by Ryan Weber
On October 10, 2010, the people of the small Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic overcame considerable social, administrative, and historical hurdles to emerge as the region's most politically competitive country, and its first to entrust executive power to parliament. Both accomplishments are laudable, rebuking the dominant trends of this semi-authoritarian presidential region, though many uncomfortable conditions continue to surround the weak government of President Rosa Otunbayeva. The extra-legal method by which former President Kurmanbek Bakiev was ousted in April - alternately described as a coup, revolt, revolution, riot, or collapse - followed in June by ethnic violence against Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek identity, aided and abetted by members of the Kyrgyz military, hardly inspire confidence in the fledgling regime.
In addition to these high profile disturbances, the post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan has struggled to live up to the pro-democracy ideals professed by its interim government. Questions of press freedom, over-zealous state prosecutions of Bakiev-era politicians and business leaders, and continuing rifts along regional North-South and various ethnic divisions haunt the prospect of a free and equal society. The fervent opposition has become the ruling elite, only to face new demands and challenges from both dispossessed Bakiev supporters and former colleagues in Human Rights advocacy NGOs.
It is not an easy situation, with lingering international pressure between Russia and the United States in the balance, and a strong Chinese influence still waiting to throw its weight behind any particular group.
The elections which took place on October 10, following adoption of a new constitution by popular referendum in July, mark the potential beginning of the Kygyz future after a summer of ample risk of further state erosion. Otunbayeva and her self-appointed administration rode into office on a wave of public discontent over increasing political and economic corruption, set off dramatically by increased energy prices enacted by the Bakiev regime in response to Russian tariff hikes. Following 6 months of increasing political repression, and the unsavory dealings of Bakiev's heir-apparent, his unpopular son Maksim, dissatisfaction turned into unrest, then turmoil, then... what? Change is the most generic way to describe the events of April 2010, but in the shadow of the much-hyped "Tulip Revolution" of 2005, even this is uncertain. When President Aksar Akaiev was forced to resign and flee to Moscow, his replacement, the hero of the Revolution - Bakiev - consolidated power over the next two years and ultimately exercised more authoritarian tendencies than the "tyrant" he overthrew.
The April events re-opened the flood gate of pro-democracy predictions, now with a sobering acknowledgement that such opportunities represent only the potential for political transition, and that less democracy is often just as likely an outcome as its desired opposite. Russian foreign policy quickly backed the new regime, anxious to win influence after its relationship with Bakiev had soured. The US, which fashions itself a player in Kyrgyzstan but in fact is singularly-focused on its access to the Manas airbase, was hesitant to embrace the misfit government, especially after years cultivating a friendship with Bakiev. Unsure of the opposition's stance on the Bakiev-supported airbase, US embassy staff remained aloof during the crucial weeks after the uprising in which citizen militias strove to restore order to the country. Aid to democracy promotion and civil governance organizations was slow to start, and remains small compared with programs in other former Soviet nations.
This is all to say what the OSCE/ODHIR preliminary report stated when it was issued on October 11, the day following the election: it took place, without significant instances of violence, voter fraud, or social upheaval - - and that in itself is quite an accomplishment.
But equally certain is that holding an election - even one deemed "fair and transparent" by the OSCE - will not solve the many challenges the small mountainous nation faces. Winter is ahead, and the expected annual power shortages will only further test a government of limited means and few resources. The elections themselves present new challenges, as former 'opposition' protesters join Bakiev appointees in a legislature with no precedent of exercising executive power or building functional coalitions.
The history of the New Kyrgyzstan is many years from being written, and whether later writers will ascribe the first step in the emergence of the future state to the uprising in April, the election in October, or even the "Revolution" of 2005 is unknown. The successful, peaceful, and competitive elections that resulted in the acceptance of 120 legislators to lead the republic into this new future is worthy of praise, even from skeptics, as at the very least, it extends the potential for real, meaningful improvement in the quality of self-governance enjoyed by the citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
The rest will be hotly debated in local and international press, at football matches, family dining rooms and public chaikhanas, and over many skewers of Shashlyk and countless glasses of vodka. As indeed it should be, for this is the mark of progress.
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