When the independent panel of international experts you solicit to investigate and report on outbreaks of ethnic violence under your jurisdiction finally issues that report - and cites your provisional government, including specific members of the administration - as at fault for notpreventing or containing the spread of that violence, what's an (Interim) President to do?
Kyrgyzstan's Roza Otunbayeva, a longtime opposition activist turn (post)revolutionary leader, was faced with this challenge recently, when the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) she established under OSCE Special Representative to Central Asia Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen published its report on the June 2010 conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan on May 3.
The report, which generally echoed similar reports by Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, could not identify specific protagonists of the violence, but did cite multiple instances at local, municipal and national levels where inaction by the newly-formed government was conducted to such a degree as to constitute culpability.
The issue went off like a bomb in Kyrgyzstan's political circles, where (ethno-)nationalist sentiments have been on the rise, especially among the Kyrgyz majority. As Eurasianet's George Camm puts it, Kyrgyz politicians are practically "falling over themselves" to outpace each other in progressively more hyperbolic shows of indignation. In the latest maneuver, the Kyrgyz Parliament - the Jogorku Kenesh - unanimously passed a resolution banning Dr. Kiljunen from entering Kyrgyzstan, ostensibly as a punishment for spreading "scandalous and disreputable" information about the June 2010 attacks that left 470 dead and more than 400,000 displaced - the overwhelming majority being ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
The relative invisibility of Otunbayeva - beloved by the West for her strong international credentials as a champion of human rights and political freedom - only demonstrates how sharp the knife edge of social schisms are within Kyrgyzstan. Otunbayeva became President in the irregular circumstance of the April 7 overthrow of former President Kurmanbek Bakiev, and then won approval via election to remain on as President through 2011 - she is not eligible for reelection in the next vote, set for this October.
In her stead, Otunbayeva dispatched senior officials on an international tour to refute the KIC report and issue their own criticisms of its findings, methodology and recommendations. On May 24, this panel visited Washington, DC, and after a US Congressional hearing the prior day, read remarks and gave an on-the-record Q-and-A session hosted by the National Democratic Institute, with Laura Jewett, NDI Eurasia Director, as moderator.
Panel and Remarks
Panel participants included:
- Ravshanbek Sabirov, the first ethnic Tajik to join the Kyrgyz parliament and an MP with the Ata-Meken party
- Mira Karybaeva, Head of the Department of Ethnic and Religious Policy within the President's office
- Erkinbek Mamyrov, Head of the Department of Legal Support within the President's office
- Dmitry Kabak, an independent NGO expert and activist on human rights in Kyrgyzstan.
Jewett opened the proceedings with brief introductions, and her assessment that further democratic reforms will help ensure more permanent domestic stability, and that the willingness of the government of Kyrgyzstan to publish the KIC report, despite their objection to some of its findings, is a welcome development in a region that, by and large, prefers to silence any opposing voices.
MP Sabirov began the comments, and set a cordial, but uncompromising tone to the proceedings. After expressing deep gratitude to the US for its "political and moral support" for Kyrgyzstan in its time of "greatest need," he admitted that the ethnic conflict in Osh and Jalalabad was a very high price to pay for the democratic restructuring that has taken place in Kyrgyzstan since April 2010. He commended the KIC for the enthusiasm of its investigation, and the quality of its analysis, but suggested the report contained "gaps" that the government of Kyrgyzstan wished to explain and correct.
The real criticism was left to Ms. Karybaeva, who wasted little time getting to the crux of the Government's position. She expressed "disappointment" that the KIC report failed to capture examples of inter-ethnic cooperation and conflict-limitation which she said proliferated and ultimately stemmed the violence. As specific examples, she cited how the Kyrgyz military helped secure the retreat of Uzbek refugees from Osh into temporary camps near the Uzbek border, or the selfless initiative of Kyrgyz and Uzbek families to shelter or assist their cross-ethnic neighbors.
Other considerations Karybaeva felt were unfairly lacking in the KIC report included the extremely weak nature of the Provisional Government at the time, the prevalence of disenfranchised old-regime favorites still holding government posts, and the entrenched drug networks in the South which the Bakiev administration had effectively condoned.
Looking forward, Karybaeva insisted that Human Rights considerations since June 2010 have become a core consideration of all government agencies - not just the police or military. The government is actively pursuing a host of reconciliation efforts, she said, but reports such as the KIC, which lay an overwhelming share of the blame on one group, risk undermining those efforts in the fragile social tapestry in Kyrgyzstan today.
Dmitry Kabak spoke next, though his most interesting contribution built on a short aside from Karybaeva, when she dismissed the KIC's ethno-centric evaluation: "It's not simply [an] ethnic conflict - there is more to it, and we have to be more careful in categorizing it."
Kabak, as many other Kyrgyz experts, expounded on this point. In Kyrgyzstan a variety of social markers including family networks, socio-economic status, and religious fervor can all combine in surprisingly fluid ways. Drug traffickers, hold-over strongmen, and those feeling themselves both empowered, or threatened, by the uncertain trajectory of events unfolding at the time in far-off Bishkek all provide ample motive to act out. Ethnic identity may have played little more than an opportune excuse for underlying tensions regarding land rights, or other, entirely non-ethnic frustrations.
Regarding the increasingly hostile, nationalist rhetoric of Kyrgyz politics, Kabak offering this observation (with my clarifications of innuendo in parentheses):
Elections (while a laudable part of a democratic government) add further complications (to ethnic reconciliation), as some of the necessary reforms (to protect ethnic minorities) are not widely popular (with the majority)... and opportunistic politicians can take advantage of this.
The final speaker, Mr. Mamyrov of the Department of Legal Support (Justice), spent the bulk of his remarks of the legal definitions of War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (the first two the KIC report said did not happen, and the last the report - in an unusual moment of equivocation - essentially said 'might' have happened). Mamyrov (rightly) eviscerated this tepid accusation, and clarified that while many illegal acts took place during the conflict, including assault, murder and rape, those are all crimes covered under the Kyrgyzstan Legal Code, and as such should be handled by local authorities, not international commissions. Such acts were committed not at the behest of the Kyrgyz government, but against its established laws, and therefore the government continues to prosecute those individuals who engaged in criminal activity.
In his final comments, Mamyrov built on Kabak and Karybaeva's point to infuse one last suggestion- "we believe that a pure ethnic conflict is not what took place, but was a[n][opportunity] used by certain political forces in the region."
The Kyrgyz Government has, since very early on, continued to insist that "certain political forces" were a mysterious '3rd force' responsible for inciting the riots and supplying arms and direction for the ensuing conflict. Whether that 3rd force has been identified as local drug cartels, al-Qaeda sympathizers, the family of the deposed Bakiev, or even - most improbably - ethnic Uzbek 'separatist-terrorists'.
Questions and Answers
The Question-and-Answer session provided a few more interesting exchanges. Notably, the further things progressed, the more Mr. Kabak appeared to be the most rational voice in the room - albeit, he was also the only member of the panel not directly representing the government, which took a series of difficult questions on the reported participation of Kyrgyz military units in the violence, use of torture by police officials, and the increasing - rather than decreasing - inter-ethnic tension caused by nationalist political rhetoric.
In response, the panel said that reforming the judicial and law enforcement system is a top priority. The selection process for local and national judges will be made less dependent on local politicians, giving the judges a larger degree of independence, while regular post-appointment oversight will be increased, to ensure judges are responsive to criticism from their local community. Police and military personnel will be retrained, and the government has begun implementing "force rotation" to move officers and even high officials between jurisdictions periodically throughout their career- actually a throw-back to Soviet policy, which the panel acknowledged.
Another keystone of the government's plan is to build up national infrastructure across the country's North-South and urban-rural divides. The current inequality of infrastructure distribution, focused more heavily on the industrailized, urban North, is seen as a point of frustration that may have tangentially fueled the ethnic backlash in Osh and Jalalabad.
The most cutting question, and controversial response, came from Erica Marat of the Voice of America Russian language service (@EricaMarat). She asked the panel about the many reports of people in Kyrgyz military uniforms involved in the clashes (which the KIC report found evidence to confirm), and the government's continued insistence of a '3rd force' inciting the violence (for which the KIC report could find no supporting evidence).
After a somewhat blustery initial reaction from Mr. Mamyrov - that Kyrgyz military uniforms can be purchased, and so witnessing someone in a Kyrgyz military uniform attacking an Uzbek is not sufficient evidence of military involvement in the attacks - the more reasoned response came from Kabak. He acknowledged the reports, without questioning the accuracy of what was witnessed, but also stressed that the topic of military uniforms is a complicated issue.
Uniforms are worn not only by active duty soldiers, according to Kabak, but also by off-duty soldiers, reservists, as well former soldiers and even unaffiliated individuals. He found it entirely plausible that certain individuals, in uniform, took it upon themselves to take action on their own initiative, or even in countervention of standing orders. Importantly, neither the KIC report found, nor has the government disclosed, any precise examples of the military chain of command ordering soldiers to take part in the violence.
Regarding the '3rd force' argument, Mamyrov merely reiterated the governments standing opinion, citing cell phone conversations from early May (when the ouster of Bakiev was still largely in doubt) as evidence that the Bakiev family and its supporters were considering ways to incite domestic turmoil as a means to regain power. To Mamyrov, this rather tenuous thread of suspicion is enough to satisfy his assertion that individuals loyal to Bakiev planned, seeded, and encouraged the riots that took place a month later, after Bakiev had already signed his resignation and taken asylum in Belarus.
The last question from the audience also offered a difficult insight into the lingering fragility of "Central Asia's first parliamentary democracy." When asked how the October 2011 Presidential Election is likely to affect the implementation of reforms, Karybaeva said it will be very important. Despite the fact that the President is only a figurehead under the new Constitution ratified last July, she expressed concern that if a candidate was elected who preferred the 'strong presidential' system more common in the region, he or she could make it very difficult for the government to implement its plans. Further, as nationalist rhetoric - centered around language issues for the moment - continues to inflame tensions, the campaign itself could prove a destabilizing element for the Republic at this critical time.
Closing Remarks
Virtually silent since delivering his opening remarks, MP Sabirov also got the last word, in which he explained continuing efforts by the government to improve "[inter]ethnic development." Notably, he announced the formation of a "People's Kurultai" (or public council) to include participation from across the 5 regions of Kyrgyzstan and representatives of minority groups. It's a popular strategy in Kyrgyzstan for both its openness and heritage - Kurultais have a long history in the traditionally clan-based social structure of nomads in Central Asia - but more modern examples, especially the one called by then-President Bakiev in spring 2010, have backfired. In that instance, instead of thanking Bakiev for the opportunity to meet, participants complained loudly about his poor governance, and began openly calling for his resignation.
Kurultais have no binding authority, and it is unclear how any reforms would necessarily proceed from such a meeting. Regardless, the first such Kurultai will be held on June 17, 2011, with subsequent gatherings at least once each year. MP Sabirov also announced that President Otunbayeva, upon her relinquishing the Presidency, would be appointed head of the Kurultai.
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