Kyrgyz Cuisine

Food choices in Kyrgyzstan are quite plentiful, but not especially diverse. It closely resembles modern Turkish food for obvious reasons (the Turks migrated to Anatolia around the 11-12th century from the Central Asian region), but the time interval and isolated evolution of tastes causes some important distinctions.

Traditionally, the "Kyrgyz" people, like their virtual twins the Kazakhs, were mostly nomadic, but it's more helpful to think of them as glacially-mobile ranchers than as an on-the-go Winnebago society. They took up semi-permanent residence in large felt-covered huts called Yurts and stayed in one location for a long season. When the season changed, they setup a semi-permanent settlement somewhere else.

What this means for cuisine is that they had access primarily to their own livestock, but also to crops they could grow quickly in small plots, which grow naturally, or that they could trade for - Central Asia was, afterall, the nexus of the Silk Road.

It is interesting that, some 400 years after the Silk Road all-but unravelled, and 150 years after Russian conquest, the radically reconfigured (and categorically created) "Kyrgyz nation" of urbanites and sedentary shephards continues to define itself by these lingering, and at times imagined, "nomadic" traditions.

Food is one such instance.

Here are the primary dishes of Kyrgyz cuisine, which are universally simple to prepare, rich and savory, and widely available in other international cuisines, despite the local insistence of the distinctiveness of the "Kyrgyz" variant

Shashlyk

There is nothing fancy about Kyrgyz Shashlyk - it is meat on a stick, roasted over charcoal. Unlike the more colorful examples from elsewhere around the globe, Shashlyk (which is refers to the unikely-Kyrgyz version of a kebab) does not involve any vegetables. It is chunks of marinated meat (usually beef or Lamb) sometimes interspersed with chunks of fat. It is usually served with raw sliced onions, herbs (cilantro?), and vinegar. I still cannot get anyone to tell me what the difference is between Kyrgyz Shashlyk and Kazakh Shashlyk, but I've been assured it is "totally different." I remain skeptical. These can be sold at fancy restaurants, or just by solo Shashlykiyya's (shashlyk cookers) along the roadside. Around $1.50/skewer.

Pilaf

An absolute mainstay, in Kyrgyzstan it's called "Pilau" and is a very static creation meaning rice cooked in oil then in a broth with slices of lamb and usually cooked carrots. There might be some boiled onions involved. This stands in great contradiction to my understanding of Pilav from back home, which was essentially any assortment of meats and veggies that was then cooked with rice. Various different nationalities claim their own "style" of pilav, but mostly this is just about the different ingredients, which within each country, are unalterable. Asking for pilau in Kyrgyzstan without carrots, for example, is wildly absurd. You can get pilau at restaurants, but I've found it more likely to be served at family gatherings (apparently, you don't go Out to just have pilau).

Manti

To date, this seems to be the most beloved of all Kyrgyz food insofar as every Kyrgyz I've met has either asked if I've had Manti, or tried actively to get to me to eat it. Don't let me paint this the wrong way - Manti is Not the "Haggis of Kyrgyzstan" - it's just steamed dumplings. That doesn't sound so bad, right? Even better, they're filled with meat (again, the lamb/beef differentiation is harder than one migth think) and grilled onions. But here's the drawback - "good" Manti also requires the presence of an equal 1:1 ratio of meet and boild fat chunks. Worse yet, the boiled onions, which are good, have the exact same color and consistency as the fat, so when you bite into a big chunk of something, you're never sure quite which you're getting. The general slimy-texture (sorry Dim Sum fans, it's true) of steamed dumplings does nothing to cut down on the queasy reaction I get from the liquid grease and solid fat stuffed inside. They're usually sold at restaurants in bunches of 5 (which is a lot of Manti), positioned surrounding a lake of ketchup.

Samsa

Like much of Kyrgyz cuisine, the Samsa has a very direct connection to its cousin, the Indian Samosa, with one important difference: no veggies. Basically, a Samsa is the same thing as a Manti, but it's exterior dough is shaped differently, and it is fried (sometimes baked) rather than steamed. On the plus side, this dramatically decreases the slime-factor, but you still have an onion-or-fat minefield lurking insidiously inside the yummy crust. These are sold on the sidewalks for the unbelievably low price of 20 som (50 cents) a piece.

Laghman

Thank goodness for Dungans! This small "nationality" within Kyrgyzstan (off-handedly called "Chinese Muslims") are recognized as being distinct from Kyrgyz, but this particular dish is ubiquitous at Kyrgyz restaurants throughout Bishkek. It is hand-rolled noodles (no idea if they are wheat- or egg-based) with Lamb, onions, and various herbs and spices. It can be cooked in a broth to make a sort of irregular noodle soup, or it can be stirfried. Either way is super-good, though as with much other Central Asian cuisine, both usually involve the addition of a touch more grease than is "necessary."

Sharma

One of the two quintessential Kyrgyz fast-food options, "Sharma" is a derivation of the Turko-Arabic Shawarma, meaning "turning," in reference to the style of cooking in which a big pile of meat is put on a verical pole and cooked outside-in as it rotates in front of a flame. The cooked, exterior, is cut off and served while the next layer cooks fresh. The name is somewhat ironic in Kyrgyzstan, where I have yet to see a working constant-rotation cooker. The final product includes shaved meat (usually chicken, sometimes beef), french fries, shredded lettuce, and slices of cucumber and tomatoe slathered in mayo and ketchup, then wrapped up in a paper-thin (and universally stale) burrito-like pancake. More Moo Sui than Tortilla. It's tasty, but shockingly un-filling for all its girth. Hard to argue with, though, as a $1.20 (50 som) lunch-on-the-run.

Gamburger

the primary alternative to Sharma, the "Gamburger" is a hard nut to nail down. It's trying-to-be-a-hambuger-bun suggests this might just be a case of lost in transliteration, but the shawarma-style beef interior is a long way from a burger patty. Add the same cucumbuer, tomato, mayo & ketchup, and suddenly the differentiation comes down to just the packaging. Bready-bun, or flimsy wrap. There are a few stands that sell "Hamburgers," which are the same thing as a gamburger, but with an actual ground-meat patty, but these remain few and generally more upscale (franchised chains vs. mom&pop stands). A little pricier at $1.30 a pop.

And that's pretty much it. There are a variety of salads (pick 2 uncooked veggies, add vinegar), and a few other national foods I've yet to try, but these are the big ones, and it must be said, make up the overwhelming majority of "Kyrgyz Cuisine."

As for diversity, Bishkek is decidedly the internationl hub. Indian, Chinese, Russian, and even a rare Korean, Italian, or "American" - burgers or pizza - are around if you look hard enough. I saw an ad for an "American/Mexican" restaurant, but the menu wasn't tempting enough to even give it a fair shake. Perhaps I'll change my mind as the summer wears on.

It should also be said the above is a decent look only a "City Kyrgyz" food. I don't have any idea what they eat in the villages and countryside, though I'm willing to bet it involves a fair amount of pilau, lamb-everything, and more gristle than I've consumed in my entire life.

In short, the food is much better than my Estonian/Serbian experience. People here eat real food, but it does tend to be real heavy, and most of it didn't spring forth from soil. I do actually know 2 ex-pats in Bishkek who are staying vegetarians while they're here, but so far I've only seen them eat french fries and carrots.

Apparently the "wealth" of veggies I see at the markets now (exclusively as follows: cucumbers, tomatoes, potatoes, peppers, onions, eggplants) declines to practically nothing during the winter months. According to one coleague, "it gets old eating the same canned meat and bread for 6 months."

Another recent admonishion from a guy traveling the countryside: "I haven't had anything to eat but Snickers for 4 days."

Cost: 23 som (50 cents) each.

Why wait?

UNdecision 2009

(a campaign billboard at the busiest intersection in Bishkek reads: Bakiev, a Real President. the man in the photo is a janitor-turned-chef, thanks to Bakiev's economic reforms, or so the heavily-run associated TV commercial claims)

It is common in US scholarship, and even more so in journalism, to add a short tag, essentially the informal motto, after use of the term "Kyrgyzstan," as in: "Kyrgyzstan, the most democractic of the Central Asian Republics..."

As I said, the phrase is widely used - and for good reason. Kyrgyzstan isdifferent from much of what can be found in Central Asia, and this phrase is an attempt to encapsulate the many elements that differentiate it from its neighbors.

However, it is also categorically wrong, and I'd like to highlight, briefly, how it is wrong, and why such a gloss has more serious repurcussions than simply bad diction.

Generally speaking, Kyrgyzstan is the most socially liberal country in Central Asia, and its government maintains more personal and professional freedoms and less direct control of the population than any other - including a not insubstantial degree more openness than its closes rival, affluent Kazakhstan.

We could simplify this to say the Kyrgyz Republic is more "Western," but only if we're prepared to define which Western this is - US, Canada, Mexico, Sweden, Italy, etc. I'm not.

From my observations, I would say that the "culture" is overwhelmingly influenced by the Russification (itself a brand of Europeanization) of the Soviet era, but that in Kyrgyzstan there has been a (political) choice to allow certain freedoms that are not present in, as an extreme example, Turkmenistan.

However, I think it's very important to realize that these limited freedoms are 1) Very closely limited - they are not absolute, and can be transgressed at the discretion of the government, and 2) they are a reflection of the government's choice, not the people's.

In other words, there is no democracy in Kyrgyzstan.

There are degrees of "freedom," and I would say generally "liberal" (in the classic sense - not the modern "left") social and political policies. But when the state tells you it is permitting (as in, with a state-issued permit) you to speak freely, rather than a people demanding and getting guarantees of free speech, there is a very different paradigm at work.

Let's take a look at Kyrgyz Presidential history.

Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president 4 years ago shortly after he lead the "Tulip Revolution" against former president (and ex-Soviet premier) Akaiev. In essence, Akaiev's corruption and nepotism became so exacerbated that public will turned against him, and sensing this, a majority of politicians decided to make a play of their own. Bakiev was at the head of this movement. When Akaiev realized the game was up and he would need to exercise force to stay in power, he elected not to mess with it. An academic by training, he preferred to retire to a life of ease and teaching in Russia, along with his considerable fortune (amassed entirely since 1991).

Bakiev took over more than just the office. He assigned Akaiev's former assets to his own family and associates, and now after 4 short years of "development" assistance from China, Russia and the West, personally controls more of the Kyrgyz economy even than Akaiev did. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the majority of US economic assistance sent to Kyrgyzstan wound up in Bakiev's pocket: he paid his own companies large sums to do the work with no-bid contracts.

To portray the Tulip Revolution of 2005 as any sort of "Triumph of Democracy," as has been the norm, is simply disengenuous. There were barely even minor changes to the government structure, and one kleptocracy smoothly replaced another. The validity of Bakiev's "election" in 2005 is generally assumed to be valid - but strongly biased by an odd lack of competitors from outside his circle of associates.

This summer, the Kyrgyz Presidential campaign season runs from June 18 to July 23. Those 25 days are the only ones in which candidates are allowed to speak openly about their platforms, run advertisements, etc. At least, this is true for opposition candidates. The incumbent operates under different rules.

Some things to note:

1) Prior to June 18, President Bakiev had a sudden influx of media time. He wasn't campaigning (in that, he didn't Tell people to vote for him), but he did use the opportunities to "explain" how he has run Kyrgyzstan for the past 4 years, how the country had improved, and what plans he has for the future.

2) There is a vitural construction boom in Bishkek at the moment, with public works projects that have been mysteriously stalled for months suddenly on the fast-track. A major thoroughfare in downtown Bishkek was torn up 6 months ago and sat, un-paved & disrupting traffic, until 2 weeks ago. It is scheduled to "reopen" by mid-July. The main plaza of Bishkek, Ala-Too Square, just got completely renovated, including new patriotic statues, childrens' fountains, painting, a new Kyrgyz flagpole, etc. Everything proves that life is good - under Bakeiv.

3) Suddently, Kyrgyzstan takes center-stage on international issues. Whether it's securing $2 billion in aid and loans from Russia, dramatically kicking US forces out of Manas air base, or flamboyantly deciding US forces can stay (for a 10 fold increase in $), the past 5 months have seen Kyrgyzstan, and Bakiev personally, play a much larger role in international affairs than ever before. "I am a Big Man, and only I know how to deal with Big Powers," he seems to say. Let this be a lesson to Western-centric foreign policy experts: sometimes, geopolitical brew-ha-ha is NOT about US-Russian relations; it's not all about you (s-a).

4) Despite the sudden (June 18) influx of Bakiev posters, billboards, TV and Radio adds, there are virtually no other campaign ads in Bishkek. Whereas most local businesses have Bakiev posters in their windows, only one opposition candidate - the long-shot Social Democrats - even have posters, and these are universally affixed to light poles and graffiti walls - places that no one "owns" or suggests they support him publicly.

5) Opposition campaign headquarters and activists have all mysteriously wound up in the files of state security agencies as potential terrorists. Some have been raided, computers confiscated, or people arrested under these charges. They are usually released a few days later, with excuses about a "mix up." Often the computers are not returned in functional order - any files on them having been erased. Several campaign speeches have also been forced to disband when police arrived to "protect them" from anonymous tips of "terrorists" attacks.

Prof. Lincoln Mitchell talked about how the first 1 or 2 elections of a new state are actually a forum for democratic change, but once the regime is settled, they become only instruments of that regime and the status quo.

The argument runs like this: The powers-that-be allow an election to take place only because it is in their best interest. Elections help incumbents reaffirms their "democratic" credentials with their western allies, give them a public forum to strengthen their own popularity, and allow them to make a lot of $ through "encouraged" campaign fund raising (campaign expenses often come from state funds), all at virtually no risk. The outcome of the election is already decided - were it not, there would not be any "election" taking place.

My rant here is not about this system of government, what some stubbornly call a "semi-democratic" state. This isn't what I think is the best system, nor do I think most Kyrgyz would necessarily choose this system if given a choice, but that's a long way from the point.

My specific beef is that, however much or little the liberal social elements of Kyrgyz society mirror those of "Western Democracies," the people do not play a role in deciding the composition or activities of the government, so it cannot be, in even a technical sense, "democratic."

Yet I would stress again that it is different from the other Central Asian Republics.

The amount of personal freedom in Kyrgyzstan is Substantially greater than you will find in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan. I don't have a frame of reference for Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan (the other relevant regional players).

This is a good thing - No, it's great! But it's not democracy, and calling it democracy has a corrosive effect.

When Barak Obama (sorry buddy) congratulates President Bakiev on his Democratic credentials, this takes the wind out of any opposition movement that could try to proclaim otherwise (Bakiev: "If America say's I'm democracy, then I am democracy!"), and it undermines domestic democratic education. Central Asians (if they could be spoken of as a group) are still learning what "democracy" means. If the West points to Bakiev's system of Oligarchical Kleptocracy and says, "look, this is what we mean by democracy," then why would anyone want more democracy?

I will color this post one step further: I don't believe "democracy" in any institutional sense is a universal goal. It may not be the best for all countries because of civic, economic, or other reasons. In fact, a strong dose of non-democracy (lobbyists, extreme wealth bias, etc) is at play in America, and we seem pretty happy with it - or at least not so upset that we do anything about it (other than write long, sarcastic blog posts).

I think as a general principle, all people should live under a system of government which they are willing to accept (or at least tolerate) - that is, no one should be oppressed by their state. Under this rubrik, Kyrgyzstan (and America) are both within my "fine so long as they're happy" qualifier.

But let's not put an Apple in a Dos Equis and call it a Lime.

I didn't make any strong predictions before the US election because, to be honest, I had no idea how it was going to go. I didn't initially think Obama had a snowball's chance in hell, and as the day got closer, I kept expecting my cynicism to be vindicated. I'm glad it wasn't, by the way.

But I will go "out on a limb" in Kyrgyz politics.

Presidential Election Prediction: Kurmanbek Bakiev Wins in Landslide. Probably not a ridiculous, international-guffaw 90%, but maybe... 73% Bakiev?

And for those of you who think all this talk of politics is "risky" under such a regime, I assure you it is not.

One of the great results of being in total control of a state's political system is that you don't even need to bother with oppressing the opposition - so firm and absolute is your hold on power that they are simply not a threat.

Engaging them in debate, or attempting to silence them, on the otherhand, generates the kind of attention and international sympathy that you don't want (see Iran).

Let them make all the noise they want; you can't out-scream a hurricane (to apply a totally ill-suited analogy to Kyrgyz politics).

But don't point to the Eye and tell me it's all clear skies from here, either.

Journalism 101: The Bishkek Ho-Tep

After more than a week in which to "get settled," which has essentially meant move into a permanent apartment, get sunburned, write way too many blogs, and still not learn any functional Kyrgyz or Russian, I now finally have some actual assignments for my RFE/RL internship.

Specifically, I have three interviews coming up that deal with some of the more contentious international issues in Central Asia: Manas Air Base, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), "democracy promotion" in Post-Soviet states, and child labor in the cotton industry.

While these are all exciting issues for me to research further (having already some basic reference from my studies at Columbia), I want to emphasize for all my family and friends "back home" who have expressed concern, that I am neither dealing with people important enough, or revealing information sensative enough, to generate any difficulties or danger for myself while in Kyrgyzstan. Media freedom here is not, perhaps, what it is in America, but even the worst-case examples of repression involve local journalists doing intense expose's, usually on local politicians.

So in addition to my US citizenship and my Radio Azattyk ID badge, I have the added protection of speaking mostly with people of limited, if any, local importance or influence. As an English-language correspondent in Bishkek, these are probably going to be my standard fare for the summer. An odd trait that may not continue - 2 of my 3 current interviews are with Columbia-affiliated personnel. That's just weird.

Upcoming interviews include:

Dr. Alex Cooley

Prof. of Political Science

Barnard College (Columbia), New York

A specialist in such theoretical concepts as the structural forms of power in post-colonial and post-soviet governments, he has more recently focused on the specific policy of small US "Lily Pad" military bases rather than the conventional Cold War mega-bases, including the contentious Manas Air Base - the primary resupply depot for the US war in Afghanistan, and currently the only US military presence in Central Asia. He is currently working in Kyrgyzstan on a fellowship regarding the SCO and its growth as an alternative international affiliation to organizations like NATO, the EU, IMF, etc.

I will be asking him about Manas, the SCO, and US Relations in the region.

Dr. Lincoln Mitchell

Prof. of International Politics

School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia, New York

In addition to being a professor, Dr. Mithcell is a regular contributor to the opinion section of the Huffington Post, where he comments on domestic US affairs. His professional leanings deal with "democracy promotion" in the Caucasus, former-Soviet states, and to some degree the Middle East. He was most engaged last summer, when his area of closest specialization, Georgia, became a flashpoint of international affairs. He wrote articles or made appearances on NPR, BBC, the New York Times, and many other formal and informal (blog) news organizations. He is currently working on a book about the many so-called "colored revolutions" in which non-violent popular protests lead to the initiation of democratic reform in many post-Soviet countries.

I will be speaking to him about the parallels of the Georgia-Kyrgyz situations, and more generally trying to clear up the divide between rhetoric and action on the issue of US foreign relations vis-a-vis "democracy promotion."

Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)

Chair, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry

Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions

In addition to having the kind of ridiculous super-American personal backstory that you mostly find in Tom Clancy novels (see wiki), Sen. Harkin is currently proposing a Senate Resolution to formally call out Uzbekistan for its well-documented, but formally denied, wide-scale practice of using seasonal child labor to harvest its cotton crop. As the 3rd largest cotton producer in the world, Uzbek has a lot to lose by foregoing this cheap labor source, though pressure from some US retailers (most famously Wal-Mart, who boycotted Uzbek cotton for ethical reasons!) may be shifting this a little. It should also be noted, Harkin's voting record / political stance is rather impressively liberal (with a few exceptions). Check out this tool:Govtrack.us

I'll ask him about the practicality of asking an economically unstable country with a repressive authoritarian regime to reduce the profits of its only viable export industry, and the confusion of implementing "Rights of the Child" in a country that generally neglects all standard "Human Rights" conventions.

As you can see from the above, I'm fortunate to have interesting topics to research, and informed, intelligent people with which to discuss them. They should allow me to learn more about the particular topics, and to use that information to better inform international listeners about items of interest in Central Asia.

But I'm certainly not turning over any applecarts, or digging up any hidden audio tape. I'm discussing issues which are either academic, or US-internal, and thus not likely to stir up any consternation in Bishkek. I mean, if in response to a question on theories of democracy structure, someone accidentally confesses to a huge conspiracy of graft involving the upper echelons of the Kyrgyz government, I might have to run with that, but... I think that's about as likely as finding Elvis battling mummies in a small Texas nursing home.

Perhaps even less dangerous.

But just in case, I'll watch my back side.

The Myth of Europe

Please allow me to present for you a concept - as briefly as possible - for which my academic studies and present experiences are in concert, and with which I think you might enjoy a new outlook on a variety of subjects.

There is no such thing as "Europe" - and there never has been.

Geographically, Europe was awarded the status of a "continent" for political, rather than cartographic or geologic reasons. The borders of the so-called "Europe" are technically the Ural mountains, which run East of the Caspian sea, approximate with the interior of Iran, and somewhere in the South Caucasus mountains, again bordering Iran after circumnavigating Turkey. This definition is the continental divide - the line that demarkates which direction water will flow - but the logic required to separate Europe and Asia thus requires every continent be split into 2 - with California, Washington & Oregon now part of North-West America, and the rest of the US on the continent of North-East America.

In actuality, "Europe" is nothing more than a rather small peninsula affixed to the NW corner of the greater Eurasian landmass, of which India - by virtual of actual geology - has more claim to independence than Europe, despite its rather imperial designation as the world's only "subcontinent."

Exercise #1 - Try putting your finger on the "middle" of Europe. You might think Switzerland, or Prague? Actually, it would be in the Ukraine.

Politically, of course, we can think of Europe as those countries in the European Union, but that would be ridiculous, as the EU has the potential to expand at will. And what precedence is there for 1 country = 1 continent (besides Australia)?

Culturally, "Europe" is an even more subjective reality. Take for example the case of Georgia (not the Peach state), which by any geographic definition must be part of Europe. While the people of Georgia consider themselves to be fully European, especially by their predominant Christian faith, the same label is not applied to Georgians by their so-called co-Continentals.

It's hard to say what makes "Europe" so "European." Certainly it is a complex mixture of social history, political and economic contact, and yes, cultural markers like religion, language and art. There is also a not insubstantial racial element to our modern understanding of Europe, which is not substantiated by actual reality. Put simply, not all "Europeans" are "Caucasian," no matter how broadly we choose to paint the term (Consider the Moors, the Balkans, even the once-Altaic Hungarians).



It has also been expressed that to be "European" is to be a direct beneficiary of the monumental events of the 14-17th centuries which supposedly shaped what we conceive of as modernity, specifically the Renaissance/Enlightenment, Political Liberalism, the Reformation, and eventually, the Industrial Revolution. To be "European" is to claim not only to be the torch-bearers of an intellectual tradition stretching back to the (partially-"European") empires of Rome and Greece, but in fact to make such a claim as the Exclusive inheritors of this line.

That the "Continent" was itself a dark place of no considerable contribution to this "Western" civilization until at least the 14th century (a gap of, say 2,000 years at least), or that it's eventual discovery of "its own" intellectual heritage was made possible only through the intermediary of other - mostly Arab, Persian and African - translations and commentaries is somehow overlooked.

Exercise #2 - Start as far West as Europe allows (Portugal, Spain, England, France), and start naming countries as you move East. See how far you get when listing off "European" countries you know by memory. When this fails, consult a map, and then check to see how "European" you still consider wherever you got stumped.

A last demonstration, the aforementioned Industrial Revolution, hailed as the great Triump of Europe, which in fact only took place in England, and was later exported to France and Germany. It's arrival in Italy, Romania, and "European" Russia was barely ahead of its implementation in India, and far behind Japan or America.

Further, as you proceed East, you fill find cultures competing to assert their "European-ness" by their link to Orthodox (sometimes called "Eastern Orthodox") Christianity, on the assumption that Istanbul was, for a time, the navel of Europe, not Rome. With Orthodoxy come the Slavs and Russia, which following its territorial conquests of the 17-18th centuries must include, culturally, all of Siberia in a concept of "European," just as New Mexico is no longer "Navajo," but "American."

There may be no "Europe" as a place or a people, but there certainly is a "Europe" as a term which can be used to separate, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion, one group of people, concepts or practices, from another.

What I would ask of you, the reader and presumably a thoughful and intelligent individual, is to contemplate why such a term was fashioned, and why it continues to have such weighty significance despite its demonstrable mendacity.

Obviously it's ideological, and equally clear is that it is most often used to the benefit of "Europeans," who use the concept to demonstrate their superiority in some way to the excluded Other, a practice which is not uniquely European. In fact, in an interesting twist, America has long used the term "European" to denigrate it as the Other to the American self-preception of newness, freedom, youth, etc.

Why do I go on-and-on about this? Because I'm in Bishkek, which by no definition that I know - cultural, geographic, political, linguistic, religious - can be construed as "European."

However, when I tell my friends that I'm going to Kyrgyzstan for the summer, the most common response I received - no offense buddies - was, "have fun in Europe."

Much to their credit, my friends all meant well, and further they are - every single one of them - bright, well-informed, open-minded people, almost entirely Americans, but most with some experience of worldly travel themselves.

So there are a few things I find interesting here:

Out of what I assume to be geographic ignorance, educated Americans assume Kyrgyzstan to be somewhere in "Europe" for reasons I, and possibly even then, don't understand.

By every definition I can imagine, Kyrgyzstan has no place in a roster of "European" capitals. And yet... Living in Bishkek, I still feel unquestionably immersed in the "Western/European world," insofar as this is understood to be only a concept.

It might be fair to say that Kyrgyzstan - or at least Bishkek - are not "European" or "Western," but rather have been "Westernized." While I don't (quite) question the truth of the underlying assertion - the Kygyz culture (itself a Russian invention via categorization) has been changed largely by outside forces to more closely resemble the concept of "Europe / the West" - I do take offense at the idea of "Westernization" on the same grounds that I reject the myth of "Europe."

If France, Germany and Britain, the key-3 of the "Europe" identity, were themselves "Westernized" by the teachings of Plato, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Heraclitus, and a wealth of Persian scholars, not to mention the fundamental roots of the Industrial Revolution in Indian hydraulic sciences, how is this in any way "Westernization?"

Isn't Bishkek just a part of the same process of cultural, intellectual, and material exchange that has shaped every non-isolated society on Earth? Since there is clearly no such thing as a neatly-defined "Europe," the broader idea of "the West" as opposed to "The East" (universally applied to anything non-Western, and totally ignoring the possibility, for example, of the Global South - Africa, South America, Pacifica) must be even more nonsensical.

Was America "Easternized" by the original migration across the Beiring straight? What about Democracy - a concept spawned (to a very limited extent) in the Eastern Mediterranean through a heritage of Anatolian transfers? Or Christianity? Aren't all major world religions, in fact, non-European and therefore "Eastern?"

I'm not suggesting we truncate the formal name to just the E____ Union, or that the idea of "Europe" is going away anytime soon, despite its preposterous construction.

What I'm suggesting is that we, as discerning individuals, be cautious in our use of the term "Europe" and all the baggage it entails, and that we be especially attentative to the motivations and assumptions employed by those who use "Europe" to describe or justify certain ideas, people, or practices.

So in answer to the friendly salutation I have so often received, "have fun in Europe," I must enigmatically respond, "but I've never been to Europe - - or perhaps I've neer left?"

Reading Orientalism in Central Asia

Last weekend I made an excursion outside Bishkek, making it the first time in the 36 days since I've been in Kyrgyzstan to leave the comforts of the capital. That's a pretty good testament to both my limbo situation vis. Radio Azattyk (they keep promising me work, but almost never delivering, leaving me stuck in town, but with nothing to do), but also pays appropriate tribute to my own lack of insistence or solo adventurousness.

For the weekend, I went with my co-worker Eleanora to visit her home village and the family she still has living there. I will post again shortly with a narrative (and photos) from the weekend, but first, a few thoughts as my recent reading, travels, and ample thinking time have allowed.

Like virtually everyone I've met in Bishkek, regardless of age, Eleanora was born in a village, grew up mostly in a town, and now lives with the rest of her immediate family in Bishkek (The City). To these three strata (village/town/city) should be added the truly-rural, which consists more of yurt-dwelling ranchers than the independent homesteaders of the American equivalent. From what I could see on my drive across the North of Kyrgyzstan, this last group, for which the term "traditional" is equally useful and misleading, is a pretty small percentage. It may be different in the South, but from what I've seen, it seems that the majority populace live in villages and small towns, with the larger remainder in Bishkek (1 million of total 5 million national pop.), and the smallest sliver in yurts.

But these categories, useful as they are for the moment, are not absolute: One family may have a daughter in Bishkek and a son in a yurt; or even some families may live part of the year in a Yurt, then part in a town/village. Regardless, the definitional boundaries are crossed regularly, and while some amenities (toilets, for ex) do not transition, most (ex: electricity, TV, Nike) do. So the yurt family watches the same TV programs as a Bishkek family, whether via broadcast, or satellite TV (admittedly more common in villages than yurts).

Further, since most of the Bishkek crowd are still closely linked to the countryside (whether semi-urban, semi-rural, or full-rural), many of the "cultural" norms are - if not identical, at least easily negotiated. The hipster urbanite with spiked hair and fashionably-ripped jeans will still stop off at a roadside Yurt for a fresh bottle of traditional kumis when traveling through the country side.

It is very difficult for me to think of a comparison based on my experience in travels elsewhere, but I think that's more due to the specifics of my previous itinerary rather than a comment on the uniqueness of the Kyrgyz situation. The relationship is like nothing I found in Europe, or most of the US. In these places, the young people still watch the same TV, and often dress more similarly than they might admit, but a certain cultural cache divides them. City kids are devoid of country experience (shooting, riding, working heavy machinery, etc), while I'm not sure how strongly the gap goes the otherway. The stereotypes of the extreme exist (redneck vs. city slicker), as I think they do in Kyrgyzstan, but in America some people seem to actually personify these stereotypes, while in Kyrgyzstan they are only an amalgam of the worst-possible traits in a population that mixes urban/rural characteristics regularly.

I'm no American studies expert, so I apologize if this is too-naive. My point is that in Kyrgyzstan, it is nothing like how I see America's bifurcated society.

"Tradition" is the all-emcompassing term under which this unity of disparate elements is fused. Few people in Bishkek are "native Bishkekers," and further, no one is more than 2 or 3 generations removed from the villages. More than that, the entire country is no more than 5-6 generations removed from an 18th-19th century version of nomadic yurt dwelling. Please don't misread - the life of a yurt dweller in the 19th century was NOT the same as that of a similar person from the 17th, 13th century, or 9th century. The "traditional" lifestyle is not eternally isolated in time, despite some (soviet) efforts to suggest otherwise.

What it gets me thinking about, honestly, is what America would be like today if we hadn't engineered the genocide of Native Americans. If there was a large body of the population that, when given the choice of "modern" / "Western" lifestyle, chose to adopt certain elements, technologies, ideologies, and reject others. It's hard for me to imagine, because while "education" about Native Americans was a big part of my childhood in Oklahoma, the entire discourse was framed on 2 pillars I now hold to be false: 1) "Indians" only existed in history books or living history museums, and 2) the "Indian" lifestyle, being "traditional," was unchanging over time.

The first was patently false, and should have been all the more obvious living in Oklahoma, while the second was ridiculous given the dual narrative of "primitive arrowheads" and the existing photography, universally showing native americans in full regalia (and often war paint) with rifles.

In looking at Kyrgyzstan, and only a small part of it, and only through the limited lense of my own social awareness, it seems to me that a great many of the methods by which we (here being Western society in general, and unfortunately as often Western policymakers or even academics) dismiss groups different than ourselves by relegating them to the classification of "traditional," and therefore timeless, incapable of improvement except through "modernization" (read, "westernization"), and usually only capable of that change w/ Western assistance.

For those not familiar with this line of reasoning, I am stealing quite liberally from a very important critique of Western scholarship by Edward Said, first published in 1978, and called Orientalism. It's a thick read, but if you've ever wondered how an Oxford (or Harvard, or Columbia - I'm not playing favorites)-educated Westerner can come to the point of speaking with authority about "The Arab mind," or just "the Arabs," as if an entire and horribly ill-defined group (Despite its common use, "Arab" is not a linguistic, racial, ethnic or religious category. It's some combination of these which changes to suit the needs of the person using it. see Darfur, for evidence) consisting of millions of unique individuals could have their personalities described through scholarly analysis of a classic literature they may or may not have ever read, or the political choices of an empowered (thus, by definition of having power in the colonized world, pro-Western) elite.

Rather than ramble on, let me leave you with a few things to think about:

1) Anytime you hear keywords like "The Arabs," (really, "The (anygroup)"), "Development," "Modernization," or "Traditional," keep in mind that these are not factual descriptions, but rather subjective, and usually judgmental ones, employed for a purpose that goes beyond description and involves intentionality. "Development," for example, implies first that one society or group of people is "less advanced" than another, second, that the "less advanced" society needs to improve, and third, that this can only happen through imitation of, or direct involvement by, the "more advanced" society.

2) It's hard to put Kyrgyz and other societies that maintain pre-Western social elements into comparison with America. It's easy for this difficulty to reinforce how much "more advanced" the US and the West appears. Let's allow that if the Europeans (and even the freedom/human rights-loving US of A) hadn't massacred (there is no other appropriate word) an entire indigenous population, we would have a much better connection with the rest of the world. The resulting gap in understanding has more to do with a brutal and voluntary extermination of the autochthynous connection to North and South America than it does to an unprecedented leap in social/technological/cultural progress.

3) Anyone who tries to "deal" with the world must pursue one of 2 things: to understand the world we live in and the various people who inhabit it, or to control it for our own benefit. Those of us who self-righteously place ourselves in the former category are nonetheless all-too-often instruments of the latter, and the indirect nature of the resulting exploitation should probably not leave our consciences feeling as clean as we allow it to.

4) If might does not make right (whether in schoolyard bullying or genocide), then the West has been wrong quite a lot, which problematizes its critique of others. Even drawing a line in history and declaring that, from this point forward, ethics should dictate behavior, is a problem when claims of exceptionalism are made anytime local rights run against US policy or interests (the catalogue of US-funded coups, etc. from the 1940s-1980s is just the most flagrant example. As more documents become available, you can be sure the same patterns will emerge, especially regarding the US "Salvation" of Iraq).

Better equipped, and better informed, we do our best to recognize that "Orientalism" is not a quality possessed by non-Western cultures, but rather a process by which Western culture frames The Other in order to domesticate it - to make it seem less dangerous, exotic and frightful. So when we are handed statements about the "backwardness" of modern citizens of the world, or whenever race or culture is used as an excuse for otherwise unacceptable treatment, we have no recourse to claim that we didn't know what was really going on.

Bishkek Whiskey Breakfast

First day on the job at Radio Azattyk.

We started the day off with an all-staff meeting. I was introduced and given a general Q&A by some of the reporters (why come to Kyrgyzstan?), then tried to follow the next hour of project assignments and reports - all in Kyrgyz. There were some lively debates, and some (apparently) humerous retorts, none of which I understood.

Following the meeting I was literally hauled into the staff break room, with the entire senior staff in attendance. Then Gulaiym, my mentor for the summer, pulled out a large bottle of Johnny Walker Red and a box of chocolates she purchased during a layover in London Heathrow.

It is a custom not unique to Kyrgyzstan, in fact it seems universal in my admittedly limited travels. Whenever someone returns from a trip abroad, they are expected to bring back some small treat to share with everyone. Large, or long-lasting gifts don't seem to be popular - what matters is that everyone can enjoy a little something exotic. There is certainly some parallel in American culture, but it's not as widespread or as communal. "What did you get me," with a focus on the brilliance of the gift, rather than "what did you bring us," with enthusiastic, but temporary, curiousity.

With a great flourish, the senior staff crowded around the break room table and spread the chocolates around, while Gulaiym quickly poured a shot of whiskey for all present, myself included. There certainly was no refusing such an offer, so I embarked on the first straight shot of whiskey in my life at 10:00 am on Monday, the first of June, 2009.

In a culture where Vodka shots are a casual refreshment (prohibitions on alcohol being a flexibility of Islamic law not widely enforced in Kyrgyzstan), I hoped that whiskey - albeit Scottish rather than Kentucky - might give some of them enough pause to make my timidity less apparent. When the middle-aged woman to my left finished in one gulp, my hopes dissipated. Further, when I say "shot" keep in mind these are not actually shot glasses - they're small juice glasses, filled to the brim. I sipped mine in the largest gulps I could manage without making a face. Luckily, at least one or two people found whiskey not as appetizing as vodka, so I wasn't the last one finished.

In retrospect, I don't think I'd go so far as to recommend a shot(+) of whiskey as a Monday morning tradition, but I can't help wonder how much more entertaining that staff meeting would have been if we just bumped the Whiskey Breakfast one hour earlier.

Radio Free Bishkek

Thus far, when asked what I would be doing this summer, I generally responded that I would be "working for Radio Free Europe." I said that because I had basically no further idea what I was walking into, or even what exactly Radio Azattyk (the local name for RFE/RL) was, did or anything.

Here are the confusing facts:
Radio Azattyk is part of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
From 2005-2008, Radio Azattyk broadcast RFE/RL Programming in Bishkek on both radio & Television. This was terminated by Government maneuvering in January 2009 as part of a renewed, but still not overwhelming, government crackdown on media freedom. Radio Azattyk employs several dozen reporters, including an "International" office that covers Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, and a "Youth Radio" program of about a dozen 20-somethings.

Here are the relevant details that make the above less enigmatic:
Radio Azattyk is essentially a field-office or Correspondent's desk for RFE/RL. While they previous also had a broadcast station in Bishkek that station is now closed. The majority of their work is not in broadcasting, but in content creation (journalism). They generate stories on Krygyzstan and the other Central Asian republics and wire (ok, e-mail) them back to the RFE HQ in Prague. From there, Kyrgyz-language reports are made available in Kyrgyzstan via internet, satellite, and the ubiquitous short-wave radio. English-language versions are posted on the website.

It's the history of RFE that makes this all sensible. The organization was founded in 1949 by the US Government as a means to undercut Soviet authority. Rather than having Americans try to convince the local Soviet citizens that Communism was bad, the station (and Radio Liberty, which was originally founded independently in 1953 in Europe with essentially the same mission) found refugee intellectuals who had fled a Soviet country and essentially gave them the means to transmit their greivances, in their own language, back to the country they left behind. These services operated exclusively outside the Iron Curtain, but broadcast into the USSR via shortwave radio and later targeted AM and FM radio. The exact methods - fascinating as they are - require a good bit more technical understanding of the physics and history of Radio, with which I will not presently bore you.

The operating premise of RFE & RL were that, 1) Freedom of information was inherently anti-oppression (and thus, presumably, anti-Communist), and 2) People from the region should be responsible for all news gathering and program creation as they best understood the inequities and were most-able to communicate, linguistically and culturally, with the local residents.

Compare that to Voice of America, which was founded at the beginnign of WWII and who's continuing mission is to promote a positive image of the United States abroad, usually relying on US-generated propaganda material translated into local languages by interpreters.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the now-united RFE/RL essentially moved in-country. Instead of relying on refugees, they setup offices staffed locally (without any local US "oversight" mind you). When possible, as in Kyrgyzstan from 2005-2008, local FM broadcast was established, rather than the "broadcast from afar." The prevailing pattern, then, is to have an RFE branch office in-country, generating news reports that are sent back to Prague and from there transmitted back in-country via shortwave, internet, and also satellite transmissions. In this way local news from one RFE/RL country can also be disseminated to others RFE/RL stations around the globe.

You can find quite a bit more about REF/ Radio Azattyk here.

As for my actual duty assignments, it's still rather early to tell, and it seems they're brainstorming more ways to use me. I am a complete oddity as an intern - their first ever from the United States. Since the entire purpose of the organization is the broadcast Kyrgyz news to Krygyz citizens, with a secondary mission of generating international news about Kyrgyzstan (mostly in English), I am potentially very helpful, but only in creative ways.

Some of my planned duties include English language training (as anticipated), but everyone on staff has already had at least some formal training. Everyone speaks Kyrgyz as a native tongue, though they all also know Russian and at least one other language (usually French or German). I am therefore not here to teach basic grammar (thank goodness), but mostly to help improve fluency through discussion sessions - or what in the 'biz is called "style editing."

I will also be involved with some journalism efforts, especially when interviewing foreigners about local or international issues. I have been promised a good share of work with the Youth Radio progam (basically every young person I've met in Kyrgyzstan speaks English), though I still don't know what exactly I would do.

In reality, I think they look on me as only 1/2 as an intern and 1/2 a resource. Whenever there is a language question, I am consultated. Additionally, when an opportunity comes up for me to observe an interesting, or suspicious, aspect of Kyrgyz politics, I get to tag along. This provides me plenty to write about, which is good. Because I am very long-winded.