PHOTO: Almazbek Atambaev and Omurbek Tekebaev, shown here during the 2009 Presidential election when both were protesting incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiev's victory. The two now face a new challenge trying to form a coalition government between their SDPK and Ata-Meken parties. (courtesy AKIpress)by Ryan Weber
Since the Kyrgyz CEC announced its official vote tally, and the resulting number of seats awarded to each of the 5 parties, on November 10, politicians and analysts have been predicting what the eventual ruling coalition would look like. Initial speculation that the pro-government Social Democrats (SDPK) would caucasus with Ata-Meken to form a majority were premature; even together the two parties don't control the 60 seats required to hold majority, and divisions and delays have continued to plague negotiations.
Instead, almost out-of-the-gate, SDPK announced a coalition with the new Respublika party, and began working to secure Ata-Meken as the third and final component. But this too has failed to materialize, and with the November 27 deadline issued by President Roza Otunbayeva just days away, Kyrgyz political calculus is headed rapidly into the realm of advanced theoretical mathematics. Ata-Meken, as the smallest party in Parliament with just 18 seats, would clearly benefit from joining the coalition, if not for the fact that if SDPK's efforts fail, Otunbayeva will next turn to Ata-Meken to lead the formation of government.
Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, both of whom swept into Parliament on much higher-than-expected results, were initially quite upset at winning a plurality of votes, only to wind up in the parliamentary opposition. But the failure of a "pro-government" bloc to materialize gives both an opening to gain influence by working with their former opponents.
On Tuesday (11/23/2010), SDPK announced that its leader, Almazbek Atambaev, would be holding meetings with representatives from both Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, and that potential coalition negotiations would be the subject of the meeting. Presumably, Atambaev is trying to cover his bases, ensuring that if he cannot strike an accord with Ata-Meken leader Omurbek Tekebaev by the end of the week, SDPK may still be able to fulfill the presidential mandate with one of these less-attractive compromises. According to SDPK representative Farid Niyazov, "[SDPK] is facing... political [heat], and it is extremely dangerous to delay with creation of the coalition and forming of the government." (24.kg)
Akhmat Keldibekov, co-chair of the Ata-Jurt party with Kamchybek Tashiev, confirmed that his party had joined in such negotiations, saying, "Ata-Jurt does not have unbridgeable difference with the other parties that won the elections. That is why we are ready for meaningful dialog for stability in the [best interest of] society."
Ar-Namys is also boasting of their new role in the formation of the potential government. Deputy chair Emil Aliev acknowledged that SDPK's negotiations were predicated on their selecting the Prime Minister - presumably Atambaev, a former Presidential candidate - but claimed that their negotiations would award the position of Speaker of Parliament to an Ar-Namys delegate. He also claimed that Ar-Namys leader and former PM, Felix Kulov, would be selected as Attorney General ("Top Prosecutor").
This is a particularly interesting potential development given the Lustration Law that some factions are trying to pass through Parliament. While Anvar Artykov of Ar-Namys has supported the bill, along with former opposition members of Ata-Meken and SDPK, it is doubtful that Kulov, as Attorney General, would enthusiastically pursue prosecution given his personal involvement in the Bakiev regime. In fairness, Kulov has also railed against the parliamentary government, but that hasn't stopped him from energetically joining in negotiations to be a part of it.
Exactly what has been promised to SDPK's earliest ally - Respublika - remains unclear. The Deputy Prime Minister, in theory the second-highest office, has not yet been claimed by any other factions, but this is merely speculation. Atambaev continues to meet regularly with Respublika leader, Omurbek Babanov, as well as Ata-Meken's Tekebaev, in the hopes of striking a working bargain.
Given the breakdown of seats following the October election, any majority coalition of 60 seats will require the participation of 3 parties. Tekebaev and Atambaev are, in essence, sworn enemies of Tashiev and Kulov, even if their parties weren't so ideologically opposed. Babanov and Respublika offer a 'swing vote' outside this usual dogfight, but with the clock ticking, it is increasingly possible that a hitherto unimaginable compromise may be on the horizon
In fact, the most likely outcome now seems not so much a ruling coalition made up of members from any 3 parties, but perhaps a "rainbow coalition" leading to the formation of a "Chimera Cabinet" with representatives from each of the 5 parties. (UPDATE: On 11/24, Ibrahim Dzhusanov, of Ata-Jurt, suggested the most likely outcome would be a 4-party coalition, excluding only Ata-Meken. The same day, Emil Aliev of Ar-Namys claimed his party would no longer accept the Speaker of Parliament and Attorney General positions as announced Tuesday, and that instead they would need to possess the "head of government" in order to achieve their desired economic policy. Both points demonstrate how volatile and uncertain the negotiations continue to be.)
Whether involving 4 or 5 parties, such a Chimera Cabinet could prove effective in stabilizing the political landscape and moving Kyrgyzstan forward on its much needed reforms. If it does, this Central Asian "Team of Rivals" would be an even greater accomplishment than the unprecedented elections that led to it. However, the alternative eventuality - that a divided cabinet would only exacerbate the complexity of an ideologically combustible parliament, leading to a government effectively incapable of governing - is the spectre that haunts most Kyrgyz citizens and scholars.
Ever since the July referendum passed, and even before, detractors - including Kulov himself, as well as neighboring Central Asian Presidents and Russian Prime Minister Putin - have lamented that Kyrgyzstan is "not ready" for parliamentary democracy; that too much compromise will render it weak and ineffective. This is, of course, is the same argument by which many of these leaders, like the ousted Kurmanbek Bakiev, justified their increasingly tight control of the political process.
But if fear of a lingering destabilized Kyrgyzstan has been a reason to suffer authoritarian tendencies, then the hope that democratic compromise will succeed is also sufficient cause to question, even challenge, the enforcement of authoritarianism elsewhere.
As others have remarked, the Kyrgyz experiment in parliamentary democracy carries with it not only great challenges for the Kyrgyz themselves, but if successful, it will shake the very foundations of its neighbor's governing legitimacy. What Uzbek wants to admit that the Kyrgyz accomplished what they could not? What Kazakh submits to a governing authority that could be his servant? What Russian can stomach watching yet another former Republic achieve the political gains they themselves are denied?
At this point, the final composition of the Kyrgyz government remains an open question, with even the most educated predictions no more than guesswork. An announcement could be made any day that would rended all of this speculation obsolete, or the Kyrgyz people may find themselves center stage for a protracted political stalemate. In the context of turbulent turnover and nascent parliamentary maneuvering, anyone's guess seems as good as the next, with no reason yet to abandon the prospect of hope for the excuse of fear.
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