(image credit RIA Novosti)the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan announced on July 14 that it estimates a cost of 449 Million Kyrgyz Som (KGS) to conduct the upcoming Presidential Elections. The election marks the first change of the top executive since Roza Otunbayeva was selected as Interim/Transitional President in a package vote along with adopting the new Constitution that expressly limits the powers of the President in July 2010.
Otunbayeva has stayed true to her inaugural promise not to seek re-election, and in her absence a who's-who of Kyrgyz politicians have hinted at their intention to run. Currently, there are 14 declared candidates (5 declared last week), the most notable of which is Kamchybek Tashiev of the nationalist Ata-Jurt party. The big name not on the ticket at present is that of Social Democrat (SDPK) Almazbek Atambaev. Both are both current leading figures within the Jogoru Kenesh Parliament - Atambaev as Prime Minister and Tashiev as leader of the largest party in the unicameral legislature.
The new Constitution was written with the express purpose of limiting the authority of the President, and turning Kyrgzystan into a Parliament-dominated Democracy - the first in Central Asia - after two popular uprisings removed strong-arm Presidents in 2005 and 2010. That the most powerful politicians in Parliament are abandoning it to seek the Presidency suggests a possible return to a more empowered Executive.
At what cost?
Most often when elections are discussed in international affairs, they are treated more as principles and platitudes than the logistical nightmares they often prove to be on-the-ground. Consider the challenge: A vast network of independent groups of citizens, consisting mainly of volunteers, is expected to conduct a complex simultaneous nation-wide poll in such a manner as to be above reproach, even as certain elements will actively attempt to subvert, disrupt, or discredit their efforts. That all of this is done only every few years, and with minimal training, further complicate the task; and those are all the difficulties facing honest election workers in any democratic system. Add years of practiced election fraud, patronage network peer pressure, and a Democratic government that has accomplished very little since it wobbled into power on promises of reform. Put bluntly, while the idea of Democracy in Kyrgyzstan receives general praise, the seminal act of Democracy - elections - remain exasperatingly difficult.
And expensive.
The greatest virtue Kyrgyzstan has in reducing the cost of its electoral cycle is the size of its population - 5 million citizens require a relatively small number of ballots. Unfortunately, they are also dispersed, many to rural areas that are not only distant from the few large urban centers, but also extremely difficult to access. It is no surpise that one of the most mountainous countries on Earth will have some very remote voters.
This gets us back to one simple point - whether or not the Kyrgyzstan CEC is being gaudy or pennywise in its KGS 449 million estimate - Elections cost money.
Who pays for elections, and why?
Western states and international organizations that push hard for democratic reforms in non- and semi-democratic countries cannot avoid accusations of hypocrisy if they are unwilling to contribute to electoral costs, especially in less-wealthy nations. But doing so raises serious questions of local sovereignty, bias and nonpartisanship. Can a country, in which 100% (90%? 50%?) of electoral costs are supplied by other nations, really be considered a functional democracy given that it cannot actually operate the basic function of democracy - elections - without assistance?
In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, which has enjoyed (or suffered) a tumultuous year of liberal democracy, is it realistic to expect it to make the difficult transition from highly corrupt semi-democracy (involving regular, but highly fraudulent elections) to a 'real democracy' (in which votes are counted honestly and there is a real possibility of regime change)? More to the point, can it navigate such a challenge on its own?
The answer, from both the Kygyz CEC and international community is No - or at least, not yet. This is where the uncomfortable dialogue begins in which the CEC simultaneously declares its intention - and inability - to conduct democratic elections. The question is then left hanging for the international community - how much is a democratic transition worth to you?
At the current exchange rate, those 449 million Kyrgyz Soms are worth $9.97 million. That's almost $2 per citizen, and probably more like $2.25 to 2.50 per actual voter (assuming a strong turnout of 60-80%). For a 1 year old democratic system declared "largely free and fair" in an ethnically-divided, post-soviet, former-autocracy - - that's not bad.
But even a relatively "cheap" election may be beyond the reach of cash-strapped countries. State coffers in Kyrgyzstan are beyond empty - the country is currently expecting a $380 million deficit for 2011, and that's with over $250 million in foreign aid from the US already. Even worse, there are still no clear signs of economic recovery on the horizon. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance announced on July 14 that it anticipates $149 million in expenses for maintaining & rebuilding infrastructure, a dramatic increase from the $33 million it originally projected for the 2011 budget.
If the cash cannot come from within Kyrgyzstan, it must come from without. The US will almost certainly provide some of this capital, either through direct grants coordinated with USAID, or via its satellite NGOs like the National Democracy Insitute, the International Republican Institute, or others. Multilaterals like OSCE's ODIHR will contribute, and there will likely be room for regional players like CSTO and the SCO to get in the game. Each of these constitutents will certainly provide observer missions to the election process, and each is likely to lodge commendations and a few criticisms.
As the lines of intention and investment intertwine and intersect, the premise of supporting the principle and practice of Democracy gets tainted with other foreign policy objectives. The clearest recent examples can be found in the 2010 Afghan parliamentary elections, when a perceived pro-US outcome led to an initially tepid investigation of what turned out to be rampant fraud. Even more stark are the now-classic 2006 Palestinian elections. Hamas, still classified as a terrorist organization by the West, won majority seats in an election that all external observers reported as credible. But that was an unacceptable outcome for a US foreign policy that had previously defined itself as indivisibly pro-democracy and anti-Hamas.
Elections as a means, not end, or Democratic change
In returning to the case of Kyrgyzstan, and the upcoming October 30 elections, the challenge - or, depending on your bias, the threat - of a properly functioning electoral system delivering the "wrong" results is very real.
Following the tragic Osh riots in June 2010, ethnic tensions have remained high - and not accidentally so. Optimism about the future of the Republic following the ouster of Bakiev in April 2010 has been coopted by political and social actors employing a renewed ethnic hypernationalism to stoke fears and discontent resulting from the deteriorating economic situation. Some who have visited Kyrgyzstan recently and witnessed the rhetoric personally find the atmostphere dramatically more hostile even than the lightly-oppressive political climate in Bakiev's final years.
It is not difficult to imagine politicians who appeal to base populist fears further fomenting social dissatisfaction, ethnic division, and disappointment with the Parliamentary system. Assuming the political process itself doesn't spark another revolt, once legally in office, certain candidates may take it upon themselves to derail the "First Parliamentary Democracy in Central Asia."
This is not to say that any of this is likely, only that all of it is within the realm of realistic outcomes in the near future. $10 million dollars is a small price to pay in pursuit of a stable, equitable, and transparent democracy for the people of Kyrgyzstan and as a model for the region. But it is not a guarantee. In fact, in the current political situation, even the best elections may open the door to illiberal or anti-democratic agents, as in the Palestinian case.
The counter argument, however, that a country is not "ready" for democracy, despite its occasional reemergence in academic journals and utterances by policymakers, has been proven thoroughly bankrupt - morally, practically, and rhetorically.
The frightening - or exhilarating, depending on one's half-full/half-empty tendencies - realization is that elections are, at best, an instrument of good governance, not the accomplishment itself. Whether elections lead to more - or less - transparency, accountability, and responsible management of a country's people and resources is dependent on the actions and principles of the resulting government, not the mechanism by which they come into power.
$10 million won't "buy" the various citizens of Kyrgyzstan a better democracy.
It can only purchase the opportunity. Beyond that, as much as political, economic and social elites may try to influence the outcome, the next step in the future of the Kyrgyz Republic will be determined by its people.
And that seems, rather subjectively, like a pretty good deal.
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