by Ryan Weber
UPDATE: the day after this was posted, November 30, at 8:55am local time a bomb was detonated in downtown Bishkek near the Palace of Sports, where the ceremonial trial of ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiev was scheduled to continue. The explosion, which killed 2 police officers and a nurse, effected minimal damage to the surrounding area according to an eyewitness account. The source of the explosion was described by state officials as an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a sewer manhole and detonated by mobile phone. While the events have changed since this post was written, most of the government and media reactions were the same as described herein.
Keneshbek Dushevaev, chief of the State National Security Service (GSNB), clarified in a statement to 24.kg News Agency, "There are not any mass riots and ethnic clashes in Osh city." Instead, the explosion and gun battle that sparked such fears were the unfortunate end of a raid by State Security special forces attempting to capture members of a "nationalist-separatist" organization planning to attack public markets in Bishkek and Osh with guns and explosive devices. The explosion in Osh was instigated by one of the suspects apparently in an attempt to avoid capture, and resulted in his death.
The Osh raid came 6 days after GSNB forces captured 9 other "nationalist-separatists" in separate operations in Bishkek and Osh. The names of the suspects have not been released, but the identity of their organization has been the subject of much debate. Or more accurately, the subject of much speculation.
Reuters led off their news release citing Kyrgyz Security Council head Marat Imankulov that "Kyrgyz special forces killed four Islamist rebels during a raid on Monday." The article continued to link the four dead to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an anti-government terrorist cell forced out of Uzbekistan in 2001 which has been known to operate in neighboring Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. The IMU has garnered much international attention since it linked up with Al-Qaeda after its expulsion, but has been largely inactive, especially since the death of its co-founder and long-time leader, Tahir Yuldashev, in 2009. Near the end of the article (actually, after the jump), Reuters acknowledges other reports that the raid may instead have targeted Hizb ut-Tahrir, another faith-based organization that is often the scapegoat in Central Asian "counter-terror" operations.
Russian-based Interfax was even less cautious. In its article titled, "Islamic Militants blocked in house in Osh," they unequivocally attribute the terrorists to the IMU.
More enigmatic, the Washington Post quoted the same Imankulov as linking the suspects to the "Islamic Movement of Turkestan." This is a reference to the supposedly-reconstituted IMU, simultaneously expanding its scope of operations and acknowledging that it is incapable of achieving its original purpose of overthrowing Uzbek President Islam Karimov. (Turkestan is a broad term referring to the land of all Turkic peoples, stretching from Xinjiang, China, to Anatolia. Historically, it was the name given to the large Russian province in the 19th century that today would include the countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan, also Turkic, was a separate province).
Since 2001, both groups - the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) - have been the subject of considerable state-sponsored anti-terror activities as the US "War on Terror" progressively gave greater and greater latitude to the means by which foreign countries prosecuted domestic terror organizations. HT, for example, exists in dozens of countries outside Central Asia, but in most of them (including Western Europe), it is not listed as a terrorist organization. Even the United States, which often accepts foreign identifications of domestic terror cells, has resisted adding HT to its list of known terrorist organizations. According to GlobalSecurity.org:
"Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been proven to have involvement in or direct links to any recent acts of violence or terrorism. Nor has it been proven to give financial support to other groups engaged in terrorism. Because of that, it falls outside the definitions used by the United States and others to designate a terrorist group."
HT operates in the UK, Germany, and other European nations - legally, but often with controversy. It is most famous for printing copious pamphlets that promote inter-Islamic tolerance and cooperation, sometimes to the detriment of extra-Islamic relations. Doing so in Denmark is on par with passing out Mormon bibles, while possessing HT literature in Uzbekistan may be considered an act of treason or terrorism.
Kyrgyzstan has been an interesting case to watch regarding its treatment of HT over the past year. The Bakiev regime, much in line with those of Nazarbaev and Karimov, persecuted HT along with IMU, and often bulldozed domestic political discontent by artificially linking it with these organizations. HT literature was planted, and viable acts of political freedom were classified as "terrorism."
But with the fall of Bakiev, and the much-heralded rise of transparent Parliamentary Democracy, persecution of HT members and activity has continued. (MORE)
In June, several Kyrgyz (pt 1 and pt 2) were arrested for distributing HT literature in the impoverished suburbs of Bishkek (sometimes translated as the "rough-hewn settlements"), and Daniyar Karimov of 24.kg has even tried to suggest that isolated incidents of religious intolerance demonstrate a link between HT and IMU, saying "unfortunately, many people tend to underestimate the threat posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan." A 29-year old HT organizer known as "Umar" was arrested in mid-October and charged with 4 counts including "attempt of stirring up national, racial, religious or interregional hatred" and "acquisition, transportation and conveyance of extremist materials for the purpose of distribution." And finally, also on November 22, GSNB arrested a 32-year old HT leader in Jalal-Abad province and confiscated leaflets and other materials translated into Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian.
To date, the crime of all HT members arrested in Kyrgyzstan seems to be just that they belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir. While the organization claims that it pursues only peaceful methods to achieve its goal of an all-Muslim caliphate, it is entirely possible that some members would be willing to engage in less-savory methods. This has always been the excuse used by authoritarian regimes to legitimize their harsh treatment of the movement and anyone they can connect to it. And if there were any evidence of such actions, that excuse might hold water. But again, the evidence is subjective at best, and more often than not, purely speculative.
And this brings us back to the rapid classification of the recent arrests as "Islamist" terrorists.
What is most shocking is that all of this speculation ignores the official release of information from Minister of Internal Affairs Zarylbek Rysaliev, who specifically avoided naming either IMU or HT in his announcement. Instead, he described the organization as a "nationalist-separatist," and pointed out that all subjects were Kyrgyz citizens, but from diverse ethnic groups. "They were Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Russian nationals," according to 24.kg, and at least one of the Russians had a previous record of extremism linked to his conversion to Islam.
Perhaps most important is Rysaliev's assertion that none of the 9 suspects have any links to international terrorist or extremist organizations! If accurate, and at this moment Rysaliev should be the most trusted source, this one revelation should entirely wipe out accusations of IMU or HT involvement in the November 22 cell. Again, according to Rysaliev, the goal of this group was "destabilization of [the] socio-political situation. They planned to attack stores and markets."
To what degree it was "nationalist-separatist," as Rysaliev labeled it, is hard to say. But the emerging picture - based on unclear attribution of ideology, mixed ethnicity, no religious message, and no links to existing international terror or extremist organization - is that this was a homegrown cell plotting acts of terror for exclusively local purposes. There has been no evidence supplied to date suggesting these were "Islamist militants" (other than the fact that many happened to identify as Muslim, like most of the Kyrgyz population).
Notably, the two groups - the 9 from Nov 22 seized in raids in Bishkek and Osh, and the subsequent 4 dead and 2 injured suspects involved in the Nov 28 Osh raid - have not been decisively linked, though some sources allude to this. The odds of the 9 earlier captives leading to further information and raids seems obvious, but perhaps shouldn't be assumed.
Imankulov and Rysaliev may both be correct - the Nov 22 captives may not be members of IMU or HT, while the Nov 28 group could belong to either. What seems more likely is that reality requires greater nuance than Kyrgyz security authorities may be accustomed to providing. Armed criminals planning bombings and other random acts of public violence? Those are terrorists, and for the past decade in Kyrgyzstan, anyone accused of being a terrorist was naturally assumed to belong to either IMU or HT. Searching for evidence of such links was unnecessary, or even counter-productive, because often they were invented retroactively by the authorities themselves.
Kyrgyzstan has entered a new era in its political life, but as these events demonstrate, old habits die hard. A mysterious underground/shadow organization with a decade of rarely-questioned guilt is far too convenient a scapegoat to let go.
But for Kyrgyzstan to seriously embrace its Democratic renaissance, it must begin to treat seriously its Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, assembly, and expression. If it continues to feign horror at the amassing of leaflets in order to silence its critics and clumsily wield the hammer of "anti-terrorism" it will continue to feed domestic discontent and discredit itself among international peers.
Mary Beth Pole, at NewEurasia.net, also has some very good analysis regarding the over-use of "Islamist" as the default adjective for Central Asian terrorists. http://www.neweurasia.net/politics-and-society/when-in-doubt-blame-the-islamists/
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