Enthusiam Gap: How registered voter lists can marginalize small parties in the Kyrgyz Electoral System

by Ryan Weber

Following up on our earlier post about Kyrgyz Election Threshold Policy, numerous sources are citing the use of eligible voter lists, rather than actual ballots cast, as a highly unusual method of determining threshold results. One reason is the highly suspect nature of national registered voter lists, with common types of fraud including the registration of the deceased, minors, non-citizens, and even multiple registration.

In highly-efficient election systems, there are a number of bureacratic means to verify and double-check these registrations, combing through lists for repeats and cross-checking with tax records, etc. When all else fails, the system is protected to at least a slight degree by the difficulty of carrying this type of voter fraud into action. Multiple voting only works with the collusion of elections officials, and getting significant numbers of minors - much less the dead - to vote without arousing suspicion is also problematic.

According to the current Kyrgyz Electoral Code, election results are based on "votes of voters, included into voter lists, in the whole republic." (Article 77, subsection 2)

Interestingly, at least in its English translation, this sentence could grammatically infer two entirely different interpretations.

1. "Based on votes of [actual] voters, [each of whom must be] included in voter lists"
2. "Based on votes of [all potential] voters, [being any] included into voter lists"

In the case of the first example, the threshold should be calculated by its actual % of votes cast, as in most parliamentary systems. In the second, the unorthodox practice of applying threshold % based on non-voters becomes operative.

The previous post demonstrated the ramifications of this discrepancy.

But what about the voter lists themselves?

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By the Numbers: The Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election and its Quantitative Shortcomings

by Ryan Weber

As widely reported (including on this blog), the October 2010 Parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic were a tremendous accomplishment and a great step forward for the Central Asian state twice-"liberated" from semi-authoritarianism. The mere logistics of organizing an election in an often difficult-to-access country, with a weak central government, a history of rigged voting, and few experienced administrators were daunting. Doing so in the aftermath of an irregular regime change, under the guidance of a President still looking for legitimacy, and with simmering ethnic tensions following outbreaks of tremendous violence, is nothing to scoff at.

Or, as the opening paragraph of the OSCE/ODIHR preliminary report puts it, "The 10 October parliamentary elections were conducted in a peaceful manner. The authorities displayed the political will to bring the Kyrgyz Republic closer to holding democratic elections in line with OSCE commitments. Political pluralism, a vibrant campaign and confidence in the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CEC) characterized these elections. Fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, were generally respected. Overall, these elections constituted a further consolidation of the democratic process. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need for profound electoral legal reform."

However, handing the Kyrgyz effort a blank check of congratulations ignores some of the less laudable aspects of the process, and obscures the areas in which the government, even the newly-adopted Constitution itself, is working against its own stated objectives. Take, for instance, the question of electoral thresholds.

Nothing puts non-experts into a catatonic stupor like discussing electoral technicalities, but in the case of the 2010 Kyrgyz Parliamentary elections, the numbers clearly demonstrate how one aspect of electoral policy can influence not only the makeup of the resulting government, but the ultimate distribution of power and future trajectory of the entire country. Additionally, electoral thresholds tell us a lot about the intended inclusiveness of the resulting government - that is, how many different voices are allowed to play a role in national decisions. Thresholds are employed in many parliamentary systems as a way to make governing more effective - removing marginal parties and encouraging compromise and coalition building - but have the notorious potential of going too far. When a threshold is set too high, or other factors are used to intentionally disenfranchise specific groups, this is recognized as an abuse of thresholds and contradictory to the productive democracy they ostensibly support.

I contend that the Kyrgyz elections, which employed a 5% threshold of eligible voters and a 0.5% "regional threshold," represent a poor implementation of the principle. Below I present figures demonstrating how different threshold policies would have resulted in different governing results and levels of inclusion for the 120-member Kyrgyz Parliament as it moves forward.

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Cautiously Optimistic: Kyrgyz Election Marks Progress, But Challenges & Concerns Remain

by Ryan Weber

On October 10, 2010, the people of the small Central Asian Kyrgyz Republic overcame considerable social, administrative, and historical hurdles to emerge as the region's most politically competitive country, and its first to entrust executive power to parliament. Both accomplishments are laudable, rebuking the dominant trends of this semi-authoritarian presidential region, though many uncomfortable conditions continue to surround the weak government of President Rosa Otunbayeva. The extra-legal method by which former President Kurmanbek Bakiev was ousted in April - alternately described as a coup, revolt, revolution, riot, or collapse - followed in June by ethnic violence against Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek identity, aided and abetted by members of the Kyrgyz military, hardly inspire confidence in the fledgling regime.

In addition to these high profile disturbances, the post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan has struggled to live up to the pro-democracy ideals professed by its interim government. Questions of press freedom, over-zealous state prosecutions of Bakiev-era politicians and business leaders, and continuing rifts along regional North-South and various ethnic divisions haunt the prospect of a free and equal society. The fervent opposition has become the ruling elite, only to face new demands and challenges from both dispossessed Bakiev supporters and former colleagues in Human Rights advocacy NGOs.

It is not an easy situation, with lingering international pressure between Russia and the United States in the balance, and a strong Chinese influence still waiting to throw its weight behind any particular group.

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Meet the Stans

Since the fall of the Soviet Union - and indeed, among certain specialist a full 50 years earlier - a large section of the largest continent on Earth has been divided into political units terminating with the suffix, "-stan," a (cognate) term in Persian that roughly means "place of." To the casual observer, for whom the region has little international relevance, the countries that have adopted this naming convention to describe their national identity are often lumped together under the umbrella term "The Stans." This informal geographic categorization assumes a certain political, cultural and linguistic similarity which is not entirely accurate. However, more formal delineations of the region - as Central Asia, the Greater Middle East, Eurasia, West Asia, etc. - also demonstrate obvious failures to identify the salient borders of a mid-continental, non-oceanic region.

Let us consider, then, a new conceptualization of this broad, geographically diverse landscape; let us start over from the naive innocence of name recognition, and apply ourselves to evaluating those countries, sub-national provinces, and macro-national regions that lay claim to a shared heritage. While existing formal definitions like Central Asia, et al fail to capture the interconnectedness of the region as a whole, an alternative conceptualization may present itself if we're willing to... Meet the Stans.

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Turmoil and Turnover

For those not spending the last few days following the various news and twitter feeds, here's a quick recap of what is going on with the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan and what it might actually mean.

First, let me say that there are a suprisingly large number of news organizations, professional freelance journalists, and amateur reporters covering this directly from Bishkek. I have listed some of the most thorough and reliable sources at the bottom, and if you really want the best view of what's going on, I would encourage you to consult these often for updates. Many of them are in Russian, but if you are using the Google Chrome browser, it can automatically translate to English with decent enough reliability to be informative.

Let me also add that my personal connection with Kyrgyzstan is based on a 2-month internship I had with the local Radio Free Europe branch, Radio Azattyk, in summer 2009. While I was there, I covered issues of international relations (esp. with US) and the rigged Presidential Elections. I certainly have my biases and particular perspectives, all of which are now some 8 months out of date, but hopefully I'm still informed enough to be useful.

In July 2009, Incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiev was re-elected to a second term in a national election that was widely regarded by international observers as highly fraudulent. It was a rigged election that was carried out at such a high administrative level, that there was no need for (much) blatant fraud like ballot stuffing or police intimidation on the day of the election. Opposition party leaders and candidates, especially Almazbek Atambayev, called for public protests, but very little actually happened. In the official tally, Bakiev won an overwhelming majority, the opposition lodged formal protests, and then nothing happened.

Four years earlier, in 2005, a similar rigged election was followed by intense public outcry for both the lack of transparency and the intense corruption and nepotism of then-president Aksar Akayev. Beginning in the regions of Osh, Talas and Naryn, and which ultimately resulted in mass public protests. Facing such hostility, the president resigned and fled to Moscow, where he still lives.

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