UNdecision 2009

(a campaign billboard at the busiest intersection in Bishkek reads: Bakiev, a Real President. the man in the photo is a janitor-turned-chef, thanks to Bakiev's economic reforms, or so the heavily-run associated TV commercial claims)

It is common in US scholarship, and even more so in journalism, to add a short tag, essentially the informal motto, after use of the term "Kyrgyzstan," as in: "Kyrgyzstan, the most democractic of the Central Asian Republics..."

As I said, the phrase is widely used - and for good reason. Kyrgyzstan isdifferent from much of what can be found in Central Asia, and this phrase is an attempt to encapsulate the many elements that differentiate it from its neighbors.

However, it is also categorically wrong, and I'd like to highlight, briefly, how it is wrong, and why such a gloss has more serious repurcussions than simply bad diction.

Generally speaking, Kyrgyzstan is the most socially liberal country in Central Asia, and its government maintains more personal and professional freedoms and less direct control of the population than any other - including a not insubstantial degree more openness than its closes rival, affluent Kazakhstan.

We could simplify this to say the Kyrgyz Republic is more "Western," but only if we're prepared to define which Western this is - US, Canada, Mexico, Sweden, Italy, etc. I'm not.

From my observations, I would say that the "culture" is overwhelmingly influenced by the Russification (itself a brand of Europeanization) of the Soviet era, but that in Kyrgyzstan there has been a (political) choice to allow certain freedoms that are not present in, as an extreme example, Turkmenistan.

However, I think it's very important to realize that these limited freedoms are 1) Very closely limited - they are not absolute, and can be transgressed at the discretion of the government, and 2) they are a reflection of the government's choice, not the people's.

In other words, there is no democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

There are degrees of "freedom," and I would say generally "liberal" (in the classic sense - not the modern "left") social and political policies. But when the state tells you it is permitting (as in, with a state-issued permit) you to speak freely, rather than a people demanding and getting guarantees of free speech, there is a very different paradigm at work.

Let's take a look at Kyrgyz Presidential history.

Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president 4 years ago shortly after he lead the "Tulip Revolution" against former president (and ex-Soviet premier) Akaiev. In essence, Akaiev's corruption and nepotism became so exacerbated that public will turned against him, and sensing this, a majority of politicians decided to make a play of their own. Bakiev was at the head of this movement. When Akaiev realized the game was up and he would need to exercise force to stay in power, he elected not to mess with it. An academic by training, he preferred to retire to a life of ease and teaching in Russia, along with his considerable fortune (amassed entirely since 1991).

Bakiev took over more than just the office. He assigned Akaiev's former assets to his own family and associates, and now after 4 short years of "development" assistance from China, Russia and the West, personally controls more of the Kyrgyz economy even than Akaiev did. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the majority of US economic assistance sent to Kyrgyzstan wound up in Bakiev's pocket: he paid his own companies large sums to do the work with no-bid contracts.

To portray the Tulip Revolution of 2005 as any sort of "Triumph of Democracy," as has been the norm, is simply disengenuous. There were barely even minor changes to the government structure, and one kleptocracy smoothly replaced another. The validity of Bakiev's "election" in 2005 is generally assumed to be valid - but strongly biased by an odd lack of competitors from outside his circle of associates.

This summer, the Kyrgyz Presidential campaign season runs from June 18 to July 23. Those 25 days are the only ones in which candidates are allowed to speak openly about their platforms, run advertisements, etc. At least, this is true for opposition candidates. The incumbent operates under different rules.

Some things to note:

1) Prior to June 18, President Bakiev had a sudden influx of media time. He wasn't campaigning (in that, he didn't Tell people to vote for him), but he did use the opportunities to "explain" how he has run Kyrgyzstan for the past 4 years, how the country had improved, and what plans he has for the future.

2) There is a vitural construction boom in Bishkek at the moment, with public works projects that have been mysteriously stalled for months suddenly on the fast-track. A major thoroughfare in downtown Bishkek was torn up 6 months ago and sat, un-paved & disrupting traffic, until 2 weeks ago. It is scheduled to "reopen" by mid-July. The main plaza of Bishkek, Ala-Too Square, just got completely renovated, including new patriotic statues, childrens' fountains, painting, a new Kyrgyz flagpole, etc. Everything proves that life is good - under Bakeiv.

3) Suddently, Kyrgyzstan takes center-stage on international issues. Whether it's securing $2 billion in aid and loans from Russia, dramatically kicking US forces out of Manas air base, or flamboyantly deciding US forces can stay (for a 10 fold increase in $), the past 5 months have seen Kyrgyzstan, and Bakiev personally, play a much larger role in international affairs than ever before. "I am a Big Man, and only I know how to deal with Big Powers," he seems to say. Let this be a lesson to Western-centric foreign policy experts: sometimes, geopolitical brew-ha-ha is NOT about US-Russian relations; it's not all about you (s-a).

4) Despite the sudden (June 18) influx of Bakiev posters, billboards, TV and Radio adds, there are virtually no other campaign ads in Bishkek. Whereas most local businesses have Bakiev posters in their windows, only one opposition candidate - the long-shot Social Democrats - even have posters, and these are universally affixed to light poles and graffiti walls - places that no one "owns" or suggests they support him publicly.

5) Opposition campaign headquarters and activists have all mysteriously wound up in the files of state security agencies as potential terrorists. Some have been raided, computers confiscated, or people arrested under these charges. They are usually released a few days later, with excuses about a "mix up." Often the computers are not returned in functional order - any files on them having been erased. Several campaign speeches have also been forced to disband when police arrived to "protect them" from anonymous tips of "terrorists" attacks.

Prof. Lincoln Mitchell talked about how the first 1 or 2 elections of a new state are actually a forum for democratic change, but once the regime is settled, they become only instruments of that regime and the status quo.

The argument runs like this: The powers-that-be allow an election to take place only because it is in their best interest. Elections help incumbents reaffirms their "democratic" credentials with their western allies, give them a public forum to strengthen their own popularity, and allow them to make a lot of $ through "encouraged" campaign fund raising (campaign expenses often come from state funds), all at virtually no risk. The outcome of the election is already decided - were it not, there would not be any "election" taking place.

My rant here is not about this system of government, what some stubbornly call a "semi-democratic" state. This isn't what I think is the best system, nor do I think most Kyrgyz would necessarily choose this system if given a choice, but that's a long way from the point.

My specific beef is that, however much or little the liberal social elements of Kyrgyz society mirror those of "Western Democracies," the people do not play a role in deciding the composition or activities of the government, so it cannot be, in even a technical sense, "democratic."

Yet I would stress again that it is different from the other Central Asian Republics.

The amount of personal freedom in Kyrgyzstan is Substantially greater than you will find in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan. I don't have a frame of reference for Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan (the other relevant regional players).

This is a good thing - No, it's great! But it's not democracy, and calling it democracy has a corrosive effect.

When Barak Obama (sorry buddy) congratulates President Bakiev on his Democratic credentials, this takes the wind out of any opposition movement that could try to proclaim otherwise (Bakiev: "If America say's I'm democracy, then I am democracy!"), and it undermines domestic democratic education. Central Asians (if they could be spoken of as a group) are still learning what "democracy" means. If the West points to Bakiev's system of Oligarchical Kleptocracy and says, "look, this is what we mean by democracy," then why would anyone want more democracy?

I will color this post one step further: I don't believe "democracy" in any institutional sense is a universal goal. It may not be the best for all countries because of civic, economic, or other reasons. In fact, a strong dose of non-democracy (lobbyists, extreme wealth bias, etc) is at play in America, and we seem pretty happy with it - or at least not so upset that we do anything about it (other than write long, sarcastic blog posts).

I think as a general principle, all people should live under a system of government which they are willing to accept (or at least tolerate) - that is, no one should be oppressed by their state. Under this rubrik, Kyrgyzstan (and America) are both within my "fine so long as they're happy" qualifier.

But let's not put an Apple in a Dos Equis and call it a Lime.

I didn't make any strong predictions before the US election because, to be honest, I had no idea how it was going to go. I didn't initially think Obama had a snowball's chance in hell, and as the day got closer, I kept expecting my cynicism to be vindicated. I'm glad it wasn't, by the way.

But I will go "out on a limb" in Kyrgyz politics.

Presidential Election Prediction: Kurmanbek Bakiev Wins in Landslide. Probably not a ridiculous, international-guffaw 90%, but maybe... 73% Bakiev?

And for those of you who think all this talk of politics is "risky" under such a regime, I assure you it is not.

One of the great results of being in total control of a state's political system is that you don't even need to bother with oppressing the opposition - so firm and absolute is your hold on power that they are simply not a threat.

Engaging them in debate, or attempting to silence them, on the otherhand, generates the kind of attention and international sympathy that you don't want (see Iran).

Let them make all the noise they want; you can't out-scream a hurricane (to apply a totally ill-suited analogy to Kyrgyz politics).

But don't point to the Eye and tell me it's all clear skies from here, either.