Enthusiam Gap: How registered voter lists can marginalize small parties in the Kyrgyz Electoral System

by Ryan Weber

Following up on our earlier post about Kyrgyz Election Threshold Policy, numerous sources are citing the use of eligible voter lists, rather than actual ballots cast, as a highly unusual method of determining threshold results. One reason is the highly suspect nature of national registered voter lists, with common types of fraud including the registration of the deceased, minors, non-citizens, and even multiple registration.

In highly-efficient election systems, there are a number of bureacratic means to verify and double-check these registrations, combing through lists for repeats and cross-checking with tax records, etc. When all else fails, the system is protected to at least a slight degree by the difficulty of carrying this type of voter fraud into action. Multiple voting only works with the collusion of elections officials, and getting significant numbers of minors - much less the dead - to vote without arousing suspicion is also problematic.

According to the current Kyrgyz Electoral Code, election results are based on "votes of voters, included into voter lists, in the whole republic." (Article 77, subsection 2)

Interestingly, at least in its English translation, this sentence could grammatically infer two entirely different interpretations.

1. "Based on votes of [actual] voters, [each of whom must be] included in voter lists"
2. "Based on votes of [all potential] voters, [being any] included into voter lists"

In the case of the first example, the threshold should be calculated by its actual % of votes cast, as in most parliamentary systems. In the second, the unorthodox practice of applying threshold % based on non-voters becomes operative.

The previous post demonstrated the ramifications of this discrepancy.

But what about the voter lists themselves?

Because the threshold is calculated based on all registered/eligible voters in the entire country, government outcomes can be affected by improperly increasing the total number of registered voters, even if no illegal ballots are cast! Notably, this method of election manipulation will always benefit larger - presumably better organized and financed - parties, as it explicitly raises the degree of difficulty for small parties to break the 5% minimum threshold.

While it also affects the total % of eligible votes that the larger parties receive, this is immaterial as parliamentary seats are distribution proportionally among the winners. The more registered voters, the harder it is for small parties to get a voice in government, even - in fact, especially - if more and more of these eligible voters don't cast ballots. This also helps the larger parties; for every small party excluded from parliament, each of the winners gain seats.

In its rush to embrace democracy the Kyrgyz Republic - likely in the best of intentions - pushed through with its efforts to create voter lists that were inclusive and an electoral process that was fair and transparent. This was especially crucial given the recent ethnically-fueled violence in the country's South and a lingering air of illegitimacy following the April uprising that put interim President Roza Otunbayeva and her cabinet into power and dissolved the previous parliament.

And to their credit, they pulled off one of the most equitable, open, and contested elections in the country's history.

But rapid growth in the voter lists - as youths, ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and others clamored for a chance to engage in participatory democracy - presented an incredible challenge to the Central Election Committee. A lack of administrative infrastructure and executive experience doubtless contributed to additional mistakes and gaps in the election list vetting process.

And this brings us to the case of the Butun Kyrgyzstan ("United Kyrgyzstan") party. Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL covered the controversy well following the preliminary announcement of elections results, and his piece from October 13 should be consulted for the background.

The gist is that Butun Kyrgyzstan party leaders calculated the total number of votes they would need to surpass the 5% threshold using CEC registered voters numbers published prior to the election. According to that data, approximately 2,850,000 voters were registered, meaning that (at 5%), a party would need at least 142,500 votes in order to secure a place in the new Jogorku Kenesh parliament.

By October 12, it was clear they had received 145,455 votes - passing the pre-election threshold by almost 3,000. Butun Kyrgyzstan celebrated - as did its ideological brethren, Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, who could now form a right-wing majority coalition.

But then the CEC announced that the eligible voter lists had increased by a stunning 250,000 voters (5% of the total population of Kyrgyzstan). With a new total of 3,005,269 eligible voters, Butun Kyrgyzstan only received 4.84%, and thus failed to pass the minimum threshold for inclusion in the new government. In fact (as the table shows), calculating based on the Post-Election CEC eligible voter lists, Butun Kyrgyzstan failed to pass the threshold by only 4,808 votes. While this represents a very small 0.16% of all eligible voters, it is still less than one-third of a percent(0.29%) of all votes actually cast on election day.

And that is the margin by which Butun Kyrgyzstan went from receiving 14 seats in parliament (or8.5% of the total house) with the potential to join a majority coalition with Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, to receiving nothing whatsoever.

It is no surprise that this turn of events has incensed the Butun Kyrgyzstan party leaders - or those of Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, who face a much tougher situation in the minority opposition. For example, Felix Kulov, or Ar-Namys, has been especially vocal recently. The question that remains is how the issue will be addressed, if not in the composition of the current Jogorku Kenesh, than in planning and reforms to the electoral code for the next cycle.

Democracy in Kyrgyzstan has made great strides in a short time since the widely-criticized Presidential election of July 2009, but as the ambiguity of Article 77 demonstrates, there is still room for continuing progress.

We all look forward to the fulfillment of that potential, and criticize the shortcomings of the current system only as a means of bolstering its long-term success.