For those not spending the last few days following the various news and twitter feeds, here's a quick recap of what is going on with the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan and what it might actually mean.
First, let me say that there are a suprisingly large number of news organizations, professional freelance journalists, and amateur reporters covering this directly from Bishkek. I have listed some of the most thorough and reliable sources at the bottom, and if you really want the best view of what's going on, I would encourage you to consult these often for updates. Many of them are in Russian, but if you are using the Google Chrome browser, it can automatically translate to English with decent enough reliability to be informative.
Let me also add that my personal connection with Kyrgyzstan is based on a 2-month internship I had with the local Radio Free Europe branch, Radio Azattyk, in summer 2009. While I was there, I covered issues of international relations (esp. with US) and the rigged Presidential Elections. I certainly have my biases and particular perspectives, all of which are now some 8 months out of date, but hopefully I'm still informed enough to be useful.
In July 2009, Incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiev was re-elected to a second term in a national election that was widely regarded by international observers as highly fraudulent. It was a rigged election that was carried out at such a high administrative level, that there was no need for (much) blatant fraud like ballot stuffing or police intimidation on the day of the election. Opposition party leaders and candidates, especially Almazbek Atambayev, called for public protests, but very little actually happened. In the official tally, Bakiev won an overwhelming majority, the opposition lodged formal protests, and then nothing happened.
Four years earlier, in 2005, a similar rigged election was followed by intense public outcry for both the lack of transparency and the intense corruption and nepotism of then-president Aksar Akayev. Beginning in the regions of Osh, Talas and Naryn, and which ultimately resulted in mass public protests. Facing such hostility, the president resigned and fled to Moscow, where he still lives.
Showing posts with label Bakiev. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bakiev. Show all posts
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Post-Election Conclusions
If you're really, really curious, then you should just parouse all the headlines on the eng.24.kg website for July 23-25. For the rest of you, here's the short version:
Voting started at 8 am; apparently at some polling stations people were lined up to vote. As the day continued, reports of "voting irregularities" started coming in from all directions. This was a surprise to the CEC (state election committee) since it declared the vote would be "free, fair and transparent" from the start, and a surprise to foreign journalists like myself in that we assumed the Bakiev regime had enough time to rig this thing in such a way that elections observers - who are only in country for 3-5 days - wouldn't be able to see them doing it.
In order for a Kyrgyz election to be valid, 50% of all registered voters must cast their ballot. Since only 1/3 of the Kyrgyz population is registered (and some people lost their registration status after voting for the opposition in the 2007 parliamentary campaign), this isn't as infeasible as it sounds. However, the official statement that 40% of all voters had cast by noon seemed to be stretching it, with at least one - as possibly many more - instance of polling stations opening their doors with pre-filled ballot boxes. There were lots of Zombie Voters (my term, and proud of it - citizens who've been dead, often for years, who still manage to vote Bakiev), and an as-yet unconfirmed number of double-voters. One wry joke of the day involved a middle-aged man who voted opposition in 2007, and was complaining that this time he wasn't allowed to vote. Another man suggested, "oh, you voted, maybe more than once, you just didn't know it."
Friday, July 24, 2009
Election Wrap-up
After many hours of waiting and lots of big talk, nothing really happened, which isn't such a bad thing.
As the election day proceeded, there were more unofficial reports of fraud from both sides - one district in the south had its entire vote eliminated when the ballot boxes arrived at the polling station pre-filled (opposition, Ak Jol, and foreign observers all agreed to just dump them).
As the day progressed, there was big talk from Atambaev and Nazarliev about joining forces and making a protest march on the Central Election Committee offices. Technically, they were already planning to have a victory celebration, and just announced that instead it would be a protest rally (as it obviously always had intended to be).
I went to the site, gorky park, and observed about 1 dozen bored police officers (mostly women) just sitting around. As time passed and it grew darker (gorky is not well lit), the making-out couples trailed off, and it became apparent that one small cluster (maybe 30 people) sitting in the dark might not be entirely social. About an hour after the march was supposed to start, someone came up and started speaking to the group. They huddled around him, then, rather casually, dispersed in several directions. Speaking ot one of them on the way out, the "agitation" was apparently cancelled.
My journalist friend at Opposition HQ said they were all pretty disheartened. But to be honest, this opposition hasn't been very impressive.
With gorky a bust, I went to the main city square, Ala-Too, but it was absolutely business as usual. Ever since the president installed new fountains, benches and gardens in teh square in early June, it's been a popular family spot every night, even until pretty late. Tonight, it was no different. Children eating icecream, young people holding hands, and old people chatting on the benches. Extremely chill.
I did hear some disturbing reports of voter fraud - it's not a surprise that the election was rigged - at all - but general concensus was that the president was savvy enough to do it all ahead of time and not in fron tof the international observers he brought in to confirm it.
Apparently not.
The OSCE will publish its official report of any violations it witnessed this afternoon, and I'm curious to see exactly how itwas graded. People here generally think Bakiev would winn a fair election, but that hasn't stopped rampant fraud from his supporters, which tends to inflate a realistic 70+% into the kind or ridiculous figures that were common in the Soviet era.
In one instance I heard of, an entire region shredded their tallys and just created new numbers when it was apparent that Atambaev actually won. If this had been reported, they would have all lost their jobs, so the OSCE observers were asked to leave so that the numbers could be "reconsidered."
Pretty blatant, but not directly Bakiev-induced. Indirectly, yes.
Thanks for paying attention to Kyrgyz Politics. Somebody needs to.
As the election day proceeded, there were more unofficial reports of fraud from both sides - one district in the south had its entire vote eliminated when the ballot boxes arrived at the polling station pre-filled (opposition, Ak Jol, and foreign observers all agreed to just dump them).
As the day progressed, there was big talk from Atambaev and Nazarliev about joining forces and making a protest march on the Central Election Committee offices. Technically, they were already planning to have a victory celebration, and just announced that instead it would be a protest rally (as it obviously always had intended to be).
I went to the site, gorky park, and observed about 1 dozen bored police officers (mostly women) just sitting around. As time passed and it grew darker (gorky is not well lit), the making-out couples trailed off, and it became apparent that one small cluster (maybe 30 people) sitting in the dark might not be entirely social. About an hour after the march was supposed to start, someone came up and started speaking to the group. They huddled around him, then, rather casually, dispersed in several directions. Speaking ot one of them on the way out, the "agitation" was apparently cancelled.
My journalist friend at Opposition HQ said they were all pretty disheartened. But to be honest, this opposition hasn't been very impressive.
With gorky a bust, I went to the main city square, Ala-Too, but it was absolutely business as usual. Ever since the president installed new fountains, benches and gardens in teh square in early June, it's been a popular family spot every night, even until pretty late. Tonight, it was no different. Children eating icecream, young people holding hands, and old people chatting on the benches. Extremely chill.
I did hear some disturbing reports of voter fraud - it's not a surprise that the election was rigged - at all - but general concensus was that the president was savvy enough to do it all ahead of time and not in fron tof the international observers he brought in to confirm it.
Apparently not.
The OSCE will publish its official report of any violations it witnessed this afternoon, and I'm curious to see exactly how itwas graded. People here generally think Bakiev would winn a fair election, but that hasn't stopped rampant fraud from his supporters, which tends to inflate a realistic 70+% into the kind or ridiculous figures that were common in the Soviet era.
In one instance I heard of, an entire region shredded their tallys and just created new numbers when it was apparent that Atambaev actually won. If this had been reported, they would have all lost their jobs, so the OSCE observers were asked to leave so that the numbers could be "reconsidered."
Pretty blatant, but not directly Bakiev-induced. Indirectly, yes.
Thanks for paying attention to Kyrgyz Politics. Somebody needs to.
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Bishkek Election Update
For those actually interested in following the insanity as it happens, here are some bit-by-bit items:
+ Start with some good background info, courtesty of Radio Azattyk:
+ Start with some good background info, courtesty of Radio Azattyk:
+ More deep background and longer article, only for the really curious:
+ President Bakiev publicly declares he will allow no "destabilization" efforts during the elections. I.E., any protest of the results will be seen as a coup attempt, and treated accordingly:
+ A good look at what happens inside the polling stations, and what the official party line of the incumbents Ak Jol party members is:
+ According to Kyrgyz law, more than 50% of registered voters must vote for any election to be valid. That seems unreasonable in a country of such vast low-population areas, and general political apathy. But consider that in Bishkek, a city of over 1 million residents, there are only 338,000 registered voters (and a full 221 polling places for them to vote).
Here is the vote figure by Noon:http://eng.24.kg/politic/2009/07/23/8597.html
+ Bakiev has been very forward about allowing Western Election Observers into the country this year, but the Central Election Committee (hereafter CEC) still keeps a tight rein on exactly which Western observers make it through. The Helsinki Committee (a respected OSCE affiliate) just learned today that they have been denied:http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/5042.html
+ This is Really interesting. The perception of Bakiev as an almost-all-powerful autocrat lead many to speculate that shortly after his re-election, we would see parliament pass an amendment changing the 2-term limit set in the Kyrgyz constitution. But not so, says Bakiev himself, on the day of voting: http://eng.24.kg/politic/2009/07/23/8596.html
+ Then there's this - according to the Bishkek Election Committee (state org), opposition campaigners are demanding to check voter's passports at polling stations. This type of ID-checking is illegal for non-authorized (state) officers to request. So, just to be clear, the first accusation of voter fraud actually goes against the oppositon:http://eng.24.kg/politic/2009/07/23/8598.html
So far today, I've visited a few polling places, and everything seems to be genial. Citizens come and go on lunch breaks, and it's all very casual. There is no intimidation at the polls, nor even a very strong police presence (contrary to the predictions of veteran democray agents here). But I'm only seeing downtown Bishkek, which is guaranteed to be the whitest of the white gloves in this process.
I'm heading back out now - don't expect too many more updates. This isn't Iran, I'm not much of a journalist, and I don't even know what you call Twitter-bytes (there is some controversy).
But I'll do what I can to share with you the (potentially) interesting developments of this generally uneventful day in Kyrgyz politics.
Bishkek Election Primer
Today is the big day. Kyrgzy Presidential Elections.
For those of you who haven't been soaking this up for 2 months, here's the rundown:
Kurmanbek BAKIEV - the incumbent, he was elected President in 2005 following the "Tulip Revolution" that saw peaceful mass protests force the former president (and soviet-era leader), Aksar AKIEV, into exile in Russia. Since taking over the presidency, Bakiev has committed all the sins for which Akiev was ousted - gross nepotism, private ownership of state industries, centralization of power, and increasing repression of opposition and media figures. His campaign posted, billboards, and TV ads have slogans like, "Bakiev: Real Presient," or "Bakiev, of course."
To be honest, most Kyrgyz I've spoken to think Bakiev is good enough, or to quote one, "he's the only candidate with presidential experience." Touche?
Almazbek ATAMBAEV - the lead opposition figure, Atambaev is a knotty puzzle. He was formerly a Prime Minister for Bakiev, but resigned in protest following the heavily-rigged 2007 parliamentary elections (in which his Social Democrat party got slaughtered by the president's Ak Jol party). He's not technically a candidate from any official party. He registered as an independent, and then a collaboration of minor parties came together and named him the candidate for their "United Peoples Movement." In the last few days, he's become Very aggressive, speaking publicly about where his "victory celebration" will be held after the voting closes - it is generally acknowledged that he has a snowball's chance in hell, making this all the more puzzling. Some think he's trying to setup a protest/coup. I've never seen more than 300 people at an Atambaev rally, so I just don't see that happening.
Jengishbek NAZARALIEV - despite looking unfortunately like a chubby Mussolini in his prolific campaign posters, Nazaraliev is actually a wealthy and well-respected doctor and beneficiary. He's built a hospital, and campaigns loudly on the premise of "100,000 questions" he has for Bakiev about his poor governance, and "8 ideas" Nazaraliev has to improve the country. He would technically be considered the 3rd most-likely candidate, making him, to keep the above analogy, an icicle in Satan's crotch.
Tamir SARIEV - He entered the race along with everyone else, passed the televised Kyrgyz language test that knocks out 2/3 of all candidates, and has generally been pretty quiet. He's a successful Kyrgyz businessman by virtue of owning the Tien-Shan Legend bottled-water company. It has been widely rumored that he's running as a way to make money. Basically, the tacit agreement is that if you don't make too much of a fuss in your campaign, and don't be too hard on the president, then nobody really looks too hard at where your campaign funding goes after the election. This is generally accepted as true for all candidates, not just Sariev. I mention it because he has been especially quiet, and very business-savvy. He did found his own political party (Ak Shumpkar) to validate his candidacy.
Toktaym UMETALIEVA - she is the chairwoman for a major NGO consortium in Bishkek, and the only woman in the race. If elected she would be the first female president of Kyrgyzstan. But that's not actually such a huge thing. While having a woman president might shake up Kyrgyz society just a touch, in all the Post-Soviet countries women are active in the workplace, involved in politics, and successful in business, simultaneous with some stereotypes, sexism, and illebral social structures. If she got elected, it just wouldn't be as earth-shattering as Obama in America, but it would be unusual. Of course, that won't happen. Her platform is basically that she wants to show that a woman can run for president (not actually be one).
Nurlan MOTUYEV - I haven't heard anything from this guy but quick one-liners about how Bakiev isn't so bad. He declined a radio debate with the president (no offered to any other candidates) because he had no policies that he disagreed with the president about. He has no posters, and as far as I can tell no campaign, though he did comment (to Radio Azattyk staff) that he thought "Bakiev is being very patient. If I were him, I would arrest any journalist who writes such things about me." When a candidate thinks the incumbent is the ideal president, I'm not sure how much of a 'candidate' he remains.
So the gist is, this is a one-horse race (Bakiev), with a loud pony (Atambaev) wandering around the track, and a few geldings watching from edges, happy to be out of the barn for a bit and enjoy the fresh hay.
It should be said that the "democratic" coup that toppled Akaev in 2005 wasn't anticipated either, but I must say that any chance for dramatic change today is exceptionally low. Still, the thunder Atambaev is putting out suggests there might be lightning somewhere, but I just don't see it. There is a sizeable opposition attitude in Kyrgyzstan, but it has nothing to do with any of these Bishkek-based politico-elites. The south of this country (Osh region) is becoming more and more swayed by Islamic hard-liners, who are taking notes from Taliban refugees. Islam in general holds more sway down south - and that's not a bad thing. Most of the mullahs and imams are very moderate, and generally encourage people to avoid politics all-together (that's not such a good thing). But Taliban and Taliban-influenced Kyrgyz and becoming more vocal. That none of the presidential candidates represents these religious opposition movements only demonstrates their lack of actual grassroots support, and the difficult situation of a "democratic" system which excludes the opinion of a considerable percentage of its citizenry. Imagine if the US electorate had to choose between Republicans and Libertarians. Or Democrats and Green Party. My point is, when a huge chunk of people don't feel like they have any political recourse or representation, eventually, cutting them out of government could cause some trouble.
But not on an election day that they don't even care about.
That's the primer. Polls opened at 8:00 am this morning, and close at 8 pm. If anything's going to happen, it will be tonight. Tomorrow the OSCE gives its report about the degree of election freedom/fraud. It should be interesting to see how much they're able to uncover.
For a more professional look, and some good perspective, check out this article posted today in the New York Times based on a recent visit by several NTY journalists to Bishkek - they actually got an interview with Bakiev, which is pretty remarkable, even if he didn't say anything interesting.
Saturday, July 4, 2009
States and Stats
A quick update to a few of my earlier posts. Following the very small "protest" in Ala-Too on June 30, today the opposition finally began its Bishkek campaign. Nothing overwhelming, but with just 20 days until the "election," the first signs of the main opposition candidate, Atambaev, showed up in the form of posters around town.As with the earlier Nazaraliev (minor party) posters, these are exclusively confined to light posts, electic boxes, and public walls - in short, (free) public spaces. This contrasts with the incumbent Bakiev campaign, which involves more than a dozen major billboards around town and posters (just a red background with the name "Bakiev" in white) placed in home and shop windows. It pays dividends to show one's personal support of Bakiev, just as it is less risky to put Atambaev posters on things no one owns.
A few other tidbits made public by the (often pro-government) new agency 24.kg:
Kurmanbek Bakiev (incumbent, Ak Jol party)
Current spending: $341,000 [how he got so many billboard & TV ads for this price is a mystery]
Total budget: $826,476,744
Almaz Atambaev (opposition)
Current spending: $104,384,534 [he must have spent this outside of Bishkek]
Total budget: $104,702, 325
Toktaym Umetalieva (only woman in the race, just for contrast)
Current spending: $5,100
Total budget: $14,465
The Freedom House ranking of Democractic "progress" is also an interesting, if rather blunt, analysis. It notes that in 2008, Kyrgystan received a score of 5 for Political Rights and a 4 for Civil Liberties, both on a scale of 1 (Free) to 7 (Not Free).
Other 5-4 countries include Uganda, Thailand, Nigeria, and Lebanon.
The full report is here. The opening graphs (pie chart of Free/Partially Free/Not Free countries in the world) are hilarious.
According to these rankings, Kyrgyzstan is a "Partially Free State," though more recently (June 30), Freedom House for the first time classified the Kyrgyz Republic as an "authoritarian state," which is a far cry from the more common "island of democacy," or "most democratic in Central Asia" tag that often gets affixed to Kyrgyzstan by Western countries looking to do business with it.
the June 30 report was a mid-year assessment published by Freedom House including a fascinating breakdown of different elements (still on the 1-7 scale). The combined figure gives Kyrgyz a 6.04 ranking (anything over 6 qualifies as an "authoritarian state"). This is actually the first year Kyrgyz fits this definition (mostly in the 5.90s previously), thanks in large part to a slight up-tick in suppression of the media in 2009.
It's a short read (with a great table of data), so if you're actually interested, check this out:http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/nit2009/kyrgyzstan.pdf
The important thing to note is that the numbers don't change AT ALL before/after the supposed "Tulip Revolution" of 2005. The President changed, but the government structure, degree of political rights, and civil liberties didn't waver one iota.
and for comparison, here is the neighborhood:
Russia (142 million people): 6.11 (first time Russia's over 6 since 1999)
So to reiterate: Kyrgyzstan is a country of somewhat open civil liberties, but very closed political operations. You can more-or-less do or say what you want, so long as you do not endanger the political status quo.
Still, I have a lot of problems with the basic assumptions of these reports, especially the insistance that countries must always be moving along the linear axis of "more" or "less" democratic - that's just not the case. Most countries (including the US) are varying degrees of semi-democratic, and they fluctuates in a very 3-dimensional space, often changing, but not often affecting their relationship to such a limited "free" vs "not free" criteria.
Most US citizens didn't want to go to war in Iraq (or to be less contentious, polls regularly show that most US citizens have wanted public healthcare for more than a decade). But the government "of the people" hasn't reflected this demonstrated public will. According to Freedom House, that's Democracy.
Conversely, the majority of Kyrgyz probably do want Bakiev to be president, even though the system doesn't really allow them to choose, and so this reflection of public will is called "Authoritarian - Not Free."
The reality is murky, and the loaded terminology of Freedom House and other "Democracy Promotion" agencies, chief among them the NDI, only exacerbate the misleading assumptions.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
UNdecision 2009
(a campaign billboard at the busiest intersection in Bishkek reads: Bakiev, a Real President. the man in the photo is a janitor-turned-chef, thanks to Bakiev's economic reforms, or so the heavily-run associated TV commercial claims)
It is common in US scholarship, and even more so in journalism, to add a short tag, essentially the informal motto, after use of the term "Kyrgyzstan," as in: "Kyrgyzstan, the most democractic of the Central Asian Republics..."
As I said, the phrase is widely used - and for good reason. Kyrgyzstan isdifferent from much of what can be found in Central Asia, and this phrase is an attempt to encapsulate the many elements that differentiate it from its neighbors.
However, it is also categorically wrong, and I'd like to highlight, briefly, how it is wrong, and why such a gloss has more serious repurcussions than simply bad diction.
Generally speaking, Kyrgyzstan is the most socially liberal country in Central Asia, and its government maintains more personal and professional freedoms and less direct control of the population than any other - including a not insubstantial degree more openness than its closes rival, affluent Kazakhstan.
We could simplify this to say the Kyrgyz Republic is more "Western," but only if we're prepared to define which Western this is - US, Canada, Mexico, Sweden, Italy, etc. I'm not.
From my observations, I would say that the "culture" is overwhelmingly influenced by the Russification (itself a brand of Europeanization) of the Soviet era, but that in Kyrgyzstan there has been a (political) choice to allow certain freedoms that are not present in, as an extreme example, Turkmenistan.
However, I think it's very important to realize that these limited freedoms are 1) Very closely limited - they are not absolute, and can be transgressed at the discretion of the government, and 2) they are a reflection of the government's choice, not the people's.
In other words, there is no democracy in Kyrgyzstan.
There are degrees of "freedom," and I would say generally "liberal" (in the classic sense - not the modern "left") social and political policies. But when the state tells you it is permitting (as in, with a state-issued permit) you to speak freely, rather than a people demanding and getting guarantees of free speech, there is a very different paradigm at work.
Let's take a look at Kyrgyz Presidential history.
Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president 4 years ago shortly after he lead the "Tulip Revolution" against former president (and ex-Soviet premier) Akaiev. In essence, Akaiev's corruption and nepotism became so exacerbated that public will turned against him, and sensing this, a majority of politicians decided to make a play of their own. Bakiev was at the head of this movement. When Akaiev realized the game was up and he would need to exercise force to stay in power, he elected not to mess with it. An academic by training, he preferred to retire to a life of ease and teaching in Russia, along with his considerable fortune (amassed entirely since 1991).
Bakiev took over more than just the office. He assigned Akaiev's former assets to his own family and associates, and now after 4 short years of "development" assistance from China, Russia and the West, personally controls more of the Kyrgyz economy even than Akaiev did. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the majority of US economic assistance sent to Kyrgyzstan wound up in Bakiev's pocket: he paid his own companies large sums to do the work with no-bid contracts.
To portray the Tulip Revolution of 2005 as any sort of "Triumph of Democracy," as has been the norm, is simply disengenuous. There were barely even minor changes to the government structure, and one kleptocracy smoothly replaced another. The validity of Bakiev's "election" in 2005 is generally assumed to be valid - but strongly biased by an odd lack of competitors from outside his circle of associates.
This summer, the Kyrgyz Presidential campaign season runs from June 18 to July 23. Those 25 days are the only ones in which candidates are allowed to speak openly about their platforms, run advertisements, etc. At least, this is true for opposition candidates. The incumbent operates under different rules.
Some things to note:
1) Prior to June 18, President Bakiev had a sudden influx of media time. He wasn't campaigning (in that, he didn't Tell people to vote for him), but he did use the opportunities to "explain" how he has run Kyrgyzstan for the past 4 years, how the country had improved, and what plans he has for the future.
2) There is a vitural construction boom in Bishkek at the moment, with public works projects that have been mysteriously stalled for months suddenly on the fast-track. A major thoroughfare in downtown Bishkek was torn up 6 months ago and sat, un-paved & disrupting traffic, until 2 weeks ago. It is scheduled to "reopen" by mid-July. The main plaza of Bishkek, Ala-Too Square, just got completely renovated, including new patriotic statues, childrens' fountains, painting, a new Kyrgyz flagpole, etc. Everything proves that life is good - under Bakeiv.
3) Suddently, Kyrgyzstan takes center-stage on international issues. Whether it's securing $2 billion in aid and loans from Russia, dramatically kicking US forces out of Manas air base, or flamboyantly deciding US forces can stay (for a 10 fold increase in $), the past 5 months have seen Kyrgyzstan, and Bakiev personally, play a much larger role in international affairs than ever before. "I am a Big Man, and only I know how to deal with Big Powers," he seems to say. Let this be a lesson to Western-centric foreign policy experts: sometimes, geopolitical brew-ha-ha is NOT about US-Russian relations; it's not all about you (s-a).
4) Despite the sudden (June 18) influx of Bakiev posters, billboards, TV and Radio adds, there are virtually no other campaign ads in Bishkek. Whereas most local businesses have Bakiev posters in their windows, only one opposition candidate - the long-shot Social Democrats - even have posters, and these are universally affixed to light poles and graffiti walls - places that no one "owns" or suggests they support him publicly.
5) Opposition campaign headquarters and activists have all mysteriously wound up in the files of state security agencies as potential terrorists. Some have been raided, computers confiscated, or people arrested under these charges. They are usually released a few days later, with excuses about a "mix up." Often the computers are not returned in functional order - any files on them having been erased. Several campaign speeches have also been forced to disband when police arrived to "protect them" from anonymous tips of "terrorists" attacks.
Prof. Lincoln Mitchell talked about how the first 1 or 2 elections of a new state are actually a forum for democratic change, but once the regime is settled, they become only instruments of that regime and the status quo.
The argument runs like this: The powers-that-be allow an election to take place only because it is in their best interest. Elections help incumbents reaffirms their "democratic" credentials with their western allies, give them a public forum to strengthen their own popularity, and allow them to make a lot of $ through "encouraged" campaign fund raising (campaign expenses often come from state funds), all at virtually no risk. The outcome of the election is already decided - were it not, there would not be any "election" taking place.
My rant here is not about this system of government, what some stubbornly call a "semi-democratic" state. This isn't what I think is the best system, nor do I think most Kyrgyz would necessarily choose this system if given a choice, but that's a long way from the point.
My specific beef is that, however much or little the liberal social elements of Kyrgyz society mirror those of "Western Democracies," the people do not play a role in deciding the composition or activities of the government, so it cannot be, in even a technical sense, "democratic."
Yet I would stress again that it is different from the other Central Asian Republics.
The amount of personal freedom in Kyrgyzstan is Substantially greater than you will find in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan. I don't have a frame of reference for Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan (the other relevant regional players).
This is a good thing - No, it's great! But it's not democracy, and calling it democracy has a corrosive effect.
When Barak Obama (sorry buddy) congratulates President Bakiev on his Democratic credentials, this takes the wind out of any opposition movement that could try to proclaim otherwise (Bakiev: "If America say's I'm democracy, then I am democracy!"), and it undermines domestic democratic education. Central Asians (if they could be spoken of as a group) are still learning what "democracy" means. If the West points to Bakiev's system of Oligarchical Kleptocracy and says, "look, this is what we mean by democracy," then why would anyone want more democracy?
I will color this post one step further: I don't believe "democracy" in any institutional sense is a universal goal. It may not be the best for all countries because of civic, economic, or other reasons. In fact, a strong dose of non-democracy (lobbyists, extreme wealth bias, etc) is at play in America, and we seem pretty happy with it - or at least not so upset that we do anything about it (other than write long, sarcastic blog posts).
I think as a general principle, all people should live under a system of government which they are willing to accept (or at least tolerate) - that is, no one should be oppressed by their state. Under this rubrik, Kyrgyzstan (and America) are both within my "fine so long as they're happy" qualifier.
But let's not put an Apple in a Dos Equis and call it a Lime.
I didn't make any strong predictions before the US election because, to be honest, I had no idea how it was going to go. I didn't initially think Obama had a snowball's chance in hell, and as the day got closer, I kept expecting my cynicism to be vindicated. I'm glad it wasn't, by the way.
But I will go "out on a limb" in Kyrgyz politics.
Presidential Election Prediction: Kurmanbek Bakiev Wins in Landslide. Probably not a ridiculous, international-guffaw 90%, but maybe... 73% Bakiev?
And for those of you who think all this talk of politics is "risky" under such a regime, I assure you it is not.
One of the great results of being in total control of a state's political system is that you don't even need to bother with oppressing the opposition - so firm and absolute is your hold on power that they are simply not a threat.
Engaging them in debate, or attempting to silence them, on the otherhand, generates the kind of attention and international sympathy that you don't want (see Iran).
Let them make all the noise they want; you can't out-scream a hurricane (to apply a totally ill-suited analogy to Kyrgyz politics).
But don't point to the Eye and tell me it's all clear skies from here, either.
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