Reposted from Gazeta.kg, originally published on Polit.kg.
Interview by Hilarion Zvyagintsev
Translation by Google/style edit by Ryan Weber
As part of the "Sharp Corners" series which focuses on the portrayal of Kyrgyz history in school textbooks, Polit.kg interviewed prominent historian Alexander Knyazev, Ph.D [of the Kyrgyz Slavic University, Bishkek]. The conversation quickly moved past the works of Osmonov and other pseudo-historians, and ultimately dealt with the connection of the past, present, and prospects for the future state of Kyrgyzstan.
Hilarion Zvyagintsev: In your opinion, what role does the Kyrgyz ethnic group play in the history of Kyrgyzstan? Why has this subject become such a fixture in today's debates?
Alexander Knyazev:- Ethnocentricity in the interpretation and teaching of history is largely the result of compromise among the unprincipled parts of the scientific community. At the turn of the 1980s and 90s, when the idea of ethnocentrism began to dominate - how this dishonored the academic community of the [Kyrgyz] Republic will be discussed - many just began to go along [with this narrative]. This is particularly noticeable in the proclamation of the 2,200th anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood, the 3,000th anniversary of Osh, and the question of the historicity of Manas as a person. It is characterized by lack of professionalism among our scientists. No profession can exist without lapses in professional ethics, but it's wrong to change [the way we write] history in favor of short-term interests. This causes harm and does not bring any benefit, and in a multicultural society - even more so. In a context where the socio-economic situation does not allow most people to travel outside the republic, not only young people, a huge part of society formed a provincial consciousness, ideology, limited to the extent of Kyrgyzstan and the myths operating here.
HZ: What is the most egregious example of inconsistency of historical facts in the ethnocentric narrative?
AK: They are a huge number. If, for example, [a historian] refers to [19th century linguist, travelogue & ethnographer V.V.] Barthold, to borrow his concept of "Kyrgyz" great power, it should be borne in mind that under Barthold, "Kyrgyzstan"meant all the Turkic nomads of Central Eurasia. For these would-be historians [pushing the ethnocentric narrative], it all comes down to exalting the Kyrgyz ethnic group, which according to them was not only formed at that time [hundred to thousands of years ago], but had the kernel of a modern state. In fact, at that time there was no ethnic groups in own current meaning - the Kyrgyz ethnos begins in 1924 as does its statehood. By the way, in this same interpretation, Barthold questioned the existence of any other Turk - Kazakh, Altai, all the Turkic nomads of Central Eurasia, [except those he labeled 'Kyrgyz']. The result is not very correct with respect to the brotherly Turkic ethnic groups, and other peoples of Kyrgyzstan. This interpretation can lead to a sense of disadvantage, resentment [among other ethnic groups today]. After all, they have and their sources as well. In Uzbekistan, for example, it is reported that their ethnic ancestors were present in the Ferghana valley much earlier than the Kirghiz, and even dominated the plains until the mid-20th century.
HZ: During the Russian colonization of Central Asia, many Kyrgyz leaders joined the Russian Empire voluntarily. What options did they have for an alternative patron?
AK: Russia in the second half of the 19th century was on the whole more advanced technologically and militarily in comparison with the [contemporary political powers] of Central Asia - Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand - and even more so compared to the stateless ethnic groups, to which the Kirghiz belonged. By the time Central Asia came under Russian control [in the 1850s and 60s], a large part of Northern Kyrgyzstan and all the zhuzes [clan/hordes] of Kazakhs had already voluntarily joined the Empire. Serious resistance was only put up by the Turkmen. In discussions with many ethnocentric-minded historians [who link current-day Kyrgyz politics to an innate cultural 'independence'], I often ask the following question: "why do the Kirghiz now have a democracy while the Turkmen society is in a state of oppression?" Proponents of "ethno-destiny" answer that the Kyrgyz are "freedom-loving people." But there are no more or less freedom-loving nations, there are only different historical circumstances, in this case - a factor of personality. Circumstances placed different individuals in the office of President at the time of independence, and ["Turkmenbashi"] was very different from the democratically-minded academic [Akayev]. Today Turkmenistan has proved to be illiberal (Authoritarian), but if Kyrgyzstan were given the same circumstances in 1990, it would now have very different set of social, economic and political realities.
HZ: How does Myth-making, or the construction of ideologies, play in solving these urgent problems?
AK: I do not think people are so keen on history, and this has had an enormous influenced on the course of events. What influences [people] can be any one-sided idea, like ethnic superiority. There is always a half-step up to the present Nazism. When a person is brought up in poverty, but with the idea of self-exclusiveness, it is very easy to slip up to accusations of other people living in "his territory." In fact, the earth never belongs to any one group. Descendants of those who once lived for centuries on the territory of modern-day Kyrgyzstan, the Sogdians and others, have no right to say that this is their land, right? Land cannot be dominated by a single ethnic group ("nation"), but may belong [as territory] to a state. And then the question arises: what is more important - the state or ethnic group (nation)? If ethnicity is more important to all citizens living in Kyrgyzstan - none. Here's the dilemma that the people of Kyrgyzstan have not yet decided. The same exists in Kazakh society, despite the fact that there is also a very difficult ethnic situation. However, Kazakh society is healthier than Kyrgyz in this regard because a large part of society there occasionally fights back against the nationalist fringe and does not allow them to dominate either in academia or the media or in other areas.
HZ: What do you think of the Belorussian initiative to create a single history textbook for all CIS countries?
AK: Several years ago I participated in a Moscow conference on the teaching of history in the former Soviet republics. It was attended by representatives of almost all these states. First, it turned out that almost every republic has its own version of how it became part of Russia. Second, no one wanted to be seen as part of Russia. That's the difficulty. I do not know how in one textbook Tajiks and Uzbeks will mutually address the issue of Samarkand and Bukhara; how Armenians with Azerbaijanis will solve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh; or how the Georgians and Ossetians will explain their relationship. And how will the Kyrgyz (Kazakhs) report the history of Kenesary Kasimov, the last unified Kazakh khan, who resisted Russian rule only to be executed by his Kyrgyz-Kazakh neighbors, and had his head sent to Moscow as a sign of their devotion? Nor do I think that Russian experts would agree with the Kyrgyz interpretation of the events of 1916. It is clear that school textbooks do not necessarily determine so much, but the 'sharp corners' in any case would be enough to bury the idea of a single [unified CIS] textbook. In Soviet times, many topics were forced through the process [despite such arguments]. Now it is simply impossible. Therefore it is not feasible, in my opinion, to create an honest general textbook for all CIS countries.
HZ: How do you assess Kyrgyzstan's current level of development?
AK: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the role of state-builder fell to the the Kyrgyz ethnic group. But today, it has become apparent that he was not prepared for this role. Rather, an organized ethnic-based system has not yet managed to emerge. This is evidenced by the inter-clan conflict that we are seeing now, and by the immaturity of the political elite as well. We can conclude that nation-building [by the Kyrgyz people?] has been a fiasco. Kyrgyzstan today is a classic "failed state." Western experts say that in Africa they have seen worse, but we're not going to compare ourselves with some Rwanda, having the foundation which we had in 1991, are we?
If society and the political elite began the ethnocratic and technocratic path to development 90 years ago, we would see a very different picture [today]. The late-Soviet political elite, which became the elite of independent [Post-Soviet] Kyrgyzstan was much richer than the present elites. These were normal business executives. But most of them, unfortunately, just left the Republic during those turbulent years. Those to whom power passed, did not learn how to shoulder the burden.
HZ: How can Kyrgyzstan, or the other former Soviet Republics, cope with these difficulties?
AK: The term "failed State" (a variant - the "failure"), is not new. This is a state in which the government has no effective control over its own territory, is not considered legitimate by a large part of the population, does not provide domestic security or ensure the basic rights of its citizens, and no longer maintains a monopoly on the use of force. I would add another criteria to this definition: [a "failed state"] is one which has not established an effective system to ensure continuity of constitutional government.
Two coups - this is the only way Kyrgyzstan has transferred political power [since 1991]. Not a well-established way of transferring power. Among all former Soviet republics, only Russia and, perhaps, Armenia has not demonstrated its insolvency [instability? 'failed' status?]. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan might be spoken of as 'stable,' but they have not yet produced a valid mechanism for the transfer of state power. As long as they do not have a reliable mechanism, they are structurally unstable - [in essence, "pre-failed"]. Although, of course, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are too different to compare directly. Failed states pose one of the fundamental threats to the modern world. This is related to the global challenges of terrorism and transnational crime.
HZ: What is the reason for insufficient effectiveness of the ethno-nation as a state-builder?
AK: For the most part, it is the result of the Bolshevik designing [and delineating] our "ethno-nations." What happened in the first decades of Soviet rule may be called 'artificial reformatting' of Central Asia. Historical centers of 'Tajik' culture, like Samarkand and Bukhara, were suddenly declared to be on the territory of Uzbekistan, while the Republic of 'Tajikistan' only included the backward [rural] province of the former Bukhara Emirate. The Soviet authorities had their own motives for this division: Tajiks were considered the most devoutly Islamic ethnic group, and represented a potential threat. Nomadic ethnic groups [were considered] less susceptible to the influence of Islam, and so the early Soviet government trusted them more. In 1930, when refined, all these boundaries split the Uzbek population of Fergana, especially in Osh and among the Uzgen Canton of Kirghizia. The central Societ authorities argued that in this part of the Ferghana Valley there is no other proletarian centers capable of providing the Bolshevik influence on the nomadic Kyrgyz mass [and so Osh was given to the Kyrgyz, for no reason but because they had no other 'proletarian center' of their own]. The result of this delineation ("ethno-national territorial division of the formation") was the creation of the current 'titular nations,' as well as the individual national elites. This was a very complicated, centralized policy, and has contributed a lot of strain [to the Post-Soviet Republics]. As a result, we have what we have.
HZ: Before Ethno-nationalism, what was promoted as the best ideology in Kyrgyzstan?
AK: Liberalization, which was made in the late Soviet period and following independence. The implications for Kyrgyzstan, however, were even worse than Gorbachev's perestroika was for the USSR. In both cases we observe the political liberalization in isolation from the economic stimulus. It turned out that most people were simply not ready for such a transition. There was a sharp [socio-economic] separation, with a thin layer of relatively wealthy individuals, and a huge layer of marginal poor - not having many opportunities for education or professional growth, with a limited, provincial outlook, and an exaggerated view of their own exclusivity [importance?]. For these people, Osmonov wrote their textbooks.
HZ: On the eve of the 1-year anniversary of the April revolution, can we expect some new myths to emerge about the nation?
rw: the following response was especially difficult for me to translate. I attempted to carry the opinions expressed by AK as faithfully as I could, and apologize for any inconsistencies.
AK: Before we talk about new myths, it is important to bear in mind the following: [former President] Askar Akayev laid one prolonged "mine" under the Kyrgyz elite - a high degree of transparency in society. Any attempt to create a myth [must overcome this obstacle]. For example, [if one were to proclaim], "heroes of the April revolution openly confronted the Alfa [military units]" - [they would not be believed, it is known to be untrue]. The myth of the Uzbek separatists is [defeated] by the fact that none of the Uzbeks ever demand autonomy. Those citizens that can access interviews with [Uzbek activist] Kadyrzhanov Batyrov and other local experts on the internet know these myths to be false. (AK's phrase, "[if] the Internet is available, he breaks all myths"). Even if [Transitional President Roza][ Otunbayeva and [Prime Minister Almazbek] Atambaev decide to introduce some kind of censorship on the internet, nothing will change. Private companies will resist such efforts, as tehy celarly showed last year when [former President Kurmanbek] Bakiev tried to do the same thing.
You can understand why internet censorship works in China: the population with Internet access there is much less than in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, there is a natural limitation due to language [and alphabets (AK: "scripts"]. Having sufficient economic resources, the Chinese authorities use this time to build local internet [that they can control]. We also have less of a language restriction - the younger generation has a sufficient degree of English, and Russian is not forgotten. For these reasons, the 'lock' will not operate (last year, several hours after the start of blocking Russian website, I already sent friends proxy addresses from which they could go anywhere).
This sometimes afflicts our political elite. They say: "during the [Osh riots] of June, We lost the information war." But wait, there was no information war - the authorities immediately showed their hand. So it is easy to disbelieve those [low] estimates of events that are presented today by the Government, or the notorious findings of the national commission of inquiry. Today only a fraction of the population is not integrated into the World Wide Web, this is too much to be overcome by the virus of ethnocentrism.
HZ: In any case, instability in the country is getting worse. Sooner or later it may invite third-party meddling. It brings to mind the most terrible examples in recent history: Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Is it likely that Kyrgyzstan will become a bargaining chip for global geopolitical forces?
AK: All this is quite likely. I believe that the tolerance of the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan [at the Manas Transit Center] - it is a huge blunder made by our first president and the Russian government at that time. Recovered, Russia, of course, marked their presence. Since that time, these two bases - American and Russian - are iconic symbols of geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation. And this bomb is ticking. I think that it the Kosovo and Afghanistan scenarios are both possible in Kyrgyzstan. In 2005 I wrote and spoke about the "Afghanization of Kyrgyzstan," a process which [to his credit?] Bakiyev's regime then managed to suspend, but not terminate. In 2007, when Kosovo's independence was recognized, I said that it was a very dangerous precedent for our region [more on AK's Kosovo parallels]. In all Central Asian countries there are powerful Uzbek minority communities. In Tajikistan, for example, they are nearly a quarter of the population. If you continue the same practice of suppressing such large populations of minority Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan [or elsewhere], sooner or later it will cause a reaction on their part.
HZ: Does this mean that the Uzbeks in the country can be used as a Trojan horse by external forces?
AK: Exactly. At the same time, there can be no guilt placed upon the Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz government itself put them right in the position of being just such a 'Trojan horse.' If the Uzbek radicals upset stability in the South, this will be followed immediately by a mass exodus of the [Kyrgyz?] civilian population North. This process is going on now [to a lesser extent], but will be accelerated by such events. If this does happen, then it will be possible to imagine calls in the South for self-detemination, autonomy, or even a separate state. That's how everything happened in Kosovo - it's just a matter of dynamics. I would note that neither Kazakhstan, Tajikistan nor Turkmenistan are insured against this possibility. Kyrgyzstan is simply the most vulnerable because of its openness and liberality, and now by the precedent of the June events.
HZ: What impact do the Americans have on the current leadership of Kyrgyzstan?
AK: American geopolitics are multi-variant: in the course of events they know when and how to change the script. During the events of June, Otunbayeva appealed to the Russian government to bring in troops. In my opinion, this was not just an emotional outburst, it was a fulfillment of a certain order. The aim was to draw Russia into a military conflict in the region. You can even calculate the consequences. If Moscow was amenable to persuasion, and gave the order to invade. It would be a powerful destabilizing factor in Russian society. Willy-nilly, Russia reacts to the request from the Kyrgyz government. This, in turn, causes a negative reaction in the Uzbek community. Now Kyrgyz and Russian troops are seen as occupiers. Ultimately, everything turns to Russia's geopolitical collapse: it is objectionable to both sides of the conflict and, thus, sorry it got involved. I think it is clear who stands to benefit [rw note:I must honestly confess that I am not clear to whom AK is referring. Possibly the US, or possibly the current Kyrgyz political elite?].
What do we see now? More provocations by the Kyrgyz government, though no longer as overt as in June: the republic's leadership systematically, consistently asking for the same Russian military assistance. The Minister of Defense suddenly declared that the army is "backward in military-technical terms," and must be urgently re-equipped. The question arises: why does the military need to be stronger, who does the military need to fight? I see only one answer - against the citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
During the June events in the south, [Uzbek President] Islam Karimov fairly and wisely did not involve Uzbekistan in the conflict. He realized that it was a provocation against him. If he were not so restrained, the conflict would pass on to the international level, and Russia could no longer resist getting involved due to its membership in the CSTO. One can only hope that the issue of geopolitical supremacy in the region will be solved peacefully.
Polit.Kg
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