Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Minority Representation Paltry in Kyrgyzstan’s New Parliament

Originally published by EurasiaNet.org
November 29, 2010 - 11:54pm, by Ryan Weber

Kyrgyzstan's October parliamentary elections have been widely acknowledged as fair and credible by local and international observers. But one issue, minority inclusion, suffered a setback which may prove especially difficult to address in the wake of June’s ethnically fueled violence. Just a handful of deputies in the Jogorku Kenesh parliament come from non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups, in large contrast to Kyrgyzstan’s 30 percent minority population.

Uzbeks are the largest minority group in Kyrgyzstan, making up 14.5 percent of the population according to 2009 estimates. But the new parliament will include only three Uzbeks among its 120 members – a mere 2.5 percent of the governing body. Local sources reacting immediately after the election predicted as many as eight Russians would take up seats, though at least two (Yuri Nizovski and Alevtina Zavgorodnyaya of Respublika) have since declined their mandates. This still leaves Russians, who account for 8.3 percent of the population, in control of twice as many seats as Uzbeks.

These developments occurred despite institutional rules designed to promote minority involvement in parliament. Article 72 of the Kyrgyz Electoral Code requires 15 percent of each party’s candidates be non-Kyrgyz. However, the code provides no guidance on dividing those spots among different ethnic groups, nor regulating where they are placed numerically on the party lists. In its preliminary report, the OSCE’s ODIHR mission cautioned that only 3.6 percent of all candidates were Uzbek, and that they and other minority candidates were often relegated to the bottom of party lists. In this capacity, they fulfilled the official quota, but were unlikely to become parliamentary delegates as no party could legally win more than 65 seats.

As parliamentary mandates were awarded, it became clear that this is exactly what happened. The most egregious example is the Respublika party, in which 11 of its 24 minority candidates were listed in spots 100 - 120.

However, 2010 did provide at least one breakthrough in minority representation. Ravshanbek Sabirov, of the Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party, became the first ethnic Tajik to serve in the Kyrgyz parliament. The successful Uzbek delegates are Anvar Artykov of Ar-Namys (Dignity), and Sabir Atadjanov and Bakhtiar Kadyrov of the Social Democrats (SDPK). There is also one deputy from the minority Korean ethnic group, Roman Shin, who has been a Member of Parliament since 2005, and now sits as a member of Ata-Jurt (Fatherland).

Monday, November 29, 2010

Kyrgyz Horse-Trading: Negotiations Continue in Parliament Coalition Building

Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva and SDPK leader and presumptive Prime Minister, Almazbek Atambayev. Otunbayeva appointed Atambayev to form a majority coalition in parliament, but SDPK has struggled to deliver as the deadline nears. (photo credit RFE/RL)

by Ryan Weber

Negotiations to form a majority coalition in the Kyrgyz Parliament continue despite the passing of the November 27 deadline issued by President Roza Otunbayeva on November 11. At that time, she gave the Social Democrat party (SDPK) 15 days to assemble a functional coalition among the 5 parties represented in parliament. She also issued the stipulation that if they could not reach such an agreement, coalition-building power would transfer to the minority Ata-Meken party.

Depending on how one counts, that put the deadline at either November 27 (if 15 calendar days), or December 2 (if 15 working days). As the horse-trading heated up last week, SDPK party spokesman Farid Niyazov announced repeatedly that SDPK would be unveiling its coalition by November 30... then December 1... then December 3.

The Respublika party is a known coalition partner of SDPK, but together the two parties only control 49 seats in parliament, 11 short of the majority. The talks, which initially focused on the Ata-Meken party, have since expanded to include meetings with Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, leaving the possibility of a previously inconceivable cohort.

Rumors abounded late last week about the possibility of Ar-Namys leader Felix Kulov as the Attorney General, or Ata-Jurt's Kamchybek Tashiev as a deputy Prime Minister. Ar-Namys, the least likely candidate for partnership, reportedly snubbed these overtures, demanding the Prime Ministership as a condition for its participation in the majority.

Apparently, SDPK leader Almazbek Atambayev continued his furious pace of multi-party negotiations over the weekend, and has emerged on Monday (Nov 29) with what appeared initially as the most likely conglomeration - SDPK, Respublika, Ata-Meken.

The news comes less than a day after Niyazov told News Agency 24.kg that "the most possible variants of the parliament coalition in Kyrgyzstan are SDPK-Respublika-Ata-Jurt or SDPK - Ata-Meken, Ata-Jurt."

Instead, later that same day a draft agreement surfaced in which SDPK would award the PM to its own leader, Atambaev, while Ata-Meken leader Omurbek Tekebaev would become Deputy PM, and Respublika's Omurbek Babanov would be the Speaker of Parliament.

Until parliament meets again, the exact nature of the coalition is likely to remain uncertain. Ata-Jurt's willingness to consider working alongside its perceived nemeses SDPK and Ata-Meken is encouraging, as has been Respublika's role as a moderating, economic-focused influence between the progressive "pro-government" and "old guard" factions.

The War on Misidentified Terror: Islamic Militants, Nationalist-Separatists, and other glib Scapegoats

by Ryan Weber

On November 29, violence erupted once again in downtown Osh, the second city of Kyrgyzstan and home of the country's largest Uzbek minority population. Despite quick-spreading fears of a repeat of the ethnically-targeted attacks of the June riots that killed several hundred ethnic Uzbeks and caused tens of thousands to flee for the border with Uzbekistan, today's events are of an entirely different cause and nature.

UPDATE: the day after this was posted, November 30, at 8:55am local time a bomb was detonated in downtown Bishkek near the Palace of Sports, where the ceremonial trial of ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiev was scheduled to continue. The explosion, which killed 2 police officers and a nurse, effected minimal damage to the surrounding area according to an eyewitness account. The source of the explosion was described by state officials as an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a sewer manhole and detonated by mobile phone. While the events have changed since this post was written, most of the government and media reactions were the same as described herein.


Keneshbek Dushevaev, chief of the State National Security Service (GSNB), clarified in a statement to 24.kg News Agency, "There are not any mass riots and ethnic clashes in Osh city." Instead, the explosion and gun battle that sparked such fears were the unfortunate end of a raid by State Security special forces attempting to capture members of a "nationalist-separatist" organization planning to attack public markets in Bishkek and Osh with guns and explosive devices. The explosion in Osh was instigated by one of the suspects apparently in an attempt to avoid capture, and resulted in his death.

The Osh raid came 6 days after GSNB forces captured 9 other "nationalist-separatists" in separate operations in Bishkek and Osh. The names of the suspects have not been released, but the identity of their organization has been the subject of much debate. Or more accurately, the subject of much speculation.

New Kyrgyzstan Violence Ahead of Clinton Visit

Days ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first visit to Kyrgyzstan, authorities say they have thwarted a terrorist-nationalist-separatist plot.

At a November 29 press conference, Interior Minister Zarylbek Rysaliyev said nine people had been arrested late last week for attempting to destabilize the government with over 10 kilos of TNT. The group of ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and one Russian were reportedly arrested in Bishkek and Osh.

Authorities may not have nabbed them all, however. Within hours of Rysaliyev’s press conference, special forces got into a shootout with members of a criminal gang and/or terrorist group in Osh, with authorities killing at least four and detaining three. One apparently blew himself up. Some reports linked the group to the arrested nine. Reuters cited a police spokesman connecting the violence to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a banned Islamist group.

Controversial Osh Mayor Melisbek Myrzakmatov has stressed the conflict was not based on ethnic rivalries. (After this summer’s deadly clashes in his city, Myrzakmatov was accused of systemic favoritism toward ethnic Kyrgyz at the expense of Uzbeks -- allegations he’s denied.)

Even beyond Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s law-enforcement forces haven’t won many kudos for goodinvestigative work in the past half-year, when hundreds of civilians died in mass unrest in the capital and in the south. Do the recent arrests and firefights signal an improvement? Or a smokescreen crackdown to come?

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

The Great (Guessing) Game: Imagining the Unlikely Kyrgyz Parliamentary Coalition

Almazbek Atambaev and Omurbek Tekebaev, shown here during the 2009 Presidential election when both were protesting incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiev's victory.  The two now face a new challenge trying to form a coalition government between their SDPK and Ata-Meken parties. (photo from AKIpress)PHOTO: Almazbek Atambaev and Omurbek Tekebaev, shown here during the 2009 Presidential election when both were protesting incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiev's victory. The two now face a new challenge trying to form a coalition government between their SDPK and Ata-Meken parties. (courtesy AKIpress)

by Ryan Weber

Since the Kyrgyz CEC announced its official vote tally, and the resulting number of seats awarded to each of the 5 parties, on November 10, politicians and analysts have been predicting what the eventual ruling coalition would look like. Initial speculation that the pro-government Social Democrats (SDPK) would caucasus with Ata-Meken to form a majority were premature; even together the two parties don't control the 60 seats required to hold majority, and divisions and delays have continued to plague negotiations.

Instead, almost out-of-the-gate, SDPK announced a coalition with the new Respublika party, and began working to secure Ata-Meken as the third and final component. But this too has failed to materialize, and with the November 27 deadline issued by President Roza Otunbayeva just days away, Kyrgyz political calculus is headed rapidly into the realm of advanced theoretical mathematics. Ata-Meken, as the smallest party in Parliament with just 18 seats, would clearly benefit from joining the coalition, if not for the fact that if SDPK's efforts fail, Otunbayeva will next turn to Ata-Meken to lead the formation of government.

Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys, both of whom swept into Parliament on much higher-than-expected results, were initially quite upset at winning a plurality of votes, only to wind up in the parliamentary opposition. But the failure of a "pro-government" bloc to materialize gives both an opening to gain influence by working with their former opponents.

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

A Hard Look in the Mirror: Central Asia Scores Poorly on Perception of Corruption


by Ryan Weber

Transparency International Released its 2010 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and as the regional map shows (above), Central Asia is left looking rather red in the face. On a scale of 0 to 10, in which lower numbers were judged more corrupt by respondents, the regional regimes scored between 2.9 (Kazakhstan) and 1.6 (Uzbekistan & Turkmenistan). Georgia, China and Russia provide some context, with the first two - by no means poster children for anti-corruption - scoring higher than any Central Asian states at 3.8 and 3.5 respectively, while Russia, the dominant political force in the region, held steady with the pack at an embarrassingly low score of 2.1.

The Index, which is compiled from a series of surveys filled out by citizens of each country then averaged and adjusted according to the survey biases, is just one measure, and an admittedly imperfect one, to evaluate the level of corruption active in the everyday, as well as institutional levels of government. Corruption is a difficult concept to define, ranging from police traffic bribes to no-bid government contracting, and even more complicated to track accurately. The index provides a "rough barometer" of public perceptions, captured at the moment they take a survey, and not held against a baseline experience. As such, as the Transparency International website warns,
"The CPI is not a tool that is suitable for trend analysis or for monitoring changes in the perceived levels of corruption over time... Year-to-year changes in a country’s score can result from a change in the perceptions of a country’s performance, or changes in the methodology resulting from TI’s efforts to improve the index." (link)
Well and good, but trend analysis may in fact provide some interesting results when considered in light of the events affecting the various countries, or as a measure of the similar or dissimilar year-by-year corruption perception of citizens from different countries within a shared region. It must still be stressed, what such analysis will show is not the level of corruption in any country, but the perception of corruption among its citizens.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Re-Presenting Representative Democracy: Inclusion in Context for the Kyrgyz Parliament

SDPK Chairman, Almazbek Atambaev, casts his vote in the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections.PHOTO: SDPK chairman Almazbek Atambaev casts his vote in the October 10 Kyrgyz Parliamentary election. SDPK is now in negotiations with Respublika and Ata-Meken to form a government amid criticism that the parliament only 'represents' a small part of the country's population.

by Ryan Weber

Translating even the most "free and open" elections into equitable government representation is a difficult task, and amidst its most laudable effort to date, the Kyrgyz Republic has faced some harsh criticism for the low voter turnout, high effective thresholds, and the resulting small percentage of the national electorate and population represented in the resulting Jogorku Kenesh parliament.

As this blog and others have pointed out, the overall stunning success of the elections as a process should be the forefront in any analysis of the 2010 Kygyz contest, but that is not to say criticism is off limits. However, to be treated seriously, such criticism must first be based on rational, realistic understandings of the workings of a national plural party list parliamentary system - rather than ideal type models.

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Either/ Ore: Gold, Uranium and the Prospects for the Kyrgyz Economy

Is Kyrgyzstan the new El Dorado? photo from CA Newswire.
by Ryan Weber

In an October 21 article for CA Newswire, analyst Martin Sieff looks into the possibility that new deposits of gold and uranium could bolster the Kyrgyz economy and perhaps even remove the "resource-poor" moniker from the isolated, mountainous Central Asian country.
"Kyrgyzstan is usually described as resource-poor. But if the country can achieve political stability after its confusing and splintered parliamentary elections on October 10, it may have a far brighter future in the mining of precious minerals."
Sieff intelligently points out the while the global recession is hitting many sectors of the Russian and Kyrgyz economy hard, it also presents an opportunity in rare minerals:
"the weakness of the dollar and the euro on world markets has led to dramatic rises in the value of gold [and uranium], and consequently international mining corporations are showing a new eagerness in prospecting for gold in the remote Central Asian state."
Currently, Kyrgyzstan is ranked 22nd in gold-producing nations, putting out 18 tons of gold each year, but Seiff - working from reports by News Agency 24.kg - predicts that could rise as high as #15, up to 44 tons, with adequate international investment. Uranian, which is found in much smaller quantities in Kyrgyzstan, especially in comparison to the large fields in neighboring Kazakhstan, is also attracting some new attention.

According to Seiff, "In terms of known resources and the possibilities of un-surveyed or under-surveyed areas, Kyrgyzstan in fact shows great promise for finding significant new deposits of gold and uranium."

Thursday, November 11, 2010

A Look Inside the New Kyrgyz Parliament

PHOTO: A view inside the Kyrgyz Parliament during its first session on November 10, 2010.

by Ryan Weber

The 5th Supreme Council - Jogorku Kenesh - of the Kyrgyz Republic held its first meeting on November 10, but it faces many challenges, not the least of which will be defining the character of the country's first ruling Parliament given its unusual balance of power and presence of former opposition and pro-Bakiev politicians. Now that the elections have ended, the real work in Bishkek begins, and the international community gets its first look at the 120 MPs who will guide the Parliamentary Democracy under the newly-christened Constitution. Understanding the complexity of the coalition process, and the composition of individuals within parliament, is the first step in predicting the future trajectory of the Kyrgyz Republic.

From Votes to Government: Coalition is the Key Step

The exact results play out like a college political science classroom exercise. The winning party, Ata-Jurt, is a new political face for a collection of mostly old-hand politicians. It includes several officials from the administration of fallen President Bakiev and his Ak Jol party. Along with the recently-created pro-Russian Ar-Namys party, they call for the return of the Presidential system - effectively erasing the parliamentary "revolution" that removed Bakiev from power in April.

On the other side of the aisle are ironically-titled "pro-government" parties Social Democrats and Ata-Meken. Both have long pedigrees as "anti-government/ opposition" parties under the repressive Bakiev regime, and were instrumental in the formation of the post-Bakiev interim government and the drafting of the new Constitution, which made the President subordinate to the Parliament.

Somewhere in the middle - or perhaps, on a different scale altogether - is Respublika, a conglomeration of business leaders presumably willing to work with any political faction in pursuit of economic goals.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Kyrgyz Parliament Meets, But Many Difficulties Remain

repost from RFE/RL

The chairman of the Central Election Commission, Akylbek Sariev (right), distributed documentation to deputies, including Ar-Namys leader Feliks Kulov.

The chairman of the Central Election Commission, Akylbek Sariev (right), distributed documentation to deputies, including Ar-Namys leader Feliks Kulov.

November 10, 2010
By Bruce Pannier

No one said moving from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government would be easy, as the first session of Kyrgyzstan's newly elected parliament has revealed.

One month after Kyrgyzstan voted in a new parliament, deputies elected in the October 10 polls have assembled. The first day fell short of expectations, however, with a handful of the 120 elected deputies failing to show up at all, and numerous deputies drifting in late to receive their mandates.

The most conspicuous absence was that of Kamchybek Tashiev, leader of the Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party. Ata-Jurt received the most votes in the October 10 election but failed to win enough to gain a majority and now, despite having 28 seats, appears positioned to be left out of the governing coalition to play an opposition role in parliament.

No official reason for Tashiev's absence was issued by Ata-Jurt, but the party leader's no-show was magnified by the failure by 20 other party members to arrive on time for the session.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Azerbaijan Elections: Pseudo-Democracy as an All-Too-Familiar Mask

Ali Kerimli, leader of the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front, leaves a voting booth in Baku.
by Ryan Weber

On November 7, the people of Azerbaijan went to the polls to elect a new class of legislators for the 125-seat Milli Majlis parliament. The voting was conducted in a peaceful environment, and representatives from all major opposition parties were included on the ballots. The number of women representatives in Parliament rose from 12 to 16. This is the "good news," presented by such rose-tinged media outlets as PressTV, taken without context from the OSCE/ODHIR Preliminary Report issued on November 8.

But, of course, it leaves out a few key details, like credible reports of voter fraud, administrative bias, and manipulated vote tabulations, all occurring within a campaign reduced to just 1/3 its previous length, devoid of public debate, and with minimal signs of public engagement or political contestation.

The unedited OSCE executive summary reads as follows:
"While the November 7, 2010 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Azerbaijan were characterized by a peaceful atmosphere and all opposition parties participated in the political process, the conduct of these elections overall was not sufficient to constitute meaningful progress in the democratic development of the country.

Overall, the Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the technical aspects of the electoral process well. However, limitations of media freedom and the freedom of assembly and a deficient candidate registration process further weakened the opposition and made a vibrant political discourse almost impossible." (read the full OSCE 2010 report)
Put more bluntly, there may have been an election, but it was not an exercise in democracy. And despite the efforts of the OSCE and other election observer missions to address the subject delicately, we must admit that while there can be greater and lesser degrees of progress toward democratic processes, the greater question of whether a system of governance is or is not democratic is one of type, not degrees.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Kyrgyz Voter Lists: Do Unusual Figures Suggest Fraud, or First Honest Results?

by Ryan Weber

In Spring 2005, the government of President Askar Akayev conducted scheduled elections for the bi-cameral Kyrgyz Parliament. The results, and the process that attained them, were widely criticized, and by April 4 Akayev resigned after fleeing Bishkek to the Kyrgyz consulate in Moscow.

Akayev's fall was based on long-simmering accusations of corruption as well as his restrictions on political freedoms - especially in the electoral process. Four months after Akayev fled Bishkek, the Kyrgyz people went back to the ballot box, this time to elect his successor. Almost 2 million citizens cast votes - a 74.67% turnout - in what was regarded by international observers as "tangible progress" toward "international standards for democratic elections." (OSCE/ODHIR, 2005)

Five years later, after the hero of the "Tulip Revolution" was himself overthrown for nepotism and authoritarian tendencies, the Kyrgyz again went to the polls, this time to indirectly elect a new chief executive - the Prime Minister. Initial reports were even more positive, despite pointing out the "urgent need for profound electoral legal reform" (OSCE/ODHIR, 2010) The 2010 Parliamentary election also set new records - the largest number of registered voters (over 3 million), and the lowest turnout in the country's history (55%).

The ramifications of this turn of events have been felt across the small country, as new electoral laws have caused for the first time the discrepancy between registered voters and ballots cast to influence the formation of government, as discussed earlier. Many, especially the Butun Kyrgyzstan party that was denied seats in Parliament as a result, have questioned the sudden addition of over 200,000 registered voters within the last month of the campaign. Such occurrences are not without precedent in Kyrgyzstan; both 2005 and 2009 saw approximately the same % increase in registered voters, but this was often attributed by international observers to administrative fraud, such as when the Bakiev regime approved exactly 114,000 new registrations from citizens living abroad - mostly in Russia - shortly before the 2009 vote.