::This is the second post on the continuing fallout of the June 2010 violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan. ::
On May 3, the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), which was tasked by Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to investigate and report on the ethnic violence that swent Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, issued its final report. Those findings included verification of many of the worst accusations made against state authorities - that Kyrgyz police and military contributed, at least through complacency, to the escalation of the violence; the law enforcement officials tortured suspects in order to gain or influence testimony; that post-conflict prosecutions by state officials have unduly targeted ethnic minority defendants; that certain high-ranking local and national officials were directly responsible for allowing the violence to continue.
It put the Kyrgyz Government in a difficult spot - President Otunbayeva specifically asked for the report from a specially-convened panel of international experts in order to raise the findings of the commission above reproach. Now, Otunbayeva's government wanted to do just that.
The response by government officials has run from thinly-veiled dismissal of the commission's methodology to outright refusal to acknowledge the findings- a debate currently raging within the Kyrgyz parliament. (update: on May 26, Parliament actually voted 95-0 to ban the head of the commission, Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, from Kyrgyzstan permanently for what it describes as a biased report the incites further ethnic tension).
Among the more measured reactions is a 30-page, 111-point refutation and comments issued by the government which are now being presented and defended internationally by members of the administration (complete text in English).
While these comments begin benignly, "The Kyrgyz Government consider that the KIC was able to collect significant evidence via a comprehensive and objective approach. The KIC conducted an unbiased investigation which permitted a thorough and useful analysis...", they quickly turn ugly.
On pg 2, for example, the government, "cannot fail to notice that the validity and effectiveness of the work of the KIC is substantially diminished by the presence of serious deficiencies in the final document." Specifically, the comments go on to accuse the KIC of unequally representing - both in quantity and style - the perspectives of victims from both ethnic groups involved. According to the comments, the KIC was more descriptive, elaborative, and used more emotionally charged language in its presentation of acts against the minority Uzbek population, while mentioning documented Kyrgyz victims less often, briefer, and more "numerically."
To quote the most direct paragraph:
"The Government of Kyrgyzstan considers it completely unacceptable that the KIC's documents clearly display an overwhelming tendency that only one ethnic group has committed crimes, ignoring the victims and deaths of this very group, and portraying the other group solely as defenceless (sic) victims."
Without going into each of the Comments' 111 points, the 3 other notable points are:
- While it applauds the KIC's confirmation that no War Crimes or Genocide took place, the Kyrgyz Government questions the commission's odd allusion to possible Crimes Against Humanity, for which it itself could find no actual evidence - and suggests such innuendo accusations be stricken from the report.
- The government attests that the conditions contributing to the violence that erupted in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 are misplaced by the KIC report. The underlying tension was not the result of the social unrest caused by the April 2010 "revolution" or by the weakness of the fledgling Provisional Government. Rather, according to the Government, these tensions were due to the "protracted policies implemented by former regimes," i.e. Bakiev (and possibly even his predecessory, Aksar Akayev, ousted in 2005?).
- The Government of Kyrgyzstan felt that many of the KIC's findings regarding the state's role to protect its citizens and prevent such outbreaks of violence are entirely warranted and fully expected in stable, developed nations - But, that Kyrgyzstan circa June 2010 was in no way capable of fulfilling these responsibilities. Therefore, they should not be held to the same standard and the KIC should be more lenient in light of activities both at the time and sense to restore order, build up greater citizen protections, and work toward ethnic and regional reconciliation.
In all, the Government's Comments come off as reasoned, intelligent, and... a little sideways. While they can cite violence against ethnic Kyrgyz as an 'equalising' factor, the overwhelming negative impact on ethnic Uzbek citizens of the Kyrgyz state is a difficult reality to fit into such explanations. If, hypothetically, 50,000 Kyrgyz attacked 20,000 Uzbeks, we could logically understand that more Uzbeks would be injured or killed. But for the government's scenario to work, Uzbeks would need to contribute almost equal numbers of rioters to that of the Kyrgyz minority, which is, demographically, almost impossible, and that before ethnic Kyrgyz from neighboring municipalities rushed to Osh to bolster their numbers.
Perhaps most disturbing, in the published comments, and reiterated in the speaking engagement on May 24 (see next post), is the continued reliance by administration officials to use over-worn (and poorly-sourced) explanations for which the KIC report found no basis. Did the fallen Bakiev family really incite the entire conflict as a way to regain political power? The report found no evidence, and the Government can only point to cell phone conversations made a month before the conflict started, when Bakiev was holed up in neighboring Jalalabad refusing to resign and still facing the very real possibility that the rather small and spontaneous 'revolution' would stall out.
In defense of the comments, some of the Governments harshest criticisms of the KIC report resonate. It is difficult to get a feel for the balance of actors and victims in a report that does spend a great deal of time describing certain events, and not others. And the entire issue of Crimes Against Humanity, and the manner in which the KIC report addresses it, fails to meet even a modicum of common sense, much less acceptable legal argument.
In truth, both the report and the comments strike hard and fast at the Government and the Commission, both coming away with substantial merit alongside unusually unsubstantiated claims.
The murkiness of this situation balks directly against the original purpose of the KIC - to ensure transparency and ultimately seek the best methods to prevent future tension and conflict. Instead, they have bred tension, both within the government, and among the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. What remains to be seen is how the Government, in partnership with international organizations, will move forward.
A good indicator will be their panel discussion and response to questions taking place on May 24, a report of which will be posted here following.
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