Kyrgyz Voter Lists: Do Unusual Figures Suggest Fraud, or First Honest Results?

by Ryan Weber

In Spring 2005, the government of President Askar Akayev conducted scheduled elections for the bi-cameral Kyrgyz Parliament. The results, and the process that attained them, were widely criticized, and by April 4 Akayev resigned after fleeing Bishkek to the Kyrgyz consulate in Moscow.

Akayev's fall was based on long-simmering accusations of corruption as well as his restrictions on political freedoms - especially in the electoral process. Four months after Akayev fled Bishkek, the Kyrgyz people went back to the ballot box, this time to elect his successor. Almost 2 million citizens cast votes - a 74.67% turnout - in what was regarded by international observers as "tangible progress" toward "international standards for democratic elections." (OSCE/ODHIR, 2005)

Five years later, after the hero of the "Tulip Revolution" was himself overthrown for nepotism and authoritarian tendencies, the Kyrgyz again went to the polls, this time to indirectly elect a new chief executive - the Prime Minister. Initial reports were even more positive, despite pointing out the "urgent need for profound electoral legal reform" (OSCE/ODHIR, 2010) The 2010 Parliamentary election also set new records - the largest number of registered voters (over 3 million), and the lowest turnout in the country's history (55%).

The ramifications of this turn of events have been felt across the small country, as new electoral laws have caused for the first time the discrepancy between registered voters and ballots cast to influence the formation of government, as discussed earlier. Many, especially the Butun Kyrgyzstan party that was denied seats in Parliament as a result, have questioned the sudden addition of over 200,000 registered voters within the last month of the campaign. Such occurrences are not without precedent in Kyrgyzstan; both 2005 and 2009 saw approximately the same % increase in registered voters, but this was often attributed by international observers to administrative fraud, such as when the Bakiev regime approved exactly 114,000 new registrations from citizens living abroad - mostly in Russia - shortly before the 2009 vote.

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By the Numbers: The Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election and its Quantitative Shortcomings

by Ryan Weber

As widely reported (including on this blog), the October 2010 Parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic were a tremendous accomplishment and a great step forward for the Central Asian state twice-"liberated" from semi-authoritarianism. The mere logistics of organizing an election in an often difficult-to-access country, with a weak central government, a history of rigged voting, and few experienced administrators were daunting. Doing so in the aftermath of an irregular regime change, under the guidance of a President still looking for legitimacy, and with simmering ethnic tensions following outbreaks of tremendous violence, is nothing to scoff at.

Or, as the opening paragraph of the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary report puts it, "The 10 October parliamentary elections were conducted in a peaceful manner. The authorities displayed the political will to bring the Kyrgyz Republic closer to holding democratic elections in line with OSCE commitments. Political pluralism, a vibrant campaign and confidence in the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CEC) characterized these elections. Fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, were generally respected. Overall, these elections constituted a further consolidation of the democratic process. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need for profound electoral legal reform."

However, handing the Kyrgyz effort a blank check of congratulations ignores some of the less laudable aspects of the process, and obscures the areas in which the government, even the newly-adopted Constitution itself, is working against its own stated objectives. Take, for instance, the question of electoral thresholds.

Nothing puts non-experts into a catatonic stupor like discussing electoral technicalities, but in the case of the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections, the numbers clearly demonstrate how one aspect of electoral policy can influence not only the makeup of the resulting government, but the ultimate distribution of power and future trajectory of the entire country. Additionally, electoral thresholds tell us a lot about the intended inclusiveness of the resulting government - that is, how many different voices are allowed to play a role in national decisions. Thresholds are employed in many parliamentary systems as a way to make governing more effective - removing marginal parties and encouraging compromise and coalition building - but have the notorious potential of going too far. When a threshold is set too high, or other factors are used to intentionally disenfranchise specific groups, this is recognized as an abuse of thresholds and contradictory to the productive democracy they ostensibly support.

I contend that the Kyrgyz elections, which employed a 5% threshold of eligible voters and a 0.5% "regional threshold," represent a poor implementation of the principle. Below I present figures demonstrating how different threshold policies would have resulted in different governing results and levels of inclusion for the 120-member Kyrgyz Parliament as it moves forward.

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Post-Election Conclusions

If you're really, really curious, then you should just parouse all the headlines on the eng.24.kg website for July 23-25. For the rest of you, here's the short version:

Voting started at 8 am; apparently at some polling stations people were lined up to vote. As the day continued, reports of "voting irregularities" started coming in from all directions. This was a surprise to the CEC (state election committee) since it declared the vote would be "free, fair and transparent" from the start, and a surprise to foreign journalists like myself in that we assumed the Bakiev regime had enough time to rig this thing in such a way that elections observers - who are only in country for 3-5 days - wouldn't be able to see them doing it.

In order for a Kyrgyz election to be valid, 50% of all registered voters must cast their ballot. Since only 1/3 of the Kyrgyz population is registered (and some people lost their registration status after voting for the opposition in the 2007 parliamentary campaign), this isn't as infeasible as it sounds. However, the official statement that 40% of all voters had cast by noon seemed to be stretching it, with at least one - as possibly many more - instance of polling stations opening their doors with pre-filled ballot boxes. There were lots of Zombie Voters (my term, and proud of it - citizens who've been dead, often for years, who still manage to vote Bakiev), and an as-yet unconfirmed number of double-voters. One wry joke of the day involved a middle-aged man who voted opposition in 2007, and was complaining that this time he wasn't allowed to vote. Another man suggested, "oh, you voted, maybe more than once, you just didn't know it."

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