Showing posts with label Kyrgyzstan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kyrgyzstan. Show all posts

Friday, August 12, 2011

Kyrgyz Release More Water to Fight Kazakh Drought

Reposted from Radio Azattyk (RFE/RL)
by: Zamira Kozhobaeva
style edit: Ryan Weber

At a special meeting in Khokand on August 8, policy makers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met to discuss pressing issues of regional water management. Following the meeting, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Water Resources and Land Reclamation Chyngyz Uzakbaev spoke with Radio Azattyk.

Radio Azattyk: What are the results of this urgent meeting on regional water management?

Chyngyz Uzakbaev: The talks were devoted to the complicated problem of joint water use. The serious threat of drought due to water shortage looms over South Kazakhstan and the Kyzyl-Orda region of Kazakhstan and southern regions of Uzbekistan, all of which are located in the downstream region of the Syr Darya.

After difficult negotiations, we reached the following agreement: At the request of the Kazakh side, we [Kyrgyzstan] will begin releasing 500 cubic meters of water/second from the Toktogul Reservoie through the Uch-Kurgan HPP [HydroPower Plant]. Due to the extremely hot weather, the Kazakhs asked us to add another 50 cubic meters of water, because they would not otherwise receive the 500 cubic meters of water [due to greater evaporation than normal].

This question is being studied at the governmental level now. Kazakhstan also agreed to buy electricity [from Kyrgyzstan] that will be generated as a result of this water release. Our electricity is tied to exports, and this is a very important issue for us. We asked for a three-day break in the water release, so at this point the beginning on August 9, Tajikistan will release up to 600 cubic meters per second from their Kyra Kum reservoir [to make up the difference].

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Rate of Exchange: The Costs of Democratic Transition in Kyrgyzstan, and Who Picks up the Bill

(image credit RIA Novosti)

the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan announced on July 14 that it estimates a cost of 449 Million Kyrgyz Som (KGS) to conduct the upcoming Presidential Elections. The election marks the first change of the top executive since Roza Otunbayeva was selected as Interim/Transitional President in a package vote along with adopting the new Constitution that expressly limits the powers of the President in July 2010.

Otunbayeva has stayed true to her inaugural promise not to seek re-election, and in her absence a who's-who of Kyrgyz politicians have hinted at their intention to run. Currently, there are 14 declared candidates (5 declared last week), the most notable of which is Kamchybek Tashiev of the nationalist Ata-Jurt party. The big name not on the ticket at present is that of Social Democrat (SDPK) Almazbek Atambaev. Both are both current leading figures within the Jogoru Kenesh Parliament - Atambaev as Prime Minister and Tashiev as leader of the largest party in the unicameral legislature.

The new Constitution was written with the express purpose of limiting the authority of the President, and turning Kyrgzystan into a Parliament-dominated Democracy - the first in Central Asia - after two popular uprisings removed strong-arm Presidents in 2005 and 2010. That the most powerful politicians in Parliament are abandoning it to seek the Presidency suggests a possible return to a more empowered Executive.

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Indefinite Deployment: US Neocons Explain Rationale of Never Leaving Kyrgyz Airbase

originally posted on CA-NEWS.org
by Ryan Weber

The US will continue to have a military presence in Kyrgyzstan, perhaps indefinitely, despite plans for a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014, according to a veteran conservative analyst and former Defense Department staff.

The admission was made on July 6 at an event hosted by the Hudson Institute, a neoconservative Washington, D.C. think tank with a history of promoting US national security interests.

The comments, by Seth Cropsey (pictured), a Senior Fellow at Hudson, and formerly of the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, came in response to an audience question about the future of US-Kyrgyz relations after the end of military operations in Afghanistan, and the presumed closure of the US airbase at Bishkek's Manas International airport. The base, which opened in December 2001 and is now known as the Transit Center at Manas (or Manas TC), has been a lightning rod of controversy since 2005, and more recently figured as an international negotiating chip for then-President Kurmanbek Bakiev to elicit a a six-fold increase in the American's lease, up to $60 million per year in 2009.

US Military and diplomatic envoys have long argued that Manas TC is critical to the Afghan war effort, largely over-shadowing other topics of US-Kyrgyz foreign relations such as economic development, anti-corruption, and Human Rights violations under the current and past administrations.

But according to Cropsey, who is a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Combat, future geopolitical concerns will necessitate a US presence long after the last US troops leave Afghanistan. He specifically cited a nuclear Iran, prolonged Afghan in-fighting, or an aggressive China all as viable justifications for a permanent US presence.


Saturday, June 11, 2011

Going Post-al: US-Central Asia Policy Post-bin Laden

In his lectures and writings, noted political scientist and former NDI Georgia country director, Lincoln Mitchell, has used the term 'Bi-post-al' to refer to US policy toward the region of the Former Soviet Republics because it was rooted strongly in both Post-Soviet and Post-9/11 legacies.

20 years after the jubilant fall of the Berlin wall, and 10 years after the tragic collapse of New York's World Trade Center, the demise (death, or assassination, depending on one's perspective) of Osama bin Laden opens a new chapter in US foreign relations, especially with Central Asia and the Middle East; the Post-bin Laden era.

The question is, does this development, following Mitchell's glib phraseology, put US-Central Asian relations into a 'Tri-Post-al' paradigm, or does it instead herald the end of 'post-alism' altogether?

Consider what is meant when US policymakers refer to the underlying stratagems they employ being based on 'Post-Soviet' or 'Post-9/11' considerations. The former suggested an awareness of the bureaucratic, economic and social vestiges of Soviet central planning, and limited political freedom. In the 20 years that have passed, the Former Soviet Republics have actually taken a diverse number of trajectories, including the wholesale rejection evidenced by the Baltic states as well as the more lenient embrace of former glory and methods found in Belarus or Turkmenistan. All of these modern states, ranging from free democracies with vibrant markets, to closed autocracies, and the more common shades of grey in-between, are equally 'Post-Soviet,' yet US policy differs widely even from Russia to Ukraine. While these states may still, may always, historically be 'Post-Soviet', the term has been stretched so far as to be virtually meaningless today, and likely more so into the future. US foreign policy toward the region is undoubtedly more focused, at least within the past 5-10 years, on its impact on the US 'War on Terror,' and the balance of US-Russia influence (initially, and mistakenly, referred to as the 'New Great Game,' or 'New Cold War').

If the Post-Soviet era is over - and by all accounts, it is so and has been for some time - what of Post-9/11 syndrome? Today, it is difficult to separate the normal considerations of national security, human rights, or due process of law, from the bizarrely overriding paranoia of international terrorist networks, with almost singular focus on al-Qaeda.

Friday, May 27, 2011

The Best We Can: Kyrgyz Government Panel Explains Circumstances, Handling of June 2010 Osh Violence

When the independent panel of international experts you solicit to investigate and report on outbreaks of ethnic violence under your jurisdiction finally issues that report - and cites your provisional government, including specific members of the administration - as at fault for notpreventing or containing the spread of that violence, what's an (Interim) President to do?

Kyrgyzstan's Roza Otunbayeva, a longtime opposition activist turn (post)revolutionary leader, was faced with this challenge recently, when the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) she established under OSCE Special Representative to Central Asia Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen published its report on the June 2010 conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan on May 3.

The report, which generally echoed similar reports by Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, could not identify specific protagonists of the violence, but did cite multiple instances at local, municipal and national levels where inaction by the newly-formed government was conducted to such a degree as to constitute culpability.

The issue went off like a bomb in Kyrgyzstan's political circles, where (ethno-)nationalist sentiments have been on the rise, especially among the Kyrgyz majority. As Eurasianet's George Camm puts it, Kyrgyz politicians are practically "falling over themselves" to outpace each other in progressively more hyperbolic shows of indignation. In the latest maneuver, the Kyrgyz Parliament - the Jogorku Kenesh - unanimously passed a resolution banning Dr. Kiljunen from entering Kyrgyzstan, ostensibly as a punishment for spreading "scandalous and disreputable" information about the June 2010 attacks that left 470 dead and more than 400,000 displaced - the overwhelming majority being ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan.

The relative invisibility of Otunbayeva - beloved by the West for her strong international credentials as a champion of human rights and political freedom - only demonstrates how sharp the knife edge of social schisms are within Kyrgyzstan. Otunbayeva became President in the irregular circumstance of the April 7 overthrow of former President Kurmanbek Bakiev, and then won approval via election to remain on as President through 2011 - she is not eligible for reelection in the next vote, set for this October.

In her stead, Otunbayeva dispatched senior officials on an international tour to refute the KIC report and issue their own criticisms of its findings, methodology and recommendations. On May 24, this panel visited Washington, DC, and after a US Congressional hearing the prior day, read remarks and gave an on-the-record Q-and-A session hosted by the National Democratic Institute, with Laura Jewett, NDI Eurasia Director, as moderator.

Monday, May 23, 2011

Clouded Transparency: Kyrgyz Government Responds to KIC Report on June 2010 Osh Violence

::This is the second post on the continuing fallout of the June 2010 violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan. ::

On May 3, the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), which was tasked by Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to investigate and report on the ethnic violence that swent Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, issued its final report. Those findings included verification of many of the worst accusations made against state authorities - that Kyrgyz police and military contributed, at least through complacency, to the escalation of the violence; the law enforcement officials tortured suspects in order to gain or influence testimony; that post-conflict prosecutions by state officials have unduly targeted ethnic minority defendants; that certain high-ranking local and national officials were directly responsible for allowing the violence to continue.

It put the Kyrgyz Government in a difficult spot - President Otunbayeva specifically asked for the report from a specially-convened panel of international experts in order to raise the findings of the commission above reproach. Now, Otunbayeva's government wanted to do just that.

The response by government officials has run from thinly-veiled dismissal of the commission's methodology to outright refusal to acknowledge the findings- a debate currently raging within the Kyrgyz parliament. (update: on May 26, Parliament actually voted 95-0 to ban the head of the commission, Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, from Kyrgyzstan permanently for what it describes as a biased report the incites further ethnic tension).

Among the more measured reactions is a 30-page, 111-point refutation and comments issued by the government which are now being presented and defended internationally by members of the administration (complete text in English).

While these comments begin benignly, "The Kyrgyz Government consider that the KIC was able to collect significant evidence via a comprehensive and objective approach. The KIC conducted an unbiased investigation which permitted a thorough and useful analysis...", they quickly turn ugly.

Sunday, April 10, 2011

Taken Aback: International Commission on June 2010 Osh Violence Issues Stunning Report

::This is the first in a 3-part series on the continuing fallout of the June 2010 violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan. We begin with a report published on April 1, 2011 by an international commission on the June 2010 violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan, and future posts will cover the Government's official response to that report, and finally a panel discussion hosted by the National Democratic Institute in Washington, DC on May 24, 2011 including several members of the Kyrgyz administration and parliament. ::

Just two months after the political upheaval that swept former President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev out of power in April 2010, the new so-called 'Provisional Government' was faced with its own violent crisis in the Southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad. The exact account of what took place June 10-14 remains a hot topic in international circles, and is practically radioactive in a domestic environment of increasing ethno-nationalism and regional tension.

To address the ferocious and conflicting accusations that circulated in Kyrgyzstan following the violence, then-Interim President Roza Otunbayeva requested the formation of a special international commission to thoroughly investigate, document, and analyze the conflict in a manner that would be unbiased, transparent, and - she hoped - reconciliatory. She chose Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Special Representative to Central Asia from OECD to head the resulting "Independent International Commission of Inquiry in the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010" - more commonly referred to as the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, or just KIC.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Historian Alexander Knyazev on Current Events in Kyrgyzstan, their Historical Roots, and Likely Outcomes

Reposted from Gazeta.kg, originally published on Polit.kg.
Interview by Hilarion Zvyagintsev
Translation by Google/style edit by Ryan Weber

As part of the "Sharp Corners" series which focuses on the portrayal of Kyrgyz history in school textbooks, Polit.kg interviewed prominent historian Alexander Knyazev, Ph.D [of the Kyrgyz Slavic University, Bishkek]. The conversation quickly moved past the works of Osmonov and other pseudo-historians, and ultimately dealt with the connection of the past, present, and prospects for the future state of Kyrgyzstan.


Hilarion Zvyagintsev: In your opinion, what role does the Kyrgyz ethnic group play in the history of Kyrgyzstan? Why has this subject become such a fixture in today's debates?


Alexander Knyazev:- Ethnocentricity in the interpretation and teaching of history is largely the result of compromise among the unprincipled parts of the scientific community. At the turn of the 1980s and 90s, when the idea of ethnocentrism began to dominate - how this dishonored the academic community of the [Kyrgyz] Republic will be discussed - many just began to go along [with this narrative]. This is particularly noticeable in the proclamation of the 2,200th anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood, the 3,000th anniversary of Osh, and the question of the historicity of Manas as a person. It is characterized by lack of professionalism among our scientists. No profession can exist without lapses in professional ethics, but it's wrong to change [the way we write] history in favor of short-term interests. This causes harm and does not bring any benefit, and in a multicultural society - even more so. In a context where the socio-economic situation does not allow most people to travel outside the republic, not only young people, a huge part of society formed a provincial consciousness, ideology, limited to the extent of Kyrgyzstan and the myths operating here.

Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Post-Vote, Declined Mandates Reshaped Kyrgyzstan’s Legislature

Reposted from Eurasianet.org
by Ryan Weber

Did Kyrgyzstan’s voters get the leaders they chose?

On December 17, the Respublika party announced the successful formation of a new governing coalition to lead Kyrgyzstan’s parliament. This second attempt at forming a majority succeeded where the first failed because Respublika, which led the effort, is unattached to the North/South regional divide or pro-/anti-government legacy of the other four winning parties.

But Respublika is unlike Kyrgyzstan’s other political parties in another way as well -- by the time the party came to power, most of its minorities and women had declined their seats in parliament, leaving a 100 percent ethnic Kyrgyz and mostly male party.

According to the Kyrgyz electoral code, voters cast ballots for a party’s list of candidates. Based on votes, each party is awarded a certain number of seats that go to the top candidates on their respective party lists. If a candidate declines his “mandate,” then the seat passes to the next highest candidate on his party’s list.

One candidate from Ata-Meken, Joomart Oturbayev, declined his mandate despite being #3 on the party’s list. There are rumors that Ata-Jurt co-chairman Kamchybek Tashiev wanted Dinara Isaeva, wife of former Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov (who is in hiding) and #12 on the Ata-Jurt party list, to decline hers, but she refused. Ata-Jurt, Ar-Namys, and the Social Democrats (SDPK) have not had a single candidate refuse a mandate.

Respublika, on the other hand, has had an incredible 18 mandates -- of its 23 total -- refused by candidates in the party’s top positions.

The combined effect of these voluntary exclusions has been to make Respublika’s parliamentary delegation much less diverse than its original party list -- the list voters elected. Alevtina Zavgorodnyaya (#8) and Yuri Nizovskii (#27), both ethnic Russians, were the only non-Kyrgyz candidates within Respublika’s top 50 positions. After they both declined their mandates, Respublika became the only party in parliament not to have a single non-Kyrgyz delegate. Four women candidates declined to enter parliament for Respublika, though five remained.

The resulting Respublika faction in parliament is exclusively Kyrgyz and 78 percent male -- i.e. not very representative of Kyrgyzstan as a whole.

Tuesday, December 28, 2010

No Thank You: Many Respublika Candidates Refused Mandates

by Ryan Weber

Though not yet much reported, something odd took place in the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections. It occurred after all the votes were tabulated, but before the new MPs were sworn in.

It wasn't fraud per se, nor was it at all illegal. Instead, it was the unusual expansion of a common, but usually isolated, practice of elected party candidates declining to accept a seat in parliament (their "mandate") on behalf of their party.

But this time, candidates from the Respublika party exercised their right to decline the mandates at an incredible rate.

Further analysis will be posted soon, but for now, here is the data which was compiled from Resublika's published election-day party listand the final list of sworn MPs issued by the Central Election Committee (CEC).

Party List #, Name, Ethnicity, Mandate Decision
  1. Babanov, Omurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#1
  2. Alimbekov, Nurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#2
  3. Pirmatov, Ishaq - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#3
  4. Sultanbekova, Cholpon - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#4
  5. Isaev, Kanatbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#5
  6. Torobaev, Bakyt - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#6
  7. Sulaimanov, Altynbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#7
  8. Zavgorodnyaya, Alevtina - Russian - DECLINED
  9. Moldobaev, Askhat - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  10. Baatyrbekov, Almazbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#8
  11. Esenamanov, Zamirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  12. Aknazarova, Rosa - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#9
  13. Boko, Kenjebek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#10
  14. Aripov, Nazarali - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#11
  15. Turuskulov, Jyrgalbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  16. Djumaliev, Elmira - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#12
  17. Obdunov, Elmurat - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#13
  18. Kadyrkulov, Iskender - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  19. Osmonov, Malik - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#14
  20. Amanbaeva, Urulkan - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#15
  21. Arym, Kubat - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  22. Aitmatov, Kushtarbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#16
  23. Shaynazarov, Tynchtyk - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#17
  24. Omurbekova, Altynai - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#18
  25. Andash, Turatbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  26. Ismailov, Ulanbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  27. Nizovskii, Yuri - Russian - DECLINED
  28. Shayymkulova, Ainura - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  29. Jolbolduev, Pamirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  30. Bakirov, Mirlan - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#19
  31. Oskonbaev, Beyshenbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  32. Alimzhanova, Damir - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  33. Asylbek, uulu Damirbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  34. Duyshenbiev, Nursultan - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  35. Murashev, Nurbek - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#20
  36. Dzhumabekova, Akylsayra - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  37. Bekmatov, Abdyjapar - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#21
  38. Zakirov, Asylbek - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  39. Sabirov, Maksat - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#22
  40. Sagynbaeva, Gulifa - Kyrgyz - DECLINED
  41. Rezhavaliev, Abdulatipov - Kyrgyz - Accepted, MP#23

What Mystery? US Probe reveals Bribery, Corruption, Incompetence... and No Ethics Violations?

by Ryan Weber

A new report from the US Congress highlights Pentagon malpractice in its fuel supply contracting in Kyrgyzstan. As the details of the report filter out, clear repurcussions are ahead for the companies involved, the US Afghan war effort, and the future of US-Kyrgyz relations. What remains obscure is how US government contracting could be conducted to such poor standards for so long, and how the new report justifies its assertion that corruption - in the form of bribes and other kick-backs to former Kyrgyz regimes - was not part of the problem.

Background

On December 21, the US House of Representatives Oversight Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs issued its final report on an 8-month investigation into US fuel supply contacts for the Manas Transit Center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Situated on the grounds of the country's main international airport, within line-of-sight of commercial travelers, Manas ferries troops and supplies to Afghanistan as part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) .

When it was originally leased in December 2001, the US offered an aid package to the Kyrgyz government of Aksar Akayev totaling just over $2 million, a large portion of which went directly to Akayev's son, Aydar. Since then, two governments have fallen - Akayev's, and his 'revolutionary' successor Kurmanbek Bakiev - but Manas remains, first with an increase to $17 million annual rent in 2005, and now with a $63 million annual rent established in summer 2009. (See expert Alex Cooley's "Manas Matters" article for the above figures)

Thursday, December 23, 2010

Skin & Bones: The Structure of the new Kyrgyz Parliament


by Ryan Weber

"It's fun to write about an ACTUAL Kyrgyz government instead of a hypothetical one."
-Jax Jacobsen, reporter for Central Asia Newswire, in a tweet on December 20th, 2010

With the December 17 announcement of a successful majority coalition agreement, the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh parliament can finally get to the business of governing the Republic after more than 2 months of political stalemate. Following the results of the October 10 elections, 5 parties entered the 120-seat parliament, all far short of the 60 seats necessary to appoint a Prime Minister and other top positions. Ata-Jurt, the largest party, controlled just 28 seats, while Ata-Meken was the smallest with 18.

The successful coalition - even more impressive following the instantaneous collapse of the first such effort led by the Social Democrats (SDPK) - was undertaken by the Respublika party, and included 'pro-grovernment' SDPK as well as the nationalist-tinged Ata-Jurt.

Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys went into the opposition, but are unlikely to caucasus given their radically different positions on domestic and foreign policy. The same could be said of the relationship between SDPK and Ata-Jurt, though the coalition agreement suggests they may have found ways to compromise.

In rapid succession, the new coalition was able to fulfill its mandate by electing the new government's top leadership. Almazbek Atambaev of SDPK becomes Prime Minister (92 votes), Omurbek Babanov of Respublika becomes Deputy Prime Minister (88 votes), and Akhmat Khelidbekov of Ata-Jurt becomes Speaker of Parliament (101 votes).

All three positions are newly-empowered by the 2010 Kyrgyz Constitution, which elevates Parliamentary executives over the Kyrgyz President for the first time in the country's 20 years of independence.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Putting on a Show: Friends, Enemies & 'Frenemies' in Kyrgyz Politics

December 20, 2010, Bishkek – 24.kg News Agency
written by Asel Otorbayeva
style edit by Ryan Weber


Once again, Kyrgyz politicians place the importance of assigning government positions over actual governing.


Old Political Enemies

In its second attempt, the Kyrgyz parliament finally succeeded in electing a speaker. Their choice was the leader of the party [Ata-Jurt] which previously called for the return of ousted President Bakiev [actually, a rumor], and is comprised of many former allies to the fallen President.

Opponents [of Ata-Jurt] were highly critical of its intentions in the run-up to Parliamentary elections in October, charging it with a variety of "sins." Some even suggested members of Ata-Jurt helped instigate the June riots in Osh the ignited ethnic tension [and in several ways increased Ata-Jurts Nationalist rhetoric going into the election]. But the accusations against Ata-Jurt were never proven, and the other parties dropped attempts to link Ata-Jurt with the violence. Being veteran politicians, rather than defend themselves, Ata-Jurt enlisted [Kyrgyz] victims of the June events to protect their reputation.

Relatives of those killed during the April coup that removed Bakiev responded passionately to the former Bakiev administrators, [throwing eggs and] attempting to block their admittance to the new parliament. They demanded that such politicians never participate in government again, but the other ["pro-government"] parties did nothing to block their participation [such as passing a controversial Lustration law]. After a while, the general public acquiesced. [Respublika] party - as if it had forgotten the public distaste for Ata-Jurt - instructed the Social Democrat party (SDPK) to "make friends" with Ata-Jurt. They explained that economic concerns must trump personal animosity.

Now Almazbek Atambayev, SDPK leader and [recently-elected] Prime Minister must find a way to work with Akhmatbek Kelidbekov - the new Speaker of Parliament from Ata-Jurt. Whether they want to or not, their cooperation is vital for any progress [in Kyrgyzstan].

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Who Will Become Author of Kyrgyz Political Default?

Reposted from News Agency 24.kg
Bishkek - December 14, 2010
(0913 hrs)
written by Asel Otorbayeva
style edit by Ryan Weber


In the throes of giving birth to a parliamentary majority coalition, Kyrgyzstan may suffer a second miscarriage. The reason is obvious - excessive greed [by party leaders] for key positions in the future parliament.


Which Prime Minister is Best?

The main battle area among the five parties appears to be for the top spot [in the restructured Kyrgyz] government. Leaders of Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) and Ar-Namys party both want to become Prime Minister. For better or worse, neither are strangers to the political arena - each possessing ample experience as well as political baggage. And neither leader, Almazbek Atambayev of SDPK or Felix Kulov of Ar-Namys, show any sign of willingly stepping aside.

The Respublika party was chosen for the second mandate to form a majority coalition, and its leader, Omurbek Babanov, now faces one of the most difficult challenges of his career. Much younger than the other party leaders, and with less time in politics, he is finding it difficult to compete. His most persuasive arguments are unable to overcome the [entrenched] SDPK or the "iron shield" of Ar-Namys. It is no secret that ambitions for the Prime Minister position are entwined with hopes for the 2011 Presidential election. SDPK and Ar-Namys both aspire to the presidency, and controlling the Prime Minister may be a necessary 'trump card' for that effort.


Speaker’s Throne as Alternative

[Realizing that the new Kyrgyz Constitution dramatically increases the power of parliament, the position of Speaker of Parliament has become much more valuable. Now, not only the leader of the Ata-Meken party, [Omurbek Tekebaev] aspires to the post [he once held], but also members of Respublika, Ar-Namys, and Ata-Zhurt's co-chairman, Akhmatbek Kelidbekov.

According to the Constitution, which Tekebaev authored, tremendous authority resides in the hands of the Speaker. Deputies of the fifth convocation - the current parliament - seem unaware of the trap inherent in Tekebaev's government structure. He "planted a bomb with a clock mechanism continuously ticking like a reminder: the Prime Minister and the Speaker shall, as Siamese twins, breathe, sleep and most importantly - work in unison. Otherwise - [say] goodbye to the coalition, and hello [to the] dissolution of parliament!"

Assuming Felix Kulov steps aside, and his sworn [enemy] Atambaev becomes Prime Minister. How well can Atambaev work with [Speaker] Kelidbekov? Will this arrangement have a [viable] future? Of course not. And what about another combination - Speaker Kulov and Prime Minister Atambaev?

Whatever the experts say about the necessity or political wisdom of regional balance [i.e. the inclusion of Ata-Jurt as a "Southern" party along with the other, predominantly "Northern" factions] to the long-term stability of state, most of the existing coalitions are [destined to be] short-lived.

Monday, December 13, 2010

Waiting for Parliament and a Kyrgyz Santa Claus

by Ryan Weber

For those of us anxiously waiting to see what sort of governing coalition will emerge from the Kyrgyz parliamentary negotiations, it's beginning to feel more and more like we may be waiting for a 'Godot' - the fictional character in Samuel Beckett's drama who, (in)famously, never arrives. Or perhaps, with the December 24 deadline for the formation of the next parliamentary coalition, it's up to the equally-fictional Santa Claus to finally bring resolution to the Kyrgyz political situation.

After requiring the full 15 working day period allowed by the constitution, the SDPK-Respublika-AtaMeken coalition failed to elect Omurbek Tekebaev as Speaker of Parliament on December 2. Since the coalition agreement was based on the awarding of the Speaker position to Tekebaev, as well as the Prime Ministership to SDPK leader Almazbek Atambaev, and Deputy PM to Respublika's Omurbek Babanov, the coalition couldn't enforce its contract, and thus dissolved. With 67 nominal coalition members in the 120-seat legislature, the surprising defeat with just 58 votes for Tekebaev demonstrated the practical, as well as theoretical, shortcomings of the agreement. Just days after signing a pact of solidarity, coalition members voted against their own coalition.

On December 3, an embarrassed Atambaev asked Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to select another party to form the coalition. Originally, Otunbayeva said Ata-Meken, as the other "pro-government" party, would be tasked with the duty if SDPK failed. Instead, whether because Tekebaev declined the opportunity, or Otunbayeva reacted to his apparent unpopularity, Omurbek Babanov and Respublika were given the charge along with a new deadline - December 24.

With the race to form a coalition once again wide open - with rumors that perhaps 4, or even all 5 political parties will join together - the possible make up of the ruling Kyrgyz government remains an item of intense, if largely uninformed, speculation.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Panel Suggests Media, Representation, Corruption all Obstacles to Peace & Democracy in Kyrgyzstan

by Ryan Weber

On the evening of December 6, the Elliott School at George Washington University in Washington, DC hosted a panel discussion titled, "Post-election Developments in Kyrgyzstan: The Tension Between Democracy Promotion and Conflict Mitigation."

The event was moderated by Dr. Sean Roberts, director of the International Development Studies Program at George Washington University, and author of the Roberts Report on Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Panelists included Alisha Khamidov, lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University; Jeff Goldstein, senior policy analyst of Eurasia at the Open Society Institute; and Sam Patten, senior program manager of Eurasia at Freedom House.

The event drew a respectable crowd of students and DC-based Eurasia analysts, and focused on the relationship between democracy promotion and (ethnic) conflict resolution in post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan. Especially at issue was the tension between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in the country's Southern regions and how certain political factions used nationalist rhetoric to exploit and encourage this tension for their own gain leading up to the October 10 parliamentary election.

Each offered their perspective on the nature of the widespread June violence that shook Osh and lead to the death of hundreds and the flight of tens of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks to the nearby border with Uzbekistan. Each speaker had been to Kyrgyzstan within the past 6 months, during the Osh violence, October elections, or both.

Monday, December 6, 2010

If at First you Don't Succeed: Kyrgyz Parliament Takes Another Shot at Forming Majority Coalition

by Ryan Weber

The march of Kyrgyzstan's fledgling parliamentary democracy took another hit on December 4 as the recently-announced "Coalition for the Sake of Stability" turned out to be a "Stillborn Coalition" as it failed to achieve its first test of forming a parliamentary government.

Despite its 3 parties controlling 67 delegates - a majority of the 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh parliament - it was only able to muster 58 votes in support of its candidate for Speaker of Parliament. That candidate, the leader of the Ata-Meken party and a former Speaker of Parliament, Omurbek Tekebaev (pictured below right), failed to receive the necessary 61 votes because 9 coalition MPs (identities unknown) didn't vote for him.

Tekebaev has been out of government positions since 2006, but remains a major player in Kyrgyz politics as a former opposition activist, interim deputy chaiman, and architect of the new Kyrgyz Constitution adopted in July. With the possible exception of President Roza Otunbayeva, he is the individual most responsible for adoption of the strong parliamentary system under which Kyrgyzstan is struggling to operate.

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

Cutting the Deck: Expert Opinions Divided on Prospects for New Coalition in Kyrgyz Parliament

by Ryan Weber

On November 29, three parties in the Kyrgyz parliament announced that they had successfully carried out President Roza Otunbayeva's directive to form a coalition of more than 60 seats. the Social Democrats (SDPK), Respublika, and Ata-Meken (Fatherland) will lead the legislature and nominate officers for the country's first ruling multi-party parliament, the 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh.

Since the announcement, various experts and analysts (including this one) have weighed in on the prospects for the coalition amidst an abysmal economy and the onset of Kyrgystan's harsh winter and regular power shortages. With Hilary Clinton's first visit to Bishkek scheduled for tomorrow (Dec 2), it's worth considering two well-respected, and entirely contrary, opinions from Bishkek-based experts.

Mars Sariev, a veteran political analyst based in Bishkek, told New Agency 24.kg that the SDPK-Respublika-AtaMeken coalition was the "best option for further development of Kyrgyzstan."
"The country is on the verge of economic and political collapse, and the ruling coalition will need team spirit. They won’t be able to cooperate without it. If we consider that each of the leaders will get their previous positions – Omurbek Tekebayev will become a Speaker, Almazbek Atambayev - Prime Minister and Omurbek Babanov - Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, recent incidents – arrest of an extremist group in the city of Osh and the explosion in the capital - had a sobering effect on the party leaders. All the incidents that broke out in the country after the April events and last outbreaks – the awareness that the state could collapse overnight and they will lose everything - joined the former oppositionists. The coalition, which could not be formed for a long time, had been established overnight. This means the coalition has a potential and contradictions between them have been minimized."

On the other hand, Elmira Nogoybaeva, head of the Bishkek-based think tank Polis Asia, told 24.kg that the resulting coalition is worrisome because it "doesn't represent interests of the people of Kyrgyzstan to the full extent."
“It turns out that interests of the south won’t be taken into account in the parliament [because the three parties in the coalition are all seen as Northerners]. I think it were more challenging to create the coalition with participation of two northern and one southern party – Ata-Zhurt. Yes, many understand these parties are ideologic and political rivals but the level of the compromise would be higher… Such coalition would be more stable. Unfortunately, the artificial regionalism intensified after [the] April events. This is dangerous. I think politicians must follow regional balance when they will distribute the portfolios."

The caveat virtually every Kyrgyz expert has used is that whatever the new coalition does, or does not, accomplish, it is operating in a situation in which "the deck is stacked against it," and "the stakes are high" for its potential democratic future.

Gambling metaphors aside, the prospects for the "experiment in parliamentary democracy" are uncertain, as is the degree to which the success or failure of the new coalition will determine the greater course of the country's governance. While it is interesting, and occasionally informative, for experts to speculate on such trajectories, the best analysis always comes in hindsight.

Fortune telling is best left to the demonstrably clairvoyant.

And tarot cards.

Kyrgyz Parliament Sets Majority Coalition

The Kyrgyz Parliament in their first (and so far, only) session on November 10. With the formation of a majority coalition on November 30, parliament is expected to begin regular meetings soon. (photo credit AFP)

by Ryan Weber

As reported earlier (Nov. 24 and Nov. 29), the Kyrgyz Parliament has been deadlocked since its opening session on November 10 because no single party, or even group of two parties, controls enough seats to form a majority of the 120-member Jogorku Kenesh Parliament and name a Prime Minister, as required by the Constitution.

On November 30, just 2 days before the deadline set by President Roza Otunbayeva, that deadlock has finally been broken. After weeks of intense negotiations, including meetings with the rival Ata-Jurt and Ar-Namys parties, the SDPK party revealed an agreement with longtime fellow "pro-government" socialist party Ata-Meken and the new business-oriented party, Respublika.

This was the exact coalition that analysts expected to emerge following the October 10 elections, but breakdowns in the negotiations, accusations of international bias, and stubborn party leaders caused the "obvious" coalition to stall time and time again. Just November 29, Farid Niyazov, spokesman for the SDPK party, said that the two most likely coalition outcomes would include the Ata-Jurt party, which controls 28 seats in parliament, the most of any party.

But on November 30, an agreement was signed - without Ata-Jurt.


Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Minority Representation Paltry in Kyrgyzstan’s New Parliament

Originally published by EurasiaNet.org
November 29, 2010 - 11:54pm, by Ryan Weber

Kyrgyzstan's October parliamentary elections have been widely acknowledged as fair and credible by local and international observers. But one issue, minority inclusion, suffered a setback which may prove especially difficult to address in the wake of June’s ethnically fueled violence. Just a handful of deputies in the Jogorku Kenesh parliament come from non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups, in large contrast to Kyrgyzstan’s 30 percent minority population.

Uzbeks are the largest minority group in Kyrgyzstan, making up 14.5 percent of the population according to 2009 estimates. But the new parliament will include only three Uzbeks among its 120 members – a mere 2.5 percent of the governing body. Local sources reacting immediately after the election predicted as many as eight Russians would take up seats, though at least two (Yuri Nizovski and Alevtina Zavgorodnyaya of Respublika) have since declined their mandates. This still leaves Russians, who account for 8.3 percent of the population, in control of twice as many seats as Uzbeks.

These developments occurred despite institutional rules designed to promote minority involvement in parliament. Article 72 of the Kyrgyz Electoral Code requires 15 percent of each party’s candidates be non-Kyrgyz. However, the code provides no guidance on dividing those spots among different ethnic groups, nor regulating where they are placed numerically on the party lists. In its preliminary report, the OSCE’s ODIHR mission cautioned that only 3.6 percent of all candidates were Uzbek, and that they and other minority candidates were often relegated to the bottom of party lists. In this capacity, they fulfilled the official quota, but were unlikely to become parliamentary delegates as no party could legally win more than 65 seats.

As parliamentary mandates were awarded, it became clear that this is exactly what happened. The most egregious example is the Respublika party, in which 11 of its 24 minority candidates were listed in spots 100 - 120.

However, 2010 did provide at least one breakthrough in minority representation. Ravshanbek Sabirov, of the Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party, became the first ethnic Tajik to serve in the Kyrgyz parliament. The successful Uzbek delegates are Anvar Artykov of Ar-Namys (Dignity), and Sabir Atadjanov and Bakhtiar Kadyrov of the Social Democrats (SDPK). There is also one deputy from the minority Korean ethnic group, Roman Shin, who has been a Member of Parliament since 2005, and now sits as a member of Ata-Jurt (Fatherland).