can automatically translate to English with decent enough reliability to be informative.

Let me also add that my personal connection with Kyrgyzstan is based on a 2-month internship I had with the local Radio Free Europe branch, Radio Azattyk, in summer 2009. While I was there, I covered issues of international relations (esp. with US) and the rigged Presidential Elections. I certainly have my biases and particular perspectives, all of which are now some 8 months out of date, but hopefully I'm still informed enough to be useful.

In July 2009, Incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiev was re-elected to a second term in a national election that was widely regarded by international observers as highly fraudulent. It was a rigged election that was carried out at such a high administrative level, that there was no need for (much) blatant fraud like ballot stuffing or police intimidation on the day of the election. Opposition party leaders and candidates, especially Almazbek Atambayev, called for public protests, but very little actually happened. In the official tally, Bakiev won an overwhelming majority, the opposition lodged formal protests, and then nothing happened.

Four years earlier, in 2005, a similar rigged election was followed by intense public outcry for both the lack of transparency and the intense corruption and nepotism of then-president Aksar Akayev. Beginning in the regions of Osh, Talas and Naryn, and which ultimately resulted in mass public protests. Facing such hostility, the president resigned and fled to Moscow, where he still lives.