Re-Presenting Representative Democracy: Inclusion in Context for the Kyrgyz Parliament

PHOTO: SDPK chairman Almazbek Atambaev casts his vote in the October 10 Kyrgyz Parliamentary election. SDPK is now in negotiations with Respublika and Ata-Meken to form a government amid criticism that the parliament only 'represents' a small part of the country's population.

by Ryan Weber

Translating even the most "free and open" elections into equitable government representation is a difficult task, and amidst its most laudable effort to date, the Kyrgyz Republic has faced some harsh criticism for the low voter turnout, high effective thresholds, and the resulting small percentage of the national electorate and population represented in the resulting Jogorku Kenesh parliament.

As this blog and others have pointed out, the overall stunning success of the elections as a process should be the forefront in any analysis of the 2010 Kygyz contest, but that is not to say criticism is off limits. However, to be treated seriously, such criticism must first be based on rational, realistic understandings of the workings of a national plural party list parliamentary system - rather than ideal type models.

For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in their special coverage "Kyrgyzstan: Country in Transition," accurately points out that the 5 winning parties that were ultimately chosen to form the new parliament represent just 35% - by my calculations, actually 37% - of the total eligible voters. This is simple math: 1,126,952 votes were cast for the 5 winning parties from a total of 3,036,703 registered voters, and by dividing one by the other, we have our answer.

Thus far, it does seem unfortunate that the governing body taking over as the dominant political force in the Kyrgyz Republic only 'represents' the wishes of 37%; that is, 63% of registered voters didn't choose any of these parties to represent them. We can further warp this number by extending it not to all registered voters, but to the total Kyrgyz population of 5,431,747 (2009 est.). By that calculation, only 21% of citizens contributed to choosing the ruling Supreme Council.

But such criticism ignores that highly competitive multi-party list elections inherently drive this number, more commonly called inclusion, lower because they encourage less-dominant parties to draw off votes. In systems such as Britain, which are nominally multi-party, but are in fact dominated by 3 parties (Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats) the results tend toward higher inclusion %. This is because of the much higher number of seats (650, compared with Kyrgyzstan's 120), a low exclusionary threshold, and the understanding by potential voters that a ballot cast outside the Big 3 is potentially wasted - in other words, the system is actually less competitive, and this drives up inclusion % by offering voters fewer substantial options.

A further proof would be the US congressional system, almost exclusively the domain of two major parties. Taken as a whole, both Republicans and Democrats are 'included' in national government, with the result that only supporters of fringe parties are excluded on the national level. But within the individual constituencies, US districts operate on a majoritarian system that necessarily chooses 1 winner and (at least) 1 loser. The winning side usually possesses slightly more than 50% of the votes cast, and so this doesn't send up the same kinds of warning flags.

However, when a 3rd party, or a strong independent candidate joins the fray, this is not the case. Consider the unusual example of Lisa Murkowski, the incumbent Republican Senator from Alaska who was defeated by Joe Miller in the primary, and decided to run a write-in campaign as an independent. After a contentious write-in count, Miller finally conceded on November 17. The most recent reports put Murkowski capturing 92,164 votes compared to Miller's 90,458 out of a total of 239,219 ballots cast (Democrat Scott McAdams finished a distant 3rd with 54,147 votes). As a result, Murkowski will be the elected Senator from Alaska despite representing only 39% of all ballots cast.

Another good historical example is that of Abraham Lincoln's 1860 victory in a 4-way election. Lincoln only received 39.8% of the ballots castl, but was still the winner over Douglas, Breckinridge and Bell respectively. The result, of course, was increasing regional tensions ultimately leading to Civil War - hardly a laudable precedent - but good evidence that low inclusion numbers do not represent failures of the democratic electoral process.

But wait - for both Murkowski and Lincoln we're talking about the % of ballots cast being in the 30s. In the Kyrgyz example cited above, they pointed to the 37% of the total electorate, not those casting votes. In fact, Murkowski received just 19% of the 495,731 registered voters in Alaska; and just 13% of the total Alaskan population of 698,473. Lincoln was elected by 1.8 million male citizens from a total US population in 1860 of 31 million people (5%).

We could also rehabilitate the Kyrgyz numbers slightly by using the US calculation method - % of ballots cast - in which case the 5 parties comprising the Kyrgyz Parliament represent 67% of active voters.

This is not to suggest that the state of Alaska is less democratic than the Kyrgyz Republic, nor is it admittedly a very fair comparison. Murkowski is just one of two Senators from the state; she is not directly responsible for any local governance; and the electoral system in which she operates is not intended to produce the same type or proportional representation for which national party list systems strive.

But it does - or at least, should - offer some pause for those who chastize the new Kygyz parliament for representing only a "fraction of the electorate." This criticism will always be true for any non-totalitarian election, and in fact the Kyrgyz results are much more positive than the 37 (or, for that matter, 35) percent that is being widely reported.

The error can largely be tied to the Kyrgyz Electoral Code itself, which relies on % of eligible voters, rather than ballots cast, to determine thresholds. This unorthodox, and rightfully-criticized practice, lures analysts and reporters into accepting this flawed metric as the most important figure of the election. In fact, that 67% of all Kyrgyz who chose to participate in the election were ultimately represented in parliament despite the high threshold and wide-open competition is a mark of high praise for the fledgling democracy.

It is also a number that can and should be improved upon, especially by lowering the threshold and calculate it based on ballots - not registered voters - as is the international norm. As this blog has shown, reducing that threshold to 3% of actual ballots cast for the 2010 election would have resulted in a parliamentary inclusion of 8 parties, accounting for fully 84% of all votes cast (46% of registered voters; 26% of population).

And that, if roughly translated into a US Presidential election, would be considered a historic landslide. (Thomas Jefferson's 1804 defeat of Charles C. Pickney is the only comparable result, with Jefferson picking up 72% of the vote. Compare to Abraham Lincoln, who was elected President in 1860 with just 39.8%. Most modern US Presidential elections rarely exceed 60% inclusion).

So while the decision of 1.36 million registered Kyrgyz citizens not to vote is unfortunate, it should not obscure the fact the only 552,758 of those who chose to cast a ballot will not be represented by their preferred party in the new Parliament. That means only 10% of the Kyrgyz population which has chosen to be politically active has been denied representation by their party of choice. And that is an excellent foundation for building a more vibrant, competitive, and inclusive democracy in Central Asia.